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A great deal of contemporary social science rests on a basic, “primitive”, principle
that rational agents are motivated by a quest for marginal returns to investment of
time, money, and other resources. In this manuscript we argue that an analogue
fundamental principle guides much of modern political science, but has remained
largely implicit in the literature.
This manuscript sets out to unearth, reshape and polish this principle into what we
term a marginal return theory of politics. We then apply this theory to the study of
electioneering in Latin America, focusing on two main elements of vote seeking: the
returns of specific votes and the returns of specific voters.
We provide evidence that political parties are keenly aware of how differences in the
returns of specific votes and specific voters affect their future plans to hold on top
power. As such, these parties go out of their way to ensure that party exchanges
prioritize the right votes being cast by the right voters.
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Marginal Return Theory of Politics
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
On the 10th of May, 2011, approximately 2300 hundred Brazilian mayors
landed in Brasilia, Brazil’s capital, for a three day march. The march, called the
National Mayoral March, is in its 14th edition. During these 3 days, mayors from
all over Brazil sit down with top members of the federal government in order to dis-
cuss the advancement of regional development. Recently elected president Rousseff,
Brazil’s first female president, personally welcomes the mayors. In the latest edition
of the march, president Rousseff actually kicked off the event by giving an opening
speech.
While mayors have been warmly welcomed in Brasilia for the past five or six
editions of the march, this friendly reception has not always been the case. The first
mayoral march took place in May of 1998, when approximately one thousand mayors
came to Brasilia to demand greater attention from the federal government. At that
time the group of mayors was received by the federal military police’s shock squad,
which had been called to observe the march by then president and former political
scientist Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
To what can we attribute such a drastic change? In 14 years, mayors have
1
gone from being treated as rioters to having the red carpet rolled out them by the
federal government. While many explanations can be proffered, we believe that this
change has been a product of a change in the importance of mayors as political allies
in Brazilian politics. Twenty years ago, Brazil had just emerged from ten years of
economic instability and was just beginning to solidify its inchoate democracy. Voters
were confused and did not know who to trust or turn to. Today the economy is stable
and political parties are much stronger.
Earning a vote has become a complex business in Brazil. As parties become
stable and develop national platforms, managing the political machine becomes sig-
nificantly more difficult. Mayors, who stand at the tip of a political party’s tentacles,
have become an important tool for parties to send their messages, interact with vot-
ers and expand their political base. 20 years ago, mayors were one of many venues
through which political parties could secure votes. Many of the other options were
more attractive. Today, with most of these other venues already exhausted, mayors
have emerged as attractive allies and are being treated accordingly. While this is the
last we will hear of Brazil’s National Mayoral March in this manuscript, the march is
a great example of how changes in a political scenario makes certain groups attractive
in the eyes of political agents. Without these attractive characteristics, groups are
otherwise ignored.
In this manuscript, we set out to introduce a theory that attempts to cap-
ture this very dynamic: what is it about certain political exchanges that make them
attractive. What is it about them that make political agents turn their backs to
certain exchanges in favor of others?. The answer to that question is the essence of
our theory.
When political agents invest their resources in exchanges, they do so with an
eye on what they will get back for their investments. Exchanges require resources
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and agents want to get the most out their resources. This principle, while simple,
underscores this entire manuscript.
1.1 The Argument: Marginal Returns to Invest-
ments
Since its introduction in Political Science, the Rational Choice framework has
become a dominant paradigm in the study of political exchanges. Large bodies of
research on a wide gamut of topics have leveraged the powerful tenets of Rational
Choice in order to make piercing contributions to the discipline. Coalition building,
ideological placement, party formation, democratization, conflict resolution are just
a few of the many topics that have profited from the adoption of a Rational Choice
design.
In this manuscript, we continue within the tradition of Rational Choice. Our
goal is to contribute to the overall paradigm with a general theory of politics that, not
unlike the Rational Choice framework, is fluid enough to allow for insights in many
topics of our discipline. We name this theory the marginal return theory of politics. In
its broadest, the theory states that political agents invest their resources with an eye
on their returns. Agents favor exchanges where the marginal returns are highest, often
in detriment of exchanges whose returns are lower and despite normative expectations
about which exchanges should be prioritized. Part of our motivation for pursuing this
theory comes from a desire to identify underlining tones that connect broad topics
within our discipline even when topics being covered appear impossibly distant. As
we will demonstrate, this connecting undertone can be found in some of the most
influential works of the past half a century, even if hidden in the background. In this
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manuscript, we take concerted efforts towards unearthing this concept, discussing and
polishing it to the point where our theory can almost organically sprout out.
A driving force pushing this manuscript forward is our effort is to unearth
a theory that is powerful enough to elucidate even the most complex of political
issues, yet broad enough to be applicable to wide variety of topics. Here we focus
our efforts on the puzzle of vote seeking. Our choice to focus on this puzzle is based
on both the complexity and diversity of the subject. Votes can be thought of as the
currency of democracy. It is through votes that political parties navigate the political
system. Votes grant parties access to political institutions and allow them to become
members of legislative and executive bodies; votes also bestow parties with legitimacy.
Securing votes is a key activity of any political party, for without votes parties are
rendered pretty much breathless. Votes are also the voice of voters; they are the
universal language spoken by constituencies. The way political parties go about
securing those votes can be as diverse as the nature of political parties themselves.
As to the complexity of vote seeking, we believe it is highly complex. When competing
for votes, political parties must juggle the desires of their constituencies, the goals
of competing parties, the conflicting interests of back-bench members, the coattails
of charismatic leaders, just to name a few. As such, we believe that vote seeking
emerges as a great topic to test our theory. By leveraging the theory’s tenets to the
benefit of such a diverse and complex topic, we feel that the manuscript sets off the
theory well on its way.
Because our goal is unearth a theory that is broadly applicable, we feel it is
important to introduce this theory detached from any particular topic. To accomplish
this, we divide the manuscript into three main parts. Part I is devoted to introducing
and developing the theoretical framework that powers the entire manuscript. This is
accomplished through a discussion of several influential works of our discipline. As
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we will show, the driving concept behind out theory is present, even if implicitly, in
most of these influential works. Our focus on vote seeking is not introduced until part
II, when we take our theory, previously introduced in its broadest form and almost
topic free and apply it the scope of vote seeking. We purposely separate these two
parts in order to explicitly demonstrate how to take the theory in its broadest form
and shape it to fit a topic a choice. While our topic of choice might not be of interest
to everyone, by distinctively separating the theory from the topic, we hope that those
disinterested in the topic can still leverage the power of the theory in other topics
that they find interesting or suitable. Part III repeats the process, taking the theory
in part I and shaping it to address a distinct angle of vote seeking. The topic of choice
in parts II and III is vote seeking, but it is addressed from different perspectives and
therefore belongs in separate parts.
As to our choice to separate our approach to vote seeking in two distinct
parts, we do so because we feel that two main dimensions addressed here are often
conflated together. These two dimensions relate to voter characteristics and actual
vote characteristics. Votes have to be casted by voters and we recognize that these
two dimensions are inherently inextricable. We show that examining them separately
is extremely insightful even if a little counterintuitive at first. To ensure that we can
separate these two dimensions well, we give each dimension its own part within the
manuscript.
In part II, we show that certain votes have specific qualities that speak to their
ability to deliver actual seats. These qualities, which are particular to certain votes,
are often non-transferable. By that we mean that political parties cannot turn their
backs to these specific votes and simply attempt to seek other ones to replace them.
These qualities make these votes very attractive and they do not necessarily relate to
the voter who happens to be casting it. We are able to leverage our marginal return
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theory of politics to conceptualize these qualities. We then design a test and provide
ample evidence that political parties recognize and go out of their way to secure these
particular types of votes.
In part III the manuscript tackles the other dimension of vote seeking: the
actual voter. As we did in part II with reference to votes, in part III we highlight
that voters themselves have specific qualities that make them very attractive. In the
case of the voter, these qualities relate to persuasion. Voters that demand ample
resources in order to be persuaded to deliver their support are less attractive than
those who require a great deal less. In the same vein as in part II, part III leverages
the marginal return theory of politics introduced in part I to conceptualize these
qualities. We provide evidence that political parties also recognize these qualities and
systematically chase after voters espousing them.
1.2 The Structure: Looking Ahead
The main goal of this initial chapter is to introduce the manuscript. It high-
lights this author’s goal of developing a general theory that can not only power this
manuscript, but also be applied to other topics. We also discussed the overall three
part structure of the manuscript. Part I’s overall goal is to develop the theory, while
parts II and III apply the theory to different dimensions of vote seeking.
Chapter 2 begins to introduce our marginal return theory of politics. It does
so by reviewing several influential works in the discipline, starting from Downs’s Eco-
nomic Theory of Democracy. In that chapter, our goal is to show that the principle
that anchors our theory has been an underlining force in many works of the discipline.
While authors have not given the concept the degree of attention that we do in this
manuscript, by discussing the findings and implications of these works, the chapter
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clearly shows that the concept itself is present.
It is only in chapter 3 that the theory is fully introduced. While chapter 2
highlights the presence of the concept, it is in chapter 3 that the theory takes shape.
The chapter discusses the theory’s main foundational concept, with concerted efforts
to ensure that the theory remains in its most abstract and broad form. The chapter
concludes part I of the manuscript.
Chapter 4 introduces part II of the manuscript. The chapter’s main goal is to
introduce the topic of vote seeking. It is only at this point that we begin to discuss
the manuscript’s substantive topic. An important part of the chapter is to walk the
reader through the process of taking the theory in its broad and general form and
leverage it within the context of vote seeking. Once the theory is adapted to fit our
topic, we introduce a mathematical algorithm that allows us to translate the concep-
tual framework into an observable proxy. At that point, we are able to search for
measures that speak to these concepts and an empirical test begins to take shape.
Chapter 5 introduces the cases that make up the empirical test for part II. It
discusses the adoption of poverty alleviation and development programs as an appro-
priate test. Beyond the discussion of why we should use these programs, the chapter
also introduces the eight programs that we use. Each program is introduced, with
special attention to program goals, types of resources delivered and pressure points
that are particularly susceptible to political manipulation.
Chapter 6 concludes part II of the manuscript with a discussion of the oper-
ationalization of the data and the results of the statistical estimators. Results are
discussed with an eye on how they support our hypotheses as well as how the strate-
gies that parties adopt impact the redistribution of resources on the ground.
Chapter 7 introduces part III, the final part of this manuscript. This chapter
is similar to chapter 4 in that its main goal is to leverage our marginal return theory
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of politics within the realm of vote seeking. The main difference is that there the
focus moves away from the vote itself and is concentrated on the specific qualities
that are displayed by certain voters. After addressing the importance of separating
voter qualities from vote qualities, the chapter introduces a typology of voters that
is based on how they respond to a party’s attempt to persuade them.
Chapter 8 introduces the case we use for the empirical test. This chapter in-
troduces the single case that is going to be used: The distribution of FONCODES
resources in mayoral races in Peru. The chapter discusses why we believe this is an
appropriate test given the many challenges that political parties in Peru have faced
since the falling of Fujimori’s rule.
Chapter 9 addresses the challenges behind the empirical test for part III. Af-
ter discussing the operationalization of variables and their expected relationships, the
chapter introduces the statistical estimator and discusses the results. Once again, at-
tention is given not only to how results provide evidence to our hypotheses, but also
how the distribution of FONCODES is affected by the strategies that are pursued by
political parties.
Chapter 10 concludes this manuscript with a discussion of some of the pitfalls
we have encountered, as well as challenges that future research will face.
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Chapter 2
Influential Works
The goal of this manuscript is to introduce a broadly applicable theory. It
does so by leveraging insight from spatial modeling works within the Rational Choice
approach, a framework that has been dominant in Political Science. The insight we
draw from spatial models is of two orders. The first order is the direct and more
obvious one, which is the framework itself, its main findings and assumptions. The
second order insight is not as direct, relating to the underlining motivations that are
ascribed to the political actors of these spatial models. In this chapter, we focus
our attention on revising the some of the most influential works that precede the
efforts made here. In the next chapter, we will turn our focus to the second order
insights, which are developed into the overarching theoretical motivation that powers
the entire manuscript. In its substantive chapters, introduced in parts II and III, the
manuscript speaks to the literature on vote seeking electoral strategies.
To place the manuscript within its corresponding body of work, this chapter
reviews the literature on electoral strategies, starting with Downs (1957); arguably
modern Political Science’s most prominent study of electoral strategies. After dis-
cussing the Downsian model, its assumptions and main predictions, I review the works
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that addressed the model in attempts to elucidate, test and or expand it.
2.1 The Quintessential Downsian Model
The study of electoral strategies to maximize votes is by no means new to
Political Science. Spatial modeling, the leading research paradigm in the study of
electoral and legislative politics, is mainly concerned with identifying strategies that
deliver high utility vote shares to political actors. High utility vote shares being those
that deliver seats. Political actors can be at the aggregate level of the party or at the
individual level of the candidate.
Arguably no Political Science theory has gotten as much mileage as the median
voter theorem, which is well depicted by Downs (1957). Downs’ quintessential model
consists of two parties running for a single seat in a race where all voters must vote
for the candidate they believe will best represent their interests. An overly simplistic
reduction of Downs’ perhaps most famous prediction is that two candidates running
for a single seat in will converge to the median of the policy spectrum. This prediction
is of tremendous importance to politics, for it suggests the emergence of what Grofman
(2004) later termed the “tweedledum & tweedledee” of politics, which are parties that
are practically indiscernible from one another in the eyes of the voter. In order
to appear attractive to the largest possible audience, parties will strip themselves
of characteristics that can make it discernible from its competitors. When parties
running from office are exactly the same, the whole concept of choice is lost as voters
are forced to pick between identical parties. A choice between identical options is no
choice at all.
Downs’ (1957) model finds its origin in Hotelling’s 1929 theory of stable points
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of competition. Downs adapts Hotelling’s original model, following a suggestion made
by Hotelling himself that the model could be used to explain political phenomena.
In politics it [the model] is strikingly exemplified. The competition for
votes between the Republican and Democratic parties does not lead to
a clear drawing of issues, an adoption of two strongly contrasted posi-
tions between which the voter may choose. Instead, each party strives
to make its platform as much like the others as possible. Any radical
departure would lose many votes, even though it might lead to stronger
commendation of the party by some who would vote for it anyhow. Each
candidate pussyfoots, replies ambiguously to questions, refuses to take a
definite stand in any controversy for fear of losing votes. Real differences,
if they ever exist, fade gradually with time though the issues may be as
important as ever. (Hotelling, 1929-54).
The original model depicts buyers of a commodity uniformly distributed along a
street, which Hotelling calls Main Street. Buyers with an inelastic demand for a
product are indifferent between sellers and care only for price and transportation
costs. Results of the model suggest that businesses will place themselves next to one
another, on the center of the street and with identical prices. By doing so, they will
minimize buyer’s distance-related costs to all buyers and consequently increase their
chances of securing their largest possible market share.
Downs’ model basically consists of translating Hotelling’s to the political realm.
He achieves this by perceiving of political agents (be them parties or candidates) as
the sellers, and buyers as the voters. Hotelling’s Main Street becomes the political
ideology spectrum. Voters are distributed along the political spectrum much like
buyers are distributed along Main Street. Hotelling’s buyers that live in the “hinter-
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land” become Downs’ extreme voters. The costs of transportation become the costs
of compromise. Much like the stores that have to place themselves somewhere along
Main Street, political agents will have to place themselves somewhere in the political
spectrum. Voters will incur the costs of voting for candidates that are far from their
ideal points just like buyers are forced to incur the transportation costs that come
from shopping in stores that are far from their homes. Larger distances between buyer
and store mean larger transportation costs just like larger distances between voter
and candidate mean larger compromise costs. Candidates behave just like stores in
that they want to secure the largest possible share of sales, which in their case are
votes.
Once this translation is complete, the same results suggested by Hotteling’s
(1929) original model hold. Political agents will place themselves in the middle of
the political spectrum (converge on location) and spouse the same issues (converge
on price). This oversimplified depiction of (both) models, while worthwhile for illus-
trative purposes, does not address the many necessary conditions that need to hold
for this convergence outcome to materialize.
Stokes (1963) identifies the axioms of unidimensionality, fixed structure, or-
dered dimensions and common reference as the four key points that sustain conver-
gence and the sole Nash equilibrium. Stokes (1963) exposes the fragility of the model
by arguing that these axioms, which are fine for Hotelling’s market competition pur-
poses, cannot be so easily translated into the political realm. Grofman (2004) later
meticulously articulates these axioms to comprise of what he perceives as twelve nec-
essary assumptions. Clearly articulated or otherwise, interpretations of these twelve
assumptions have spawned countless papers addressing the robustness of convergence
as a stable equilibrium.
It is worth noting that Black (1958) arrives at results that are very similar to
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Downs, only with a greater emphasis on legislative committees. The main assump-
tions, such as unidimensionality and single peaked preferences are also essential to
Black’s findings. For reasons we suspect related to publication date, Downs is cred-
ited as the quintessential spatial model in Political Science. See Plott (1967) and
Hinich (1972 and 1973) for reviews of Black’s (1958) model.
2.1.1 Applicability of Spatial Modeling
Several works have addressed Downs’ model, some with a pure focus on the
assumptions that it requires. Davis et al 1970 addresses unidimensionality and the
problems that arise when models attempt to deal with the problem of social choices
spanning from individual preferences, as articulated by Arrow (1963). The authors
reject Downs’s (1957) and his brand of spatial modeling as inadequate on the grounds
of real life application. “If we assume that parties and candidates waltz annually be-
fore a blind audience,[...] than spatial analysis is not a requisite for understanding
this waltz” (Davis et al 1970-429). This rejection reflects what the authors perceive
to be an overly simplistic evaluation of the electoral process. Nothing is gained by
examining the political process in a spatial way if the model does not allow voters to
observe movements in said space.
Calvert (1985) takes a more welcoming approach to spatial modeling, relaxing
the core assumptions of information uncertainty and office seeking. Calvert argues
that convergence to the median still occurs even if the office seeking assumption is
retracted in favor of policy seeking parties. Converge also occurs when candidates are
uncertain about how voters will respond to their bids for votes. Convergence only fails
when both of these core assumptions fail to hold. Spatial modeling and the search
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for equilibrium, argue Calvert, are still a worthwhile way to pursue an understanding
of the electoral competition process.
These papers mainly focus on the applicability of spatial modeling as a viable
alternative to the study of electoral competition. A great deal of efforts is spent
attacking or justifying the models and their ability to teach us something about real
life politics. Regardless of what the model can or cannot teach us, one of the model’s
indelible contributions is to solidify spatial modeling as a potent tool for understand-
ing electoral and legislative processes. Even when authors reject a pure Downsian
model by adding parameters to it, the fact that they continue to operate within the
spatial paradigm attests to the strength of this paradigm.
In their critiques and additions to the model, authors recognize that electoral
processes are inherently complex. However, there is little discussion of how varied
they are in their nature. The Downsian model mainly deals with two party races for
a single seat. While a lot of discussion addresses whether or not the Downsian model
variations and their assumptions are capable of explaining these races, no discussion
so far has addresses whether or not these races are the only type or even the most
frequent type of races we observe. Even if spatial modeling is the most appropriate
paradigm to study electoral processes, significantly less attention has been paid to
which types of electoral processes we should be interested in.
2.1.2 Uncertainty, Office vs. Policy Seeking
Some of the harshest criticisms faced by the Downsian model relate to two of
its important assumptions: that agents are purely office seeking and that voters can
easily place candidates within the policy spectrum.
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Enelow and Hinich (1984) concerns mirror Davis et al 1970. Spatial model-
ing, they argue, must allow for variation in the goals of political agents (i.e. office
versus policy seeking) as well as incorporate the characteristics of the political agents
that are used by the voters when making their decisions. The concern with allowing
for variation in the goals of political agents is also echoed by Wittman (1983), who
introduces what he terms a synthesis model. This model accounts for a synthesis of
candidate goals, which can be office seeking, policy seeking or a synthesis of both.
Convergence to the median is only an equilibrium when policy seeking candidates
spouse policy preferences that are central. In other words, candidates will converge
to the center if the center is their ideal point, but will not do so if they spouse non-
centrist preferences.
Placing candidates along the policy spectrum relates to information gather-
ing costs, or in other words: uncertainty. Downs (1957) assumes that voters can
readily place candidates within the spectrum and therefore make the necessary party
differential calculations. Building on the concept of lotteries introduced by Zeck-
hauser (1969), Shepsle (1972) tests convergence while endogenizing uncertainty into
the model. The idea of a lottery is that voters vote based on an expectation of the
party’s position. Parties can take advantage of the way voters build this expectation
by taking a range of positions within a single issue, so long as their expected position
coincides with the median voter. Results suggest that convergence is still a dominant
strategy, but convergence to the expected median is preferred to convergence to the
actual median.
Page (1976) adds to lottery-based equilibria by introducing what he terms
emphasis-allocation strategies. Equilibrium for this model, which operates in multidi-
mensional issues, consists of two actions. When it comes to their positions, candidates
take solid stances on single peaked (non-controversial) issues and only take lottery
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positions in controversial (bimodal) issues. Emphasis is placed on non-controversial
issues, while controversial issues are deemphasized.
Enelow and Hinich (1981) address uncertainty by adding an additional param-
eter to the candidate positioning. Their model accounts for candidate positioning by
ways of two parameters: a position parameter and a variance parameter. Candidates
that are difficult to place have larger variance parameters, capturing the concept of
uncertainty and the costs involved with collecting and processing candidate related
information. Voting decisions are made based on these two parameters and results
show that voters will favor non-central candidates over central ones so long as non-
central candidates have small variances. Results suggest that convergence becomes a
dominant strategy only if it can be pursued credibly.
Weisberg and Fiorina (1980) accuse spatial modeling research that followed
Downs to be deceptively organized. The Downsian impetus to focus on parsimony
pushed research to incorporate uncertainty into its models without carefully exam-
ining what uncertainty really entails. The authors reject simple parameters that
can account for uncertainty in models, such as position lotteries. At a minimum,
they argue, politicians produce uncertainty by ways of equivocation or vagueness.
Equivocation, which consists of candidates taking different positions over the same
issue, results in voters misplacing the candidate conditional on what they have heard.
Vagueness, which consists of candidates not taking any position over issues, results in
voters placing candidates within a range of possible positions. These types of uncer-
tainty are inherently different and voters behave differently depending on what kind
of uncertainty they believe to be dealing with. To tackle this, Weisberg and Fiorina
suggest that politicians need to know not only what kind of uncertainty they wish to
produce, but also how they are being perceived by their voters.
These works advanced the applicability of the Downsian model and as a con-
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sequence solidified spatial modeling as the leading research paradigm in Political
Science. While efforts to increase the breath and applicability of the models are un-
deniable, all of the aforementioned research has limited itself to single seat two party
races. Based on these works, we learn little about incentives and strategies across
districts and between multiple competitors.
2.1.3 Multi Constituency Races
Another criticism of Downs is that it trivially reduces races to a single con-
stituency, defining it as a single constituency model (henceforth SCM). Even if the
focus is on a single race, i.e. the race for the national executive elected by the popular
vote, the single constituency reduction is artificial because races truly start with pri-
maries or candidate selection rounds. These previous stages are likely to have smaller
electorates with narrower and non-centrist ideologies.
Aranson and Ordeshook (1972) characterize this difference in electorates as
a dilemma that candidates have to face. They argue that candidates are forced to
choose between converging to the median of the (s)electorate in the candidate selec-
tion stage or to converge to the median of the entire electorate. By converging to
the median of the (s)electorate at the candidate selection stage, a candidate maxi-
mizes its chances of earning the nomination, which is a prerequisite for winning the
actual election. However, this hurts its chances at the election because it precludes
convergence to the median of the entire electorate. On the other hand, by converging
to the median of the entire electorate, the candidate increases its chances of winning
the overall election but risks losing the nomination to the candidate that converges
to the median of the primary. Aranson and Ordeshook (1972) reject convergence to
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the median voter for a strategy that places candidates somewhere in between the
electorate’s median voter and the primary’s median. It is important to highlight that
while convergence to the median voter is rejected, it is rejected on account of other
possible convergence points.
Aldrich (1983) rejects convergence as the Nash equilibrium adopting a similar
premise to Aranson and Ordeshook (1972) and endogenizing the costs incurred by
party activists. In the model the activists’ support is a function of the activists’ costs
and benefits. Benefits decrease as the party/candidate’s ideology moves away from
the activist’s ideal point. Results show that when the electorate’s median is too far
from the median activist, the activist’s costs outweigh their benefit and they will
simply withhold support. Convergence to the electorate median ceases to be Nash
because it ultimately erodes the party’s support base.
Robertson (1976) highlights that the Downsian model is inappropriate to elu-
cidate the behavior of a party looking to secure a majority of seats in an assembly
type of body, such as the Labor and Conservative parties in Britain or the Republi-
can and Democratic parties in the United States. The Downsian model can be seen
as appropriate by way of being separately applied to each individual constituency,
as suggested by Aranson and Ordeshook (1972); when candidates converge to their
temporal median. Robertson rejects this juxtaposed Downsian model because he ar-
gues it would invite uncertainty issues that would eventually hurt the party’s chances,
especially if the temporal aspect is concurrent1. Uncertainty would manifest itself as
each individual candidate would converge to its local median, leading the party to be
ideologically spread across the spectrum and therefore risk being perceived as unable
1In Aranson and Ordeshook (1972), the races are not concurrent and candidates could potentially
converge to the primary median, only to converge to the national median once the nomination was
secured. With multiple concurrent races, as examined by Robertson (1976), this move becomes
impossible
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to enact one specific policy.
Austen-Smith (1981 introduces a model that addresses some of Robertson’s
(1976) concerns. When it comes to the candidate’s freedom to converge to its local
median, the model is the opposite of the juxtaposed Downsian model in that candi-
dates in each district are committed to their party’s national ideology and therefore
cannot simply converge to their local median unless such move were beneficial to their
party’s overall performance. Results suggest that equilibria exist when two parties are
attempting to maximize their winning seats. This existence, argues Austen-Smith, is
mostly mathematical and it is unlikely to be observed in real political settings. In an
alternative model where candidates are given some flexibility over their ideological
position vis-a-vis their party’s, Austen-Smith (1984) finds that two parties running in
multiple districts will converge to the national median voter, while candidate policies
will converge to some compromise between the national and its respective local me-
dian. See Austen-Smith (1996) for a review of the challenges that multi-constituency
models must address.
These papers add further knowledge to our understanding of electoral races by
accounting for incentives that arise when parties need to contemplate multiple posi-
tions, a common aspect of electoral strategies for legislative seats. Their contribution
is undeniable but however still limited, as these models are restricted to two party
races and teach us little about multi party competition.
2.1.4 Multi Party Races
Concerned with the limitations that the two-party assumption placed on the
Downsian model, researchers set out to test equilibria once this assumption was re-
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laxed. Research on multi party races expressed itself in two veins. The first vein
addresses multi candidate entries in single seat races.
Eaton and Lipsey (1975) are interested in the understanding if convergence
to the median is still a Nash equilibrium when multiple agents are present in the
model. Their proposed multi agent model (there are four versions) does not account
for the origin or strength of the agents in the game, simply checking for whether
a system that has 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 exogenously determined agents creates incentives
for agents to downplay their differences. Their findings suggest that other equilibria
exist in addition to the median point. Agents faced with multiple competitors have
incentives to cater to segments of the electorate. There is still an incentive to appear
indiscernible from competition that is searching for equal segments of the consumers.
The principal of minimum differentiation (which states that there will be no difference
between the products offered in a single market) itself is not entirely discarded, it
simply becomes localized. While this paper is directed to Hotelling (1929) more than
to Downs (1957), it impacts Political Science spatial modeling by suggesting that
convergence as a Nash equilibrium, and its resulting shrinking of options, is a point
constructed on fragile assumptions. Once more agents are introduced, convergence
fails.
Palfrey (1984) also rejects the Downsian two party restriction as unrealistic.
While the author accepts that two party systems exist, he is interested in under-
standing why are the two parties that populate the model so dominant over all other
parties. In other words, if any party that places itself close the median voter has
a chance at the seat, why don’t third parties enter races? Palfrey (1984) models
third party entrance conditional on the placement of two existing dominant parties.
Findings indicate that convergence to the median invites the entrance of otherwise
uncompetitive third parties and, on that account, is not a Nash equilibrium. Weber
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(1992) characterizes Palfrey’s (1984) findings as a special case of a more complex
model that is able to deal with a larger class of single peak voter distributions.
Feddersen, Sened and Wright (1990) models candidate entry when voters are
allowed to vote strategically and maximize utility over policy outcome (strategic vot-
ing) as opposed to candidate ideological proximity (sincere voting). Their findings
indicate that third parties that choose to enter the race will do so by placing them-
selves over the median voter. Voters that vote sincerely irrespective of the chances
that their candidates will win a seat create incentives for third parties not to enter,
as there is no position in the ideological spectrum that can give this entering third
party a chance at winning the seat (Brams and Straffin, 1982).
These papers have addressed the issue of multiple candidates but retain the
single winner aspect of the electoral race. They contribute to our understanding of
multi party races but fall short of contemplating an important issue of multi party
races, which is that multiple parties are unlikely to emerge in a single member dis-
trict (henceforth SMD). The second vein of multi party research tackles the issue of
multi candidate entry in models with more than one seat winner. Shepsle and Cohen
(1990-31) point out that some multi candidate races, such as those in proportional
representation, don’t necessarily punish candidates that receive fewer votes than the
plurality vote getter. When that is the case, securing a costly plurality of the votes
is no longer the only game in town.
Greenberg and Weber (1985) model candidate entry strategies given the elec-
toral rules that regulate races. Given a fixed standard method, where all candidates
that earn a minimum quota of votes are awarded a seat, results suggest that there
exists an equilibrium where all candidates currently in the race will place themselves
in specific (different) points of the policy spectrum. In this equilibrium, candidates
secure a chance at a seat as well as create an incentive for no other agent that is not
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currently in the race to enter.
Greenberg and Shepsle (1987) introduce a model that also changes the goals
of the candidates, with a focus on a fixed-number method type of legislature, which
is basically one with a fixed number of seats2 Their results show that given this type
of electoral rewards, there is no equilibrium that will incentivize agents to stay away
from the electoral races, despite the position of the dominant parties already in the
race. Without such equilibrium, argue the authors, entry becomes open to whoever
is willing to bear the costs.
In a series of papers, Cox (1984, 1984c, 1985, 1987) investigates multi candi-
date centrist strategies in different types of electoral rules that yield multiple winners.
Cox (1984) finds that two seat three candidate races create a strong incentive for vot-
ers to behave strategically. As for the candidate’s strategies in these systems, Cox
(1984c) finds that centrist strategies are Nash when three candidates are running,
and actual convergence to the median is Nash if a fourth candidate enters the race.
Centrist strategies are also found for candidates running in approval-voting systems
(Cox, 1985). Cox (1987) shows that in general terms, multi candidate models with
multiple office seeking winners create incentives to converge to the median, or at least
to adopt centrist strategies, in all but plurality rule methods.
The expansion of spatial models in attempts to include multi candidate races
has produced important findings. It tackles an important issue that is essential if we
wish to understand the type of legislative elections that go on across Latin Amer-
ica, Continental Europe and parts of the democratized Asia and Africa. However, it
suffers from two limitations. This first limitation has already been discussed: single
2Unlike the standard quota type of legislature, which awards as many seats as candidates who
manage to secure the quota of seats. An example of such type of unlikely legislature is the German
Reichstag during the Weimar period.
For a discussion see Hoag and Hallett (1926).
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constituency models. While researchers did take the first step into multi candidate
races, they remained within the realm of the single constituency model(SCM). The
choice to remain within SCM is warranted for it is important to develop a good
understanding of what strategies look like in a single district before we can begin
to study them across districts. That being said, the move to a multi constituency
model (henceforth MCM) is inevitably necessary if researchers wish to understand
multi party competition in applicable terms. A concerted effort to develop this un-
derstanding is introduced in part II of this manuscript.
The second limitation relates to how interchangeable parties and candidates
can be when it comes to assuming the role of a model’s political agent. To a great
extent, the political agent in the overwhelming majority of the models reviewed here
can go from being the party to being the individual candidate quite freely. In other
words, the models perform equally well to predict either the party’s or the individual
candidate’s behavior. This is owed to the restriction that political agents are limited
to earning a single seat. Even in models with multiple winners, each winner is limited
to a single seat.
While this distinction may appear trivial, it actually impacts strategies at the
party level. Consider, for example, one of three candidates running for two seats.
When candidates are limited to a single seat, candidates should be indifferent be-
tween outcomes where they rank first and outcomes where they rank second. This is
because they are concerned with earning a single seat and either outcome will deliver
that. However, if we lift the one seat per contender restriction and allow parties to
win multiple seats in a single district, then parties would not have the same indif-
ferences. An entirely new preference profile would have to be drawn, where a party
would prefer ranking first and second to anything else (it would secure both seats),
being only indifferent between first and third and second and third (it would secure
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a single seat in both cases).
2.2 Conclusion: The Downsian Heritage of Elec-
toral Competition
As we have shown above, the Downsian model spawned hundreds of works
that speak to its assumptions, its limitations, its applications and its results. Despite
the controversy behind the model, the fact that so much energy was put towards the
dissection of its components is in itself a testament to the importance of the model.
Ultimately, the heritage that comes out of this research agenda is that electoral com-
petition creates a plethora of incentives. These incentives either tell parties to switch
positions or to stay put, to enter or not to enter a race, to favor a small or a large
group, to take stands on certain issues while avoiding others. All of these are predic-
tors that should be taken into account when devising optimal strategies.
Much of the criticism that has befallen Downs relates to the models failure
to incorporate all of this elements. We join the bandwagon of criticism when we
say that not enough focus has been placed towards understanding these incentives in
multi seat races. We recognize that in putting a concerted effort towards advancing
knowledge in that direction, we fall prey to the same criticism. In our efforts put
forth in this manuscript, we too fail to incorporate all of these incentives into our
study. By examining multi seat races, a new set of incentives emerges and it would
be practically impossible to address them while still accounting for a multitude of
contenting incentives that come attached to the model. Our choice to leave these
incentives out of the framework is merely due to a concern with keeping this project
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within executable goals and by no means suggests that be believe the incentives left
out do not play a role here.
In this chapter, we have surveyed one of modern Political Science’s most in-
fluential works. This model set the standards for the study of electoral competition
for decades and it continues to influence current work as we speak. What we can
notice right away is that a brief perusal of the model unearths several complicated
issues that speak directly to the relevance and results of the model. What is not so
obvious is the common ground that unites the overwhelming majority of the criticism
that follows the model. This common ground, which speaks to the return to efforts
invested in the race, becomes the steam that powers this entire manuscript and is
addressed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
A Marginal Returns Theory of
Politics
3.1 Putting the Pieces Together
As argued in the previous chapter, very few political science theories have got-
ten as much mileage in our discipline as the median voter theorem [MVT]. The MVT
was criticized for the assumptions needed to secure the result, but was later found to
be robust to relaxations of many of these assumptions. While criticism towards the
MVT came from multiple angles, they shared the concept of returns to investment,
a concept that we leverage in this manuscript.
Page (1976) criticizes the MVT for assuming a single issue dimension. Af-
ter introducing multiple dimensions to the MVT, he finds that political agents will
emphasize non-controversial issues over controversial ones. This emphasis on non-
controversial issues is due to low returns coming from multi modal distributions:
while taking a position at one of the modes is likely to secure votes from voters close
to that mode, it is likely to alienate voters closer to other modes. In other words,
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multi modal (controversial) issues have lower returns to position taking than do uni-
modal (non-controversial) ones.
Aranson and Ordeshook (1972) criticized the MVT for failing to account for
the multiple stages of an election cycle, from primary to actual election. While returns
are highest at the median, political agents must first earn support from primary elec-
tion voters, whose median might differ from the election median. A similar criticism
is voiced by Robertson (1976), who argues that the makeup of a national legislative
body is often a product of multiple district elections. In this case, each district can
have its own median, which may or may not be the same as the national median.
The underlining theme behind the two pieces of criticism is that returns from plac-
ing oneself at the median are unduly perceived as the highest. In fact, returns from
placing oneself either at the median of the district or at the median of the primary
voter pool are higher in the sense that they guarantee entrance to the next round.
Aldrich’s (1983) criticism, not unlike Aranson and Ordeshook (1972), also
attacks the MVT for not accounting for the negative returns attached to placing
oneself on the median. More specifically, Aldrich argues that while sitting at the
median might earn an upcoming election, the dilution of party ideological positions
compromises the party’s core support coming from activists. Austen-Smith’s (1981)
criticism, which accounts for costs to party label, embodies similar concerns. Both
of these pieces of criticism can be worded as a cautionary reminder that long term
returns from placing oneself in the median are not nearly as large as suggested by the
MVT. When costs are accounted for, returns become drastically less attractive.
While the criticism towards the MVT was not limited to multiple races, criti-
cism stemming from other concerns also showed a similar skepticism of the median’s
supposedly high returns. Palfrey (1984) was an early critic of the MVT’s 2 party
narrow focus. He argues that by rushing to the median, parties become indistin-
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guishable and therefore invite the entrance of other equally indistinguishable parties.
These new parties, argue Palfrey, can place themselves in the median and become
equally competitive right away. His argument highlights that additional entry into
the race lowers the returns from placing oneself in the median.
Greenberg and Weber (1985) and later Greenberg and Shepsle (1987) criticize
the MVT for not accounting for multi seat races. They argued that quota systems
create incentives for positioning beyond the median because quotas award seats to
more parties, often with smaller voter shares. In other words, these systems increase
the returns of smaller vote shares.
General Marginal Return Theory: Beyond MVT
The trend we hope to have highlighted is that political agents are incredibly
sensitive to the returns to their political investments. While political action is in-
credibly trivialized in MVT type models, in reality we should recognize that there are
significant costs associated with all of the aforementioned issues, from entering races
to creating and maintaining a party label to moving from one ideological point to
another all the while maintaining activist support. We recognize that endogenizing
every plausible cost can quickly bring a research agenda to halt and it is not what we
suggest here. We merely intend to highlight that as illustrated by the critics of MVT,
political actors are incredibly sensitive to the returns to their political choices and
once we account for these returns more carefully, we see that they are not so quick
to run to the median of the spectrum. They might instead choose to sit out a race,
cater to less central voters or local voters and so on. It is based on this insight that
we argue that a general marginal return theory of politics begins to emerge. This
theory, whose elegance stems directly from its simplicity, states that political actors
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will invest their resources based on the returns to their political investment.
It is also worth highlighting that this insight is not limited to MVT and its
critics. Down’s influential work was closely followed by Riker’s (1962) equally influ-
ential “Political Theory of Coalitions”. Riker argued that coalitions are formed with
an eye on the payoffs that coalition members reap from being in power. Given the
constant sum nature of the game, more members mean fewer benefits for each mem-
ber. Riker’s celebrated “size principle” states that coalitions will be just big enough
to reach a majority: any smaller and they are vulnerable, any bigger and they will
be dividing the pie inefficiently. Three decades later, Sened (1996) showed that coali-
tions could be stable enough even if they enjoy the support of less than a majority,
when considerable ideological differences keep other parties from challenging these
coalitions.
Here, our incipient marginal return theory rears its head again, and explains
the phenomenon of minority coalitions. The formator may stop well short of secur-
ing majority support to her coalition when a minority government is expected to be
stable due to ideological disagreements among opposition parties that may seek to
overturn it(Strom, 1990). Under these conditions, the marginal returns of sharing
government perks with additional partners quickly diminish. Returns drop because
the opposition’s marginal costs from coming together rise proportionally to their lev-
els of disagreement. In the case of minority coalitions, the theory becomes strikingly
powerful. Costs from building a coalition with certain opposition members are so pro-
hibitive that they swamp any possible returns that would come from actually taking
government, which then essentially becomes up for grabs by minority coalitions.
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) develop a model of coalition building in systems
where party loyalty is not strong enough to deliver block votes. When parties can-
not keep party members from deviating off the party line, it is reasonable to assume
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that a coalition will have to be built by securing one vote at a time. They use a
non-cooperative framework to analyze these events, where each legislator is only con-
cerned with selfish benefits. Despite the contrast to Riker’s cooperative framework
and the individual legislator’s heightened power in this model, Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) remain true to the premise that coalition bargaining is done always with one
concern: building a coalition that is big enough to pass bills and no bigger. Since
ideology does not play a role in their model, the proposer of a bill will secure up to
and never more than the strictly smallest possible majority of legislators. In light
of the framework introduced here, any legislator beyond this narrow majority will
not get any payments for supporting the bill because marginal returns to securing an
additional legislator have diminished to zero.
Schofield and Sened (2006) examine coalition formation in proportional repre-
sentation electoral systems at a very high theoretical and empirical resolution. The
work affords the reader insight on strategies pursued in the multiple stages of coali-
tion formation, from vote seeking to portfolio negotiation. Building on findings from
a five decade long literature, one of the main findings of Schofield and Sened (2006)
is that parties move about the ideological space not simply with an eye on how many
votes they can get, but also how many votes they might leave behind when they
move. As parties move around to become closer to certain voters, they become vul-
nerable to other parties by neglecting the voters from whom they move away. This
suggests a ballet of party movements that are carefully rehearsed to ensure that the
benefit of moving is actually positive. Parties graciously move around this space until
they reach a point where no party can gain any additional votes by moving in any
direction, given the positions of all the other parties to the dance. The parties may
want to invest further resources to gain more votes but the marginal benefit of these
investments has diminished to zero. This is analogue to a producer who is willing
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to produce more but has no buyers to sell his product to given the competition. At
that equilibrium point the marginal returns have diminished to zero as changing the
parameters of the political product by changing the political message is no longer
going to increase the market or vote share.
Cox and McCubbins (1986) developed a theory of party strategies that pre-
cedes our theoretical aspirations here. Theorem one (Cox and McCubbins, 1986: 375)
explicitly recognizes that a party will redistribute scarce resources with an eye on the
returns to delivered resources, moving from one group to another once a group’s rate
of return falls below that of the other groups. The choice to favor swing, support or
opposition groups is a function of the risk involved with attempting to reach each of
these groups. Ultimately, by accounting for a party’s level of risk averseness and each
group’s response to delivered goods, a party can estimate the overall return of each
group and redistribute accordingly.
3.2 Conclusion
For more than half a century, political science tip-toed around this marginal
return theory of politics without ever concluding the general application of the the-
ory to the study of politics. This may be due to a focus limited to understanding
single member district dynamics, or bargaining in legislatures with weak parties or
any other specific political phenomenon, or the unwarranted focus on the disagree-
ment over whether the cooperative or the non-cooperative framework best serves the
rigorous, analytical, approach to the study of politics. Whatever the case may be,
all these influential works shared a single unifying general theory of politics: political
agents labor to increase political support to the party or coalition they build until the
marginal return to their effort diminishes. A general political equilibrium occurs when
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all relevant players have reached the diminishing return point.
Whether the works discussed here dealt with the value of an additional vote
(Downs, 1957; Black 1958; Schofield and Sened, 2006), the value of an additional
coalition partner (Riker, 1962; Sened, 1995, 1996), the value of the support from an
additional legislator (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989), or the return for an additional unit
of resource delivered to a group (Cox and McCubbins, 1986), this additional unit was
only pursued to the extent that it had a marginal benefit that exceeds the marginal
cost of getting this unit. If the vote from an additional legislator does not increase
the probability that a bill will pass, this additional legislator will not be courted. The
same is true for an additional vote in a proportional rule electoral campaign, an ad-
ditional party in a coalition building effort or an additional group in a redistribution
scheme. The claim that political maneuvering, generally speaking, is guided by the
marginal return that this maneuvering may bring about is the overall insight that
unifies most of the literature we surveyed above and guides our contribution in this
manuscript.
We recognize that while we have surveyed a limited part of a very broad litera-
ture, we nonetheless make a claim that political actors, in general, operate according
to the returns to their actions. We recognize that some might receive this claim as so
broad that it can ultimately be disregarded. While that may be, we do feel that the
despite its breadth, it is a uniting theme behind some of the most influential work
in electoral politics, if not in all Political Science for the past 60 years. From Downs
to Riker, Baron and Ferejohn to Strom, these works cover essential topics in modern
political science and all of which can be easily interpreted through the lens of this
simple, broad yet powerful theory.
The introduction of this theory, which states that political agents labor to in-
crease political gain until the marginal return to their effort diminishes., concludes
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part I of this manuscript. We do so recognizing that while powerful, the concept is
broad and has to be carefully narrowed when it comes to empirical testing of par-
ticular cases. When narrowing it, we should pay particular attention to the clear
identification of what is meant by efforts, or investments, as well as what is meant by
returns. Parts II and III of this manuscript set out to do just that.
In Part II, we continue with the study of electoral politics, a theme we first
identified on the literature review. Part II is particularly concerned with elucidating
political investments in multiple, multi-member districts. The focus on multi-member
races comes from the wealth of criticism directed to the MVT on its failure to deal
with such type of races. The focus on such types of districts is warranted by the
fact that these systems are actually the most common types of systems we observe
today. SMD races, about which we know the most, are roughly 28% of the world’s
current electoral systems. Single district multi-member systems, sometimes referred
to as pure PR systems (such as Israel) are actually one of the rarest systems in terms
of adoption, only representing about 7% of the world’s current systems. Multiple
multi-member district systems comprise 65% of the world’s current electoral systems.
Considering how little we know about these systems and how often we observe them,
they become the focus of part II of this manuscript.
As to the narrowing of investment, part II begins to take shape from a very
simple departure point: votes. Votes are the currency of a democratic political sys-
tem. Parties in search of power must first secure votes in order to later exchange them
for a share of power. Interestingly enough, votes themselves don’t directly translate
into power, for they have to be exchanged into seats. It is towards this simple ex-
change of votes for seats that we direct our first test of our marginal return theory of
politics.
In Part III, we continue to study how party investments are translated into
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votes. We shift gears and focus on the returns displayed by voters. We continue to
test how political parties invest their resources in an attempt to collect votes, but we
switch the focus away from trying to understand which votes have highest returns,
and turn it towards trying to understand which voters have the highest returns, given
what they do with the resources directed at them.
The choice to focus on these two aspects is driven by a desire to identify the
most efficient use of a political agent’s resources. Part II focuses on the votes with
the highest returns. In a sense, if a party is able to collect only high return votes,
it should be able to collect either the largest number of seats for the same amount
of votes as its competitors, or the same number of seats for way less votes than its
competitors. Part III focuses on what it takes for voters to deliver their support.
If certain voters deliver their support for less resources, than certain parties can get
either get way more support for the same amount of resources as their competitors,
or they can get the same levels of support with much fewer resources. If we combine
these two behaviors, we can envision what an ultra-efficient party would behave like,
delivering resources to high return voters in exchange for high return votes. While we
are not able to test this behavior in this manuscript, these two behaviors are outlined
with great resolution in the two empirical tests that follow.
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Part II
Vote Returns
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Chapter 4
Votes and Their Marginal Returns
4.1 Introduction
We concluded the previous chapter by stating the expectations for our broad
theory of politics, which we named a marginal return theory of politics. This the-
ory states that political agents direct their resources at the highest marginal returns
that these resources may get them and refrain from spending their scarce political
resources where marginal returns are diminishing. While we lauded the theory for its
broad applicability in Political Science, we also suggested that leveraging the theory’s
foundational principle requires that we pay careful attention to what we perceive in-
vestments and returns to be. It is only by carefully narrowing down the theory’s
broad foundations that we can test it empirically.
In this chapter, we heed our own suggestion and take the steps necessary
to narrow the theory and draw testable hypotheses from it. We do so by pointing
the theory to the scope of vote seeking, more precisely electoral competition across
multi-member districts [MuMD]. Our theory’s foundational principle, that of marginal
returns, shows itself in the return of votes, which is the currency of electoral compe-
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tition.
The next section of this chapter is a discussion of why we choose to focus
on competition across multi-member districts. The section that follows narrows the
concept of marginal returns to votes, a distinction that is hindered by the common
perspective that all votes are equal. We choose to introduce the discussion of vote
marginal returns within the realm of single member district systems [SMD] in order
to ensure that the concept is introduced with most clarity. After the concept is intro-
duced in its clearest and simplest form; within SMD, we then expand it to its more
complex form, which happens in MuMDs. We conclude the chapter with a discussion
of the set of expectations that emerges from the narrowing of our marginal return
theory of politics.
4.2 Why Multi-Member Districts
The choice to focus this test on MuMDs is the result of three concerns: pur-
posely avoiding SMDs, putting the theory through a harsh test and, finally, using
the theory to shed light on an area of that has been mostly neglected. We purposely
avoid any empirical tests that rely on SMDs due to the sheer attention that these
types of districts have received in the past half century. The overwhelming majority
of findings and extensions to Downs’ MVT adopt these systems to build their claims
and support their findings. We fear that framing our contribution in the confines of
this system would ultimately turn our test into one of the countless tests that these
systems have been put through and unduly subtract from the test’s value.
One of the reasons why researchers often turn to SMDs to test their theories
has to do with the remarkable stability that these systems produce. They often lead
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to two party races and they often end up lavishing the median voter with an inordi-
nate amount of power. These are often strong and non-controversial characteristics
of SMDs that reduce the number of political agents to a minimum, consequently re-
ducing political exchanges to their simplest form. This simplicity makes it easy for
researchers to derive expectations without having to account for all possible odd ball
scenarios that would quickly arise from introducing multiple agents.
While we don’t reject simplicity as an attractive feature of an empirical test, we
introduced a very broad theory and we wish to put it through a harsh test. If a theory
is indeed applicable to various branches of politics, then it should perform not just in
the simplest and most stable systems, but also in the more complex ones. MuMDs
often introduce multiple agents, making it possible that different agents engage on
multiple issue dimensions and making the quest for votes even more complicated. If
we are able to find evidence for our theory in MuMDs, we will feel more confidence
in the theory’s applicability to even the most complex of political exchanges.
Last but not least, it is also worth noting that while SMDs have been the over-
whelming system of choice when it comes to electoral politics, this system is hardly
the most common. If we simply separate electoral systems into single district PR1,
single member districts and multi-member districts, then only about 28% of lower
houses are in fact elected through single member districts. Given that about 65%
of the world’s legislative (lower) houses are elected through MuMDs, we feel that
making this system the focus of our study allows us to make another contribution to
the discipline, which is to pay more attention to this system, which is widely adopted
but not as widely studied.
In short, we feel that MuMDs provide us with a strong test to our theory. We
1By single district PR, we are referring to pure PR systems where the entire legislative body is
elected from a single, nationwide district. Israel is such a case.
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also feel that this stronger test is appropriate given our expectations of how broadly
applicable our theory is. Finally, we feel that MuMDs are understudied and this is
an opportunity to give these systems academic attention that is more proportional to
the frequency we observe them in the real world.
4.3 Conceptualizing Different Marginal Returns for
Different Votes
While democracies entail granting every citizen a vote, after factoring the
electoral rules and the goals of political agents, we learn that not all votes are worth
the same. Standing between a vote and an elected official is an electoral formula
(Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). This formula assigns values to votes and then uses
these values to allocate seats. Different values may or may not deliver seats. A hier-
archy of votes emerges as a function of the values they hold and their consequential
ability to translate vote shares into seat shares.
Understanding this hierarchy is not a simple task. By itself, every vote is
worth the same, so it becomes difficult to make sense of it otherwise. To better grasp
this idea, we remind the reader that thinking of votes individually can be a deceiving
exercise. The concept of voting itself only makes sense in the context of multiple
votes. Votes are used to turn individual preferences into a collective and therefore are
inextricably related to a collective environment, otherwise there would be no need for
voting in the first place. In other words, any study of a single vote must be accompa-
nied by a pool of votes against which this single vote can be referenced. It is exactly
this process of relating one vote to another, encapsulated by the electoral rules, that
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assigns different values to different votes. To that we add the fact that votes are
cast in favor of political agents who have goals of their own and the vote value issue
becomes even more significant. It is by always thinking about votes with reference
to other votes and by contemplating the goals of political agents that the idea of
marginal returns to votes begins to take shape. As a consequence of this framing, we
are able to leverage our marginal return theory of politics.
Consider, for example, two parties running for a single seat that is awarded
through plurality rule. For intuition’s sake, this can be easily pictured as an Ameri-
can race for a legislative seat, between the Republican and Democratic parties. The
example basically boils down to the seat being awarded to the first party that secures
one vote beyond the 50% mark.
If we assume that the chief concern of the two parties above is to secure the
seat, they will value votes to the extent that these votes will help them secure the
seat. As voters cast their votes to a party, these initial votes are worth something to
the party in the sense that they put it closer to its desired seat. The value of each
casted vote in this initial count is low because the party getting this vote is still far
from the 50% mark. As votes are added, the party gets closer to its goal and the
value of each additional individual vote increases. Once the party reaches a critical
point of 50%, the value of a single additional vote peaks. That is because this one
additional vote will put the party beyond the 50% threshold and secure that party its
desired seat. After this point, the value of each additional vote flattens to its lowest
possible value of zero, reflecting the fact that a party only concerned with securing a
seat places no value in votes that cannot help it secure its goals. To the extent that
the party has already secured its seat, additional votes are virtually useless.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the above example by graphing vote’s latent return (y
axis) against their position along the vote share spectrum (x axis). We interpret
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vote return in terms of latent returns because true returns in the realm of voting are
dichotomous. Ultimately parties are looking for seats and considering that parties
either get or do not get seats, they look for votes that either deliver or do not de-
liver seats. In a SMD, that would imply that the vote immediately after the 50%
mark has a return of 1 (1 seat) and all other votes have a return of zero (zero seats).
Considering that this 50%+1 vote is the only vote with a positive return, it follows
that a party would care about securing this vote alone. While this interpretation is
mathematically trivial, it is virtually impossible for a party to secure the +1 vote
without securing the 50% vote share that precedes it. This impossibility highlights
that the 50% of the votes that precede the coveted +1 vote might have some latent
return, which is their ability to move the party closer and closer to the vote that
has the actual seat return that the party is looking for. The figure illustrates this
increase in returns, starting at zero where the party is furthest away from the +1
vote. As votes move rightward on the x axis, their returns increase, eventually being
maximized at the +1 point.
By framing the discussion of vote value in terms of vote marginal return, we
gain traction when it comes to electoral strategies. Seat seeking parties are concerned
with earning seats and we expect them to chase after votes that are likely to deliver
seats. As figure 4.1 illustrates, the votes that are most likely to deliver seats are those
that have the highest marginal returns.
Acquiring votes is a resource intensive process. To gain votes, parties need to
build and maintain an image, cater to constituencies through community service and
policy building, just to name a few. The actual apparatus that comes with performing
these duties is large and expensive. Open Secrets, an American watchdog, estimates
that during Barrack Obama’s bid for the presidency, the Democratic party spent
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Figure 4.1: When we follow the returns plotted by the dark solid line, we see
that returns quickly drop to zero almost immediately after peaking. This drastic
drop captures the fact that beyond the peak point votes have no seat returns (they
cannot deliver new seats). They do have some latent returns, on account of added
security. The dotted line is the mirror image of the solid line, but it captures
returns from the perspective of losses. Votes lost above the 50%+1 mark have
latent returns in that each vote lost puts the party closer to the vote that will cost
the party its seat. Just like in the perspective of gains, the return of votes lost
drastically drops to zero immediately after the 50%+1 vote is lost. Because parties
don’t precisely know whether they will gain or lose votes, there is uncertainty as to
which of the two curves they are travelling. The third line (thick solid) represents
the overall return of any vote given this uncertainty.
The vote return curves follow a beta distribution with skewness parameters
α and β (α and β > 1). The choice to use a beta distribution comes from the need
to adopt a distribution curve that can accommodate an exponential type of growth
followed by a quick drop in growth right after the inflexion point. This shape is
achieved through the manipulation of the α and β parameters, with the mode equal
to the 50%+1 vote. Under the perspective of gains, the curve is calculated with α
greater than β, producing a right skewness. Under the perspective of losses, β is
larger than α, resulting in a skewness to the left.
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roughly 175 U$ million on administrative costs alone2. Brazil’s PT presidential bid
for October 2010 elections is estimated at R$187 million3. When we account for the
amount of resources that go into securing votes and the obvious fact that resources
are finite and costly to obtain, it is almost natural to expect that parties would use
their resources strategically. This strategy consists of seeking votes with a focus on
securing seats. Once enough votes are secured to clench the seat, the party will stop
the resource intensive process of vote seeking and save itself the resources. Continuing
to seek votes once enough votes to secure a seat have been secured becomes wasteful
because a party would have no actual use for these votes.
The expectation that a party will stop chasing after votes once it crosses a
certain threshold, however, is hardly observed. Parties often chase after votes until
they are legally forbidden from doing so, i.e. in election days when campaigning
is prohibited by law. The expectation is the result of a stylized example that it is
limited to a single race for a single seat. Here, our goal is to expand this argument
to multiple races (multiple constituencies) and for multiple seats within each race.
While understanding multiple seats within each race is complex, the translation of
the aforementioned model into multiple races (constituencies) is relatively trivial.
Let us expand on the previous example, where two parties competed for a seat.
This time the two parties are running for two seats, each being elected by a different
district. In essence, the two parties are facing each other in two distinct races. In
the first district, A, we assume that the first party expects a non-zero vote share.4
2See http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/expend.php?cycle=2008&cid=n00009638
3Estimate was submitted by the party to the Superior electoral courts, TSE. See http:
//agencia.tse.gov.br/sadAdmAgencia/noticiaSearch.do?acao=get&id=1313491
4For the sake of completeness, we assume that this party expects a non-zero vote share that is
between zero and 50%.
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In the second district, B, this same party expects a smaller vote share than the one
from A. The party has a limited amount of resources and therefore can only secure
a limited amount of votes. Vote for vote, a new vote that is secured from district A
has a higher marginal value than a new vote secured from B. New votes secured from
district A will have a higher marginal value because they have a higher starting point.
As stated previously, we can only grasp the value of a vote in relation to its reference
pool of votes. In the case of new votes secured from district A, their reference pool
grants them a higher marginal value than the reference pool from district B. Marginal
votes have a greater likelihood of securing seats and therefore it makes more sense to
spend resources on these types of votes. Based on this likelihood, when contesting
for seats in multiple simultaneous races the party will put its limited resources on the
district where it expects newly secured votes to have higher marginal returns.
As we move to multiple simultaneous races, the prediction that a party will
halt its expenditures once it crosses certain thresholds becomes much more palpable.
While it is true that parties don’t stop campaigning until the very last minute, they
do focus their efforts on the districts where they are closest to winning. Both the
Republican and Democratic parties in the U.S. often battle for seats in Ohio and
Florida, where both parties are really close to securing seats. Because both parties
are close to victory, any additional vote they can get has a high marginal return,
which is why they are focusing on those races in the first place. Both parties end
up putting resources on these races and neglecting districts where they have either
too many votes beyond the necessary (zero marginal return) or too few to begin with
(low marginal return).
The notion that a party will stop chasing after votes once it crosses some
threshold makes theoretical sense in the context of a single race, yet we hardly observe
a halting in vote seeking in real life. However, when there are multiple simultaneous
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races, although the party does not necessarily stop spending resources, the objective
behind withholding expenditures is still reached. When faced with multiple races,
the party favors districts where resources will secure marginal votes and therefore
avoids the waste associated with securing non-marginal votes, which is why a party
in the stylized single race example would cease expenditures in the first place. While
spending in multiple races does not necessarily stop, the goal of avoiding the exchange
of resources for non-marginal votes is still reached. This suggests that the stylized
prediction, although naive, is intuitively correct.
In its broadest state, our marginal return theory of politics states that political
agents direct their resources at the highest marginal returns that these resources may
get them and refrain from spending their scarce political resources where marginal
returns are diminishing. Once we narrow this theory down to explain electoral races
for legislative seats, we expect that a party will put its resources towards districts
that can deliver marginal votes, while ignoring districts that cannot deliver such types
of votes. While this puts us much closer to an empirical test, our ultimate goal is
to test these expectations within the realm of MuMDs. The next section takes the
final step in making this test possible. It does so by examining how to translate the
concept of vote marginal return within MuMDs.
4.4 Marginal Votes in Multi Member Districts
The previous sections addressed how to perceive of marginal vote seeking
across multiple districts. While that certainly puts us closer to our goal of narrowing
our theory, we are ultimately interested in conducting our test in MuMDs. This sec-
tion addresses the challenge that these systems introduce, particularly as they relate
45
to grasping vote marginal returns. We start by acknowledging that districts that
elect multiple seats often adopt proportion representation (henceforth PR) allocation
formulas.
The fact that PR formulas utilize the same vote share repeated times creates
some confusion when it comes to sorting out electoral strategies because this repeti-
tion muddies the incentives that agents face. To build some intuition, we start from
a simple single constituency model [SCM]. In general terms, PR allocation formulas
entail calculating some sort of yardstick against which party vote shares are measured
throughout multiple rounds of seat allocation. There are as many yardsticks as there
are seats to be assigned, which means even if a party’s vote share fails to produce
seats against an initially long yardstick, it might still produce seats at later allocation
rounds, when the yardstick has shrunk.5
As discussed, in a single seat model (SMD-SCM) a party can discard votes
that fall beyond a certain threshold. In multi member districts, because votes that are
too many in initial rounds might become just enough in mid rounds, and eventually
become too few in final rounds, intuition suggests that the idea that votes can be
discarded should be rejected. We recognize that PR allocation formulas do not create
the same type of incentives as those coming from plurality SMDs. However, we reject
the idea that because PR incentives are not clear, parties should blindly maximize
their vote shares in hopes of securing seats in most rounds of the allocation process.
Although the incentives created by PR are not as straight forward as those coming
from winner-take-all SMDs, here we show that multi member districts that use PR
5We consciously chose to use the yardstick over quota because although quota might better
represent the measure that vote shares are weighted against, the term quota also speaks to an entirely
separate literature on quota electoral systems and their incentives. By using the term yardstick we
avoid any mixing of terms that might result. For a detailed description of the allocation process,
see Gallagher (1992)
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do create incentives that are richer and more complex than simply maximizing vote
shares.
To understand what MuMD incentives look like, we must analyze the elements
that go into the seat allocation formulas. PR allocates seats by processing vote shares
as a function of the three elements. The first is the number of seats that are being
allocated, which generally but not necessarily corresponds to the district magnitude6.
The second is the number of competing political parties and the third is the specific
seat allocation formula.7
The number of seats being allocated roughly dictates how many rounds of
allocation are going to take place and, consequently, how many times vote shares will
be reutilized to secure seats. Intuition suggests that parties wishing that their vote
shares deliver seats in every round should strive to secure the largest possible vote
share. As a consequence, this intuition conflicts with the notion that a party can
divest itself from certain types of votes.
On the surface the idea of maximizing shares is a natural intuition to develop.
However, it is actually the product of an incomplete assessment of the allocation pro-
cess. It is incomplete because it has failed to account for the number of competing
parties. This number plays a crucial role in the process because it allows for the
crowding of the race in ways that create disincentives to increase vote shares.
Consider as an example three parties, A, B and C. These parties are running
for two seats allocated through the D’Hondt method. D’Hondt allocates seats to the
highest averages, which are calculated by dividing each vote share by a vector of divi-
6Certain countries, such as Argentina, stagger elections so that congress is renewed half a body
at a time. As a consequence, a district of magnitude 20 would only elect 10 seats at a time.
7These could be D’Hondt, Saint Lague, Modified Saint Lague, Droop quota, Imperiali, O’Hare,
just to name a few. See Gallagher (1992) for a thorough list and discussion.
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sors starting from one all the way to the number of seats being allocated (M). Party
A secures 50% of the vote share, B secures 30% and C secures the remaining 20%.
By dividing each party’s vote share by the divisors 1 and 2 (1 through M, M=2), we
can obtain all party averages. These are shown on table 4.1. Once all party averages
are calculated, they are sorted from largest to smallest and the top M averages are
awarded seats. Sorted averages are also shown at the bottom of table 4.1. Given this
combination of vote shares and number of competing parties, parties A and B each
secure one seat.
Table 4.1: Party Averages for parties A, B and C
divisor A(50%) B(30%) C(20%)
1 50(50
1
) 30(30
1
) 20(20
1
)
2 25(50
2
) 15(30
2
) 10(20
2
)
Sorted Averages : 50A, 30B, 25A,
20C , 15B, 10C
The averages in bold indicate seat
winners (2). Average’s subscript
identifies the party.
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Table 4.2: Party Averages for parties A, B, C and D
divisor A(50%) B(17%) C(17%) D(16%)
1 50(50
1
) 17(17
1
) 17(17
1
) 16(16
1
)
2 25(50
2
) 8.5(17
2
) 8.5(17
2
) 8(16
2
)
Sorted Averages : 50A, 25A, 17B, 17C , 16D,
8.5B, 8.5C ,8D
Consider now that a fourth party, D, enters the race. D is able to secure a 16%
vote share at the expense of B and C, which are now only able to secure 17% of the
votes each. A’s vote share of 50% remains intact. Table 4.2 displays the averages. As
we can see from the sorted vector on table 4.2, A ends up with the top two highest
averages and is able to secure both seats.
This example illustrates that depending on how many parties run for seats,
similar vote shares can become more (or less) efficient in their ability to deliver seats.
This ability counters the intuition that parties hoping to increase seat shares should
blindly maximize their vote share. To put it within the framework of marginal re-
turns, while party D’s performance does not impact A’s vote share, it does impact the
marginal returns of A’s votes. Upon D’s entrance, A’s votes become more marginal,
going from being able to deliver a single seat in a race between three parties to de-
livering two seats in a race between four.
Because the marginal impact of votes allocated in MuMDs is a function of mul-
tiple moving parts, identifying a process to systematically measure their marginality
is an important challenge faced by this test. To meet this challenge, we take advan-
tage of two mathematical algorithms introduced by Palomares and Ramirez (2003).
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Table 4.3: Marginal Vote Algorithm
Min Function min
h∑
i=2
hi = H − h
d(h− 1)
d(h− 1) +
n∑
i=2
(hi)
Max Function max
h∑
i=2
hi = H − h
d(h)
d(h) +
n∑
i=2
(hi − 1)
The input is fed to the algorithm through a rounding function d(h). h
is a vector containing the m, n and a γ parameter. This γ relates to
the seat allocation method, ranging from 0 to 1.
The algorithms, which are shown in table 4.3, evaluate and consolidate a series of
formulas that have been introduced in by researchers focusing on a separate set of
questions.8 This algorithm superimposes a structure onto the vote share spectrum
that allows us to derive the marginal impact of votes in districts that allocate using
PR formulas. This structure is a function of the three discussed elements that impact
seat allocation in PR: number of seats to be allocated, number of parties running for
seats and specific allocation formula.
For every seat share in a district, the algorithm outputs two numbers. The
lower of the two numbers, which we name seat loss threshold (henceforth SLT) rep-
resents the minimum vote share necessary for a party to have a non-zero probability
of securing that seat share. Any vote share below the SLT is unable to be translated
into that SLT’s respective seat share. If a party drops below the SLT for the seats it
currently holds, seat loss will inevitably occur. The larger of the two numbers, which
we name seat gain threshold (henceforth SGT), represents the maximum vote share
that is sufficient to secure that seat share. By crossing the SGT for x many seats, a
8Table 4.4 introduces the separate formulas for individual seat allocation rules
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Table 4.4: Allocation Formula Specific Functions
d’Hondt Saint Lague Mod. Saint Lague Largest Rem.
Max Function
if n− 1 ≥ m− s s+1
m+1
2s+1
m+s+1
2s+1
1.4m+.6s+1
s
m
+ 1−s/m
m−s+1
if m−s
2
< n− 1 < m− s s+1
m+1
2s+1
2m−n+2
2s+1
1.6m−.2n+.4s+1.2
s
m
+ n−1
mn
if n− 1 ≤ m−s
2
s+1
m+1
2s+1
2m−n+2
2s+1
2m−n+2
s
m
+ n−1
mn
Min Function
s
m+n−1
2s−1
2m+n−2
2s−1
2m+1.4n−2.8
s
m
− n−1
mn
The above functions are a byproduct of the literature on thresholds to representation. The first functions were
identified by Rae et al (1967). In their original version, they contained a few mistakes, which were later corrected
Lijphart and Gibberd (1977).
party effectively secures those x many seats with 100% probability. Votes that fall
within the SLT and the SGT have an unknown non-zero probability of securing that
respective seat share.
For a district with magnitude four, the algorithm will compute a total of
eight thresholds. Two thresholds related to securing one out of four seats, two re-
lated to securing two out of four, two related to securing three out of four, and finally,
two related to securing all four seats. The algorithm basically starts with an even
distribution of vote shares for all competing parties, then proceeds to alter the vote
distribution by a vote. For every possible vote distribution, the algorithm sorts out
the vote shares where the one vote change results in changes in seats. Once these are
identified, the algorithm proceeds to sort out vote share changes that result in seat
change every time from those that only result in seat changes some times. It repeats
this process until it identifies critical vote shares for securing anywhere from one to
M seats. The vote shares that result in seat change every time are the algorithm’s
final output.
The initial discussion of vote marginality started with electoral races in SMDs
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Figure 4.2: Graphical Representation of Algorithm Output
because these races produce a clear threshold that indicates when vote shares can or
cannot deliver seats. This ability is muddied in MuMDs because of the difficulties
that arise from understanding the repeated use of the same vote shares that PR for-
mulas necessitate. By taking advantage of the structure that the algorithm allows us
to superimpose onto the vote share spectrum, we can once again turn to thresholds
when it comes to understanding what vote shares can deliver. As a consequence,
perceiving of a vote’s marginal impact becomes possible also in MuMDs. Figure 4.2
is a graphical representation of the algorithms output. Figure 4.3 is an attempt to
adapt figure 4.1 to MuMDs using the algorithms output, it illustrates what we believe
return curves would look in MuMD according to some smoothing assumptions.
It is worth noting that in a two party SMD race the 50%+1 mark consolidates
a great deal of information. In this type of race, a party that holds a seat must enjoy
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Figure 4.3: Just as in figure 4.1, the y axis represents vote returns and the
x axis is the vote spectrum. The dashed line captures vote returns from the
perspective of gains and the dotted line captures vote returns from the per-
spective of losses. The thick solid line captures an overall return (smoothed via
lowess). Notice that unlike in the SMD case, the peak point of loss does not
coincide with the peak point of gain and therefore the maximum utility for the
overall return curve does not coincide with either peak, which we consider to
be yet another important insight gained from our analysis. We decided against
using these curves as a way to operationalize our variables because we have to
make additional assumptions in order to generate them. These assumptions
relate to how parties weigh seat gain against losses, which is information that
is beyond the scope of this manuscript. We felt that introducing additional
assumptions in this early stage of the research would subtract from our efforts.
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the support of at least 50%+1 voters in the district. If its support drops below this
point, this party will lose its seat. As it crosses the threshold once again, this party
will regain a seat. These gains and losses not only are certain to happen but are
all centered around the 50%+1 mark.9 To assess the marginal impact of the vote,
this pivotal point is the only point that requires attention. In MuMDs, the threshold
that leads to certain seat loss is not the same as the one that leads to certain gains.
As a consequence of this spreading of thresholds, understanding the vote’s marginal
impact requires that we address seat gains and seat losses separately.
In MuMDs, the two thresholds that relate to seat gain and seat losses are the
SLT and the SGT. In the realm of seat losses, the SLT is similar to SMD’s 50%+1
mark in that if a party’s vote share dips below the SLT, seat loss will inevitably
occur. A vote lost will have the highest marginal impact when this vote will put a
party below the SLT for the number of seats this party currently holds (henceforth
SLT status-quo, or SLTsq) and consequently leads to a loss of seat. As vote shares
get increasingly closer to this point, the marginal impact of votes lost increases.
In the realm of seat gains, both the SLT and the SGT apply. The SGT is
similar to the SMD threshold in that if a party crosses the SGT, it is assured a seat
share. As a consequence of this property, closer proximity to the SGT for one seat
beyond the status-quo (henceforth SGT status-quo plus one, or SGTsq+) increases
the marginal return of a gained vote.
However, unlike in SMDs, a party does not necessarily have to cross the
SGTsq+ to secure a new seat. Consider a party with a vote share that is below the
SLTsq+. This means this vote share cannot secure its party a new seat and therefore
9When we say that a party that drops below the mark will lose a seat, that is short for dropping
below the mark at election time. When we refer to crossing the threshold, we speak of securing over
50%+1 in the next election. Also, when we say 50%+1, we are speaking of valid votes.
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has a negligible marginal return. So long as votes gained are still below the SLTsq+,
vote shares cannot be converted into a new seat and will continue to have a negligible
marginal return. When a new vote puts the party beyond the SLTsq+, the party gains
a non-zero probability of securing a new seat, which is a significant improvement from
its previous situation. While votes below the SLTsq+ have no impact on the party’s
ability to secure a new seat, this new vote puts the party in a new situation where
it now has a chance of securing a new seat. This property gives the vote a higher
marginal return than the votes that came before it.
When we began to narrow our marginal return theory of politics to the realm
of marginal voter seeking, our crudest expectation was that a party’s main goal was
to secure the greatest amount of seats while spending the fewest possible resources.
In other words to efficiently secure the largest possible amount of seats. One way to
reach this outcome is to hold on to current seats and to secure new ones. Because
the action around securing new or holding on to current seats in SMDs all takes place
around the 50% vote share threshold, the electoral strategy for these types of districts
is basically reduced into a single behavior: to cater to districts where a party’s vote
share hovers around this threshold.10
In MuMDs, the thresholds do not all neatly fall on a single threshold, which
means that the electoral strategy for MuMDs does not neatly reduce into a single
uniform behavior like in the SMD case. However, the concepts behind the strategy
remain unchanged. Just as in SMDs, the electoral strategy aims to direct a party to-
wards delivering resources to districts that will allow it to hold on to its current seats
and to secure new ones in a way that most efficiently takes advantage of resources.
In other words to efficiently secure the largest possible amount of seats.
10The simplicity of this expectation borders the obvious, which is part of the reason we felt it was
not an appropriate test to our theory.
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In MuMDs we expect a specific behavior for parties securing new seats and
another behavior from parties protecting their current seats. Altogether, we expect
that a party that is attempting to efficiently use its resources to secure seats will
behave in two possible ways. These are as follows.
Holding on to current seats speaks of seat losses and should point us directly to
the SLTsq. A party that is expecting an equal vote share loss from two districts that
are identical in everything, only differing on the vote share the party expects to secure
prior to the loss, should focus its resources on the district where the expected vote
share is just above its SLTsq. By doing so, the party can fight vote share loss where
it matters while neglecting vote loss in the district where this loss is more likely to
be inconsequential. Expanding this argument beyond two districts, we should expect
that a party will favor districts where its vote share is barely above the SLTsq and
neglect those where it is far from this point. In terms of marginal returns, this means
the party will be putting its resources in districts where the votes secured from the
delivery of these resources are likely to have a large marginal impact. The following
is a more formal expression of this expectation:
A party protecting its seats should focus its resources on districts where its expected
vote share is barely above its SLTsq.
Securing new seats speaks of seat gain and highlights two possible threshold
points: the SLTsq+ and the SGTsq+.
11 A party that is very close to securing a seat but
has been unable to do so will focus on the SGTsq+. By crossing this point, the party
11Here, we disregard this threshold as an attractive investment because crossing this threshold
does not secure the party a seat, it merely gives the party a non-zero probability of securing seats,
which is hardly an attractive investment. While we recognize that a non-zero probability is more
attractive than a zero probability, it is likely that there will be other districts where a party is either
closer to losing a seat or very close to securing one and these districts are likely to take priority.
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is ensured a new seat and therefore has efficiently used its resources to accomplish
its goal. In this case, a party whose delivery of resources returns an equal vote share
gain from two districts that are identical in everything but the initial expected vote
share should focus its resources on the district where the expected vote share before
the delivery of resources is closest to the SGTsq+. To expand this argument beyond
two districts, we should expect that a party will favor districts where its vote share
is barely bellow the SGTsq+ and neglect those where it is far from this point. This
behavior ensures that new votes secured all have high marginal impact. The more
formal expression of this expectation is:
A party looking to secure new seats should focus its resources on districts where its
expected vote share is slightly below the SGTsq+.
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Chapter 5
Poverty Alleviation and
Development Programs
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we continued to discuss our marginal return theory of
politics, taking steps towards a narrower perception of the theory that would make
an empirical test possible. We focused on the incentives that parties face to seek
marginal votes and we set our sights on systems that employ multi member districts.
We concluded the chapter by introducing two general expectations of how a party
might manipulate its resources in MuMDs.
In this chapter, we continue to take steps towards the designing of an empirical
test to our theory. While the previous chapter focused on how to leverage the theory
to explain the impact of MuMDs on the returns of vote shares, here we focus on how
to perceive of party resources. Thus far, we have been successful in narrowing the
broad theory into expectations about votes within a specific type of voting system.
Upon the conclusion of this chapter, we will have narrowed the broad concept of party
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resources into a smaller and more manageable concept. The following chapter will
conclude part II of this manuscript by discussing the data, variable operationalization
and findings of the test.
5.2 Party Resources: Poverty Alleviation and De-
velopment Programs
To continue to narrow our theory towards a plausible empirical test, we high-
light that our theory relies on two essential assumptions. The first is that seat seeking
parties have a finite amount of resources. The second is that once these resources
are doled out, voters return their delivery with votes. The actual theory allows us
to rank the best use of these resources and derive expectations as to which districts
these resources will be delivered. However, before any analysis can be made, it is
important that these basic assumptions hold.
The assumption that resources are finite should not present any difficulty or
face any skepticism. The assumption that resources delivered prompt voters to de-
liver votes in return, however, is not as straight forward. Several things must happen
between the time resources are delivered and votes are casted so that we can com-
fortably assume that resources delivered are translated into support in the voting
booth. Voters must be able to identify the sources of those resources (i.e. he or she
must recognize that those resources are coming from a certain party) in order to be
able to reciprocate with support. These resources must meet some pronounced need
that voters have, otherwise voters will not notice these resources in the first place.
Resources delivered by one party must not be challenged by resources delivered by
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another party, at least not to the extent that a voter becomes incapable of deciding
who to support.
If a voter cannot identify who is delivering resources, if the resources deliv-
ered do not interest her or if she receives an equal amount of resources from every
contending party, this voter will ultimately be unable to translate those resources
into a voting preference. In part II of the manuscript, we will not further discuss the
challenge of delivering resources that match the interests of voters because this is the
central topic of party III of this manuscript. For the empirical test we conduct here,
in part II, we will focus on the need for resources delivered not to be met with other
resources coming from other parties.
Whatever type of resources we chose to use for this test, it is important that
these are not met with other resources coming from contending parties. If resources
delivered by one party can be countered with other resources, then their returns would
quickly drop and they would cease to be an attractive investment. This represents an
important challenge to our empirical test because parties are free to court whomever
they like and no party can restrain societal groups from being targeted by other par-
ties.
To counter this challenge, we decide to focus on the delivery of Poverty Alle-
viation and Development programs (henceforth PADs). By focusing on PADs we get
around the problem of parties countering each others resource allocation strategies
because only parties in power control these programs and can deliver those resources.
Other parties might have resources to deliver but these are unlikely to match the
magnitude of government sponsored programs. These programs enable the party in
charge to deliver resources without having to strategize over whether or not these re-
sources will have their impact mitigated by a resource delivery war between competing
parties. By focusing on PADs, we also get around the problem of identifiability. Par-
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ties in charge of government hold a significant comparative advantage when it comes
to credit claiming. Even if parties in charge of programs cannot literally attach the
party label to the actual program, they enjoy greater control over the rhetoric behind
the program, as well as the dissemination of information about the program, allowing
them to better match the program’s language alongside with party principals or slo-
gans. They can take advantage of incumbency to leverage the timing in the delivery of
resources, ensuring that party operatives or representatives are present to take credit
for the delivery. Last but not least, the narrowed version of the theory we introduced
in the previous chapter attempts to explain how a party will manage resources across
districts, suggesting that a party needs to be able to deliver resources to many, if
not all districts. This ability requires a large political machine of party operatives
that is capable of reaching across the entire nation. PADs are an attractive choice
for the test because they are often national programs, which mean they are likely to
come attached with a machine that will facilitate this required broad in reach. In the
unlikely case that PADs do not have such a machine, one will inevitably have to be
built and the party in charge of the program will enjoy a comparative advantage in
the development of this machine.
5.2.1 Poverty Alleviation and Development
Poverty Alleviation and Development programs, as the name implies, are gov-
ernment programs specifically designed to alleviate poverty and foster development.
These programs are currently present in several developing nations, from Latin Amer-
ica to Africa, Europe and the Indian subcontinent. In general terms, these programs
deliver resources to those that would be unlikely to secure them otherwise. These
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programs operate under the premise that by boosting the poor’s living conditions,
the government can create some developmental momentum. Because these programs
are tailored to tackle nation specific problems, the way they go about reaching their
goals varies. The Chilean FOSIS (Solidarity and Social Investment Fund) attempted
to alleviate poverty by creating temporary jobs. Peru’s IDESI (Institute for Develop-
ment of the Informal Sector) focused on strengthening informal sector jobs so these
could successfully transition into the formal economy. Bolivia’s FES (Social Emer-
gency Fund) tackled poverty by creating school feeding programs (see Graham 1991,
1991B and 1992, respectively). The Bangladeshi VPP program addressed poverty by
increasing connectivity between rural villages, installing village pay phones (VPPs).
Development in this case is reached by improved law enforcement and stronger kinship
support (Bayes, 1999).
A fundamental part of the theory is that resources are delivered in exchange
of votes. We are comfortable with the notion that the delivery of PAD benefits can
be reciprocated with votes because of two reasons: the marginal impact of these re-
sources and the non-clientelistic process in which resources are delivered.
Research on vote buying has highlighted that the poor are likely targeted as
recipients of party resources because their precarious living conditions mean that their
immediate well-being can be drastically improved with relatively small amounts of
resources. Calvo & Murillo (2004) argue that while a low skill public sector job only
pays an average of 130 Argentinean pesos more than a private sector job, when the
average salary is only 370 pesos, the additional 130 pesos represent an approximate
35% income premium. This premium becomes negligible for higher income brackets
and is dismissed by high skill laborers. As a result low wage workers become likely
receivers of public jobs (that are bestowed as political patronage) on account of this
income premium that the job represents. In return for the income premium, low
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skill workers deliver political support. This is an excellent example of how the same
resource, in this case a 130 peso premium, is much more appreciated by a specific
segment of the population.
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, a cash transfer (henceforth CT), gives a R$200 monthly
benefit to a family with five children and a monthly income of up to R$70. This
transfer basically quadruples the family income and eases otherwise subhuman living
standards. The tremendous impact that these resources can have create an incentive
for benefiters to go through great lengths to secure them.
It is based on this strong incentive that we believe that PAD resource recip-
ients are willing to return political support in exchange for the continuity of these
programs. In a survey of 1920 respondents conducted in Argentina, 24% of respon-
dents who received a handout from a political candidate or party operative said that
having received this good impacted their voting behavior (Brusco et al 2004). In a
survey of 2400 respondents, De La O (2007) finds evidence suggesting that being a
recipients of Mexico’s PROGRESA positively impacts one’s likelihood of supporting
the PRI, which was the party in charge of the program. De La O (2007) estimates that
being a male PROGRESA recipient raises the probability of supporting the PRI from
17% to 30%, suggesting that resource delivery practically doubles the chances that
recipients will reciprocate with political support. In the case of female PROGRESA
recipients, the probability goes from 24% to 40%. Escobar (2002) argues that an
increased likelihood of support is the result of a precarious economic condition that
forces recipients to value immediate tangible benefits over long term abstract benefits,
such as policy. Because recipients need the immediate benefits to keep from falling
deeper into poverty, they support the current situation in hopes that their status-quo
can be, at a minimum, maintained. When the alternative to the status-quo is an even
more precarious situation, political support that can be translated into the mainte-
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nance of the status-quo becomes an obvious choice.
FONCODES, a Peruvian PAD, was widely accused of having been manip-
ulated by Fujimori as an electoral tool (Schady, 2000). Roberts and Arce (1998)
argue that Fujimori manipulated the FONCODES as a way to continue to enjoy sup-
port despite the harsh conditions that neo-liberal reforms imposed on the poor. The
authors argue that the short term conditions that immediately follow reforms were
likely to hurt Fujimori’s ability to continue enacting reforms. Because these reforms
were a priority, Fujimori chose to continue with reforms while boosting FONCODES
resources to his supporters. This delivery is argued to have helped Fujimori ensure
the support necessary to finalize reforms (see also Graham and Kane, 1998 and Kay,
1996). Graham (1992) argues that Bolivia’s FES was a fundamental tool for the
maintenance of political stability during Bolivia’s structural reforms.
In Mexico, Kaufman and Trejo (1997) argue that Salinas attempted to strengthen
his political support by allowing local level officials in charge of the Programa Na-
cional de Solidariedad (ProNaSol) to engage in grass roots mobilization. Differences
in the amounts of resources available to local level officials drastically impacted the
amount of support that Salinas was able to draw (see also Bruhn, 1996). After earn-
ing a reputation for being heavily politicized and eventually being credited as one of
the contributors to PRI’s comfortable 1991 victory (see Dresser, 1991; Heredia, 1994;
Molinar, 1994; Gershberg, 1994), ProNaSol was replaced by PROGRESA. Menocal
(2001) argues that this new program was better than its predecessor when it comes
to alleviating poverty, but was not devoid of a support-engineering component.
While this brief review of the literature on the manipulation of PADs suggests
that these practices are restricted to Latin America, this suggestion is merely the
result of this author’s interest in the region. Evidence that public resources meant
to bring development are manipulated for political gain have been produced for Al-
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bania (Case, 2001), Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark (Tavits, 2009; Dahlberg and
Johansson, 2002) and Indonesia (Ravallion, 1993).
The final yet crucial point that must be present in the test is manipulabil-
ity. The theory states that a party will strategically deliver resources to attractive
districts. We have argued that the government networks make the delivery logistics
possible, but that only means that resources can reach their final destination. The
ability to deliver and the ability to manipulate where to deliver are independent and
should be treated separately.
The reviewed literature on the manipulation of PADs suggests that these pro-
grams can and indeed often are manipulated by political parties in charge of them.
However, this claim is mostly backed by evidence that resources are concentrated in
pockets of political support without necessarily heeding the actual mechanisms be-
hind the program that would facilitate such manipulation. Claims that incumbents
are in charge of budgets make sense but are less than satisfying.
Glaessner et al (1995) argues that Latin American PADs are marked by a
great degree of administrative autonomy. This autonomy is purposely introduced by
design and is justified by the drastic conditions that these programs are trying to
alleviate. Because the situation is so dire, it is important that these programs are
designed in a way that allows them to identify recipients and deliver resources as fast
and efficiently as possible. Different potential beneficiaries face particular challenges
and flexibility becomes crucial for the program to adapt to these particularities. By
being autonomous, these programs can change their methods according to the situa-
tion without going through the morass of bureaucracy or drafting of amendments.
Glaessner et al (1995) also points out that poverty alleviation requires a multi-
pronged approach that has institutional implications. Poverty alleviation and con-
sequential development are less likely to be achieved if simply addressed in a single
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front, such education, health or nutrition alone. All these issues must be accounted
for, which means that PADs that do address them often end up encompassing dimen-
sions that fall under the scope of multiple ministries. The Chilean Plan de Alimenta-
cion Escolar (PAE) attempts to boost development by maintaining school enrollment,
which impacts the ministry of education. The program does so in part by offering
meals to qualifying students, action which impacts the ministry of health. Colom-
bia’s Vivienda Program boosts development by facilitating home ownership, which
impacts the ministry of vivienda (housing) and the ministry of medio ambiente (min-
istry of the environment). Multiple ministries translate into multiple bureaucracies
that can ultimately reduce the programs autonomy and reaction capacity. Glaessner
et al (1995) observes that to avoid this risk, programs end up falling under the re-
sponsibility of para-ministerial institutions that bypass the multiple ministries. The
institutions are often created to manage particular programs, with directors that are
appointed by and answer directly to the executive.
While autonomy and speed are important to the eradication of poverty, they
drastically increase susceptibility to manipulation. Lose rules that allow a program
to quickly change allocation patterns means that changes are not difficult to enact
and will not raise suspicion. Para-ministerial status allows for the bypassing of bu-
reaucratic procedures that can leave unwanted paper trails.
Program directors are often partisans of the executive, to which they owe al-
legiance. In Argentina, the director of the BNLBF (Banco Nacional de la Buena
Fe) program is President Kirchner’s sister. This link between director and executive
does not mean that PAD resources automatically become party resources, but it does
provide a strong and direct link between the interests of the program director and
the interests of the executive. Considering that it is in the interest of the executive
to have legislative support, we believe that PAD resources can be manipulated to
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for this purpose. In addition, program directors often have political aspirations of
their own and are likely to need the backing of their political party when it comes
time to fulfill them. The director of the Chilean PAE eventually stepped down to
pursue a senatorial bid. In Colombia, the director of the Vivienda program stepped
down to run for a local executive position. Using PAD resources to strengthen one’s
party while currying favor with it is way to secure party backing for future bids, thus
providing another link between PAD resources and party interests.
Due to these characteristics, we identify PADs as a good fit to the empirical
tests. These programs strike a good balance between observability and capacity to
reach multiple districts, their resources can be manipulated to favor incumbent party
and they also address the challenge of avoiding a resource war between parties. These
characteristics address important underlining assumptions that are crucial to our the-
ory and add validity to our empirical test.
5.3 Case Selection
Poverty alleviation and development programs have become common in the
developing world. The Indian subcontinent is a region of the world that has turned
to these programs as a way to tackle their poverty challenges. In India and in
Bangladesh, these programs have been adopted with success (Keefer and Khemani,
2009; Bayes, 1999; Wahid, 1993). Both of these countries adopt SMD electoral sys-
tems, which disqualifies them as appropriate tests to this study. In Latin America,
these programs have been deployed as far North as Mexico, as far south as Argentina
and almost everywhere in between. This widespread adoption of PADs directed us to
search for data in as many of these countries as possible. Our concern is to produce
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a dataset that has large breadth and securing data from different programs addresses
this issue.
Mexico, Bolivia and Ecuador were discarded as sources of data because the
majority of their seats are allocated through SMD1 With the exclusion of these three
countries, our search extended to all remaining thirteen Latin American countries.
The final dataset contains data from eight PADs from six different countries. We col-
lected data from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala and Uruguay. The
following is a description of each of the programs.
5.3.1 Banco Popular de la Buena Fe
The Banco Popular de la Buena Fe (Popular Bank of Good Faith, henceforth
BPBF) is an Argentinean PAD that facilitates micro credit by giving out small loans.
The program’s main goal is to improve the quality of life of low income Argentineans
through employment, more specifically self-employment. The program’s main pillars
are development through endemic employment and support, meaning the generation
of employment and support must be fostered from within the community. By facil-
itating access to micro credit, the program expects to generate employment that is
niche based, which forces applicants to contemplate demand. As a consequence, the
program expects that demand focused employment has greats sustainability odds.
The program has a built-in incentive to create and cultivate local networks of sup-
1300 out of Mexico’s 500 seats are allocated through SMD, with the remaining 200 allocated
through a nationwide (at large) superimposed district. Ecuador allocates 103 of its 124 seats through
SMD and the remaining 21 are for foreigners or special seats. Bolivia allocates 70 of its 130 seats
through SMD and the remaining 50 through superimposed MuMDs that overlap the SMD. Please
visit each country’s respective webpage at http://www.ipu.org/parline/parlinesear.asp for a
summary of their electoral systems.
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port. By offering workshops about tried and proven business practices, the program
puts beneficiaries in contact with one another and stimulates the sharing of solutions
to local level problems.
The banks themselves are local and their reach is mostly at the municipal
level. These banks are funded by the program’s commission, which operates under
the ministry of social development but enjoys a great deal of autonomy from this par-
ent ministry. The commission’s main role is to allocate the program’s budget to local
banks and maintain the equipo promotor (promoter team). This team of approximate
90 individuals gathers the best practices and success stories from beneficiaries and
disseminates them across the country. The actual lending is done by the local banks,
which are autonomous on their decisions regarding to whom they extend loans. Loans
are small, not to exceed the value of 50 canastas basicas (basic baskets). They are
given at an annual interest rate not higher than 6%2 and must be paid back in 25
weekly payments. Beneficiaries are eligible to reapply to new loans once the current
loans are fully paid.
The program was promulgated into law by the Senate on July 17, 2006. Law
23.1173 created both the program itself and a new commission (CoNaMi: National
Microcredit Council) within the ministry of social development that is meant to man-
age the program’s funds (article 5, paragraph 4). The head of the CoNaMi is to be
appointed directly by the executive independent of the minister of social development
(article 6). Article 18 grants the CoNaMi the right to monitor the use of program’s
resources, especially with reference to how effective these resources are in furthering
2According to the CIA’s World Factbook, Argentina’s 2008 commercial bank interest rates av-
erages a whopping 28% a year, the 6th highest in the world. This 22% premium represents an
important gap between what the program can offer and the alternative, making the program ex-
tremely attractive in the eyes of benefiters.
3http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/115000-119999/118062/norma.htm
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the program’s goals. The article states that if the CoNaMi deems it appropriate, it
can alter the allocation of previously allotted funds so that new allocations will better
reach the program’s goals. The program’s budget can be augmented directly the by
executive if need be (article 15).
It is important to point out that behind a veneer of local autonomy there is a
great deal of power that is institutionally placed directly on the executive. While the
program falls under the scope of the ministry of social development, the program’s
director is appointed by the executive, which allows it to exert influence over the
program even should the ministry fall under the control of coalition parties. This is
not the case for the date used here (2007), when the president’s sister in law (Ali-
cia Kirchner, sister of the former president and then current first gentleman Ernesto
Kirchner) was the minister and shared a bond with the executive that went beyond
co-partisanship. The fact that the executive can supplement the program’s budget
directly is another way that the executive can take advantage of the program as
an electoral tool. Without this ability, the executive would have to supplement the
ministry of social development and hope that those funds would trickle down to the
program, which would risk having the ministry’s own interests play a role in the way
funds are allocated. With a direct line to the program, this risk can be avoided al-
together and funds can swiftly be delivered to potential supporters. This ability to
increment and alter allocation patterns consists of a pressure point where the pro-
gram can be politically manipulated. The council has the authority to alter allocation
patterns and it responds directly to the executive.
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5.3.2 Programa Bolsa Familia
Programa Bolsa Familia (Family stipend program, henceforth PBF) is Brazil’s
most successful and talked about program, having earned praise beyond Brazil and
Latin America. World Bank’s Kethy Lindert says leaders from all over the world are
looking the PBF as a template for poverty alleviation (The Economist, 02-09-2008
). The program consists of delivering a monthly stipend to beneficiaries who meet
the eligibility requirements and continue to meet the program’s on-going obligations.
These obligations consists of ensuring all school age household children attend and
perform well in school and are vaccinated according to the national vaccine schedule.
Heads of household are expected to go through regular checkups, attend night school
or job training.
The program’s goal is address poverty both on the short and long terms. The
short term aspect is addressed through the monthly stipend, which operates as a sort
of bait that ensures the long term aspect. This long term aspect is ensured through
school enrollment and scheduled health visits. The program’s main pillar is the con-
ditionality between short and long term benefits. By conditioning short term benefits
(monthly cash stipends) on the fulfillment of activities that will alleviate poverty on
the long term (job training, school enrollment and health checkups), the program
aims to become a transitioning tool out of poverty, instead of simply becoming a set
of crutches to those in poverty without ever offering a way out of it.
The monthly stipend depends on the household’s average income. A family of
three children and two teenagers (five total dependents) that makes less than R$70 a
month (approximately U$35 or a dollar a day) gets a R$200 monthly stipend. This
same family would get R$132 if their household income is between R$70 and R$140
a month. The actual delivery of the monthly stipend is made through an ATM like
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debit card, but recipients must constantly visit PBF facilities to show proof of con-
tinued fulfillment of their obligations to the program. Beneficiaries that fail to fulfill
conditions are discontinued from the program after a warning. To become a benefi-
ciary, applicants must enroll on the programs database. The main requirements for
eligibility are per capita household income related. If they meet all of the require-
ments, they automatically become eligible and move to a wait list. The move from
wait list to actual beneficiary is conditional on budgeting.
A World Bank report on Bolsa Familia highlights that the program’s registra-
tion and monitoring process are its main pressure points for political manipulation.
While eligibility is transparent and uniform, a potential recipient must enroll on her
own. This allows the central government to proselytize recipients by developing a
biased and uneven registration network. The monitoring of the conditions that must
be met is open to political manipulation because lack of clear directives as to what
and how to look for violations has allowed the central government’s monitoring unit
(Controladoria Central da Uniao) to conduct audits on a case by case basis, resulting
in arbitrary disqualification of beneficiaries (Lindert et al 2007).
As of 2009, the program has reached approximately 50 million people (12 mil-
lion families). Since its inception in 2003, the program has claimed to have reduced
extreme poverty from 12% to 4.8% in just five years.
The PBF is an appropriate program to the empirical test because it has a large
impact on the welfare of beneficiaries. The program has been accused as a sharp vote
buying tool. PT’s association with the program is pronounced: it was claimed that
the program played an important role in Lula’s 2006 reelection (Washington Post,
October 29th 2006). In 2006, the program saw its eligibility requirements loosened so
to include more beneficiaries shortly after a national newspaper’s pre-election survey
showed that 48% of program recipients intended to vote for Lula, while only 32% of
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the poor who were ineligible to the program intended to do so (Veja Online). In 2009,
after benefits had been adjusted twice, the program’s average benefit was increased
yet a third time. This was met with criticism that the increase was a sign that the
PT was gearing up for the 2010 elections (Veja Online, 08-01-2009). Rousseff, PT’s
2010 presidential candidate, claims responsibility for the PBF because the program
is clearly PT’s brainchild4
5.3.3 Programa de Alimentacion Escolar
Chile’s Programa de Alimentacion Escolar (Program for School Meals, hence-
forth PAE) fights poverty through education. The program’s main goal is to boost
student classroom performance and lower drop-out rates by providing meals to public
school students of all levels, from kindergarten to college. It operates by delivering
one daily meal (either breakfast or lunch, depending on the needs of the student) to
the student in school. The meals cover almost 50% of preschoolers’ daily nutritional
needs and approximately 35% of older students.
One of the programs main concerns is to ensure that it reaches the students
who will benefit the most from the meals. To accomplish this goal, the program allo-
cates its resources according to a scale that ranks schools based on their vulnerability
(IVE, indice de vulnerabilidad del establecimiento). This measure is made up of a
school level and an individual level components. The school level measure comes from
yearly surveys that rank schools according to the conditions of the facilities and the
average performance of the student body. The individual level component concerns
itself with each student’s attributes as they relate to the student beyond the school.
4Interview given to Jo Soares on 05-26-2008
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This individual level measure reaches approximately three million of the students
enrolled in Chile’s public schools5 Likely PAE beneficiaries consists of students that
score high on their individual IVE measure and attend schools with high school level
vulnerability scores. This double selections process allows the program to prioritize
the neediest students of the most precarious schools, increasing the marginal impact
of the program.
The PAE is part of JuNAEB (Junta Nacional de Auxilio y Becas, National
Council for Aid and Scholarships), a standalone government institution created to
manage student social vulnerability. JuNAEB’s main goal is to ensure students en-
roll in and graduate from Chile’s public educational system. The JuNAEB doubled
its budget from early to late 1990s. While the JUANEB funds and oversees the PAE,
actual delivery of meals is done by private local organizations. These caterers must
be certified prior to starting. The certification of potential provides is a major pres-
sure point of political manipulation. Qualification is done by local authorities, which
are staffed by the JuNAEB. Districts rely on local authorities to register providers
and in the absence of qualified providers these local authorities must carry the onus
of identifying, developing and eventually qualifying new ones6. By controlling the
staffing at the local level, the JuNAEB can ultimately impact the delivery of services.
The program’s large database on personal student IVE makes the PAE an
incredibly attractive electoral tool. While the overwhelming majority of actual bene-
fiters do not vote on account of their age, it is important to highlight that the program
allows parents to ensure that their children are attended to while they are at work.
5It is worth noting that Chile’s population is approximately 17 million, which means that the
program contains data on roughly 20% of the population.
6This process can be in itself a political largess, as caterers who are qualified gain access to a
large, year round market that is financially backed by the government. The caterers, along with the
children, become beneficiaries of the program.
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This not only eases the financial burden of the parents but also frees them to seek
gainful employment. Between the program’s ability to target receivers and the pro-
gram’s impact on the parent’s livelihoods, the delivery of PAE has the potential to
transform the resources it delivers into electoral support for those that deliver it.
While it is true that the selection of recipients is done according to the IVEs,
the composite of these indexes is regulated by the central government and has changed
twice single 2005 (2005 and 2007). For the empirical test, we use data on total PAE
expenditures for 2007.
5.3.4 Programa Universidade Para Todos
Brazil’s Programa Universidade Para Todos (University for All program, hence-
forth ProUni) is a PAD that delivers college scholarships to low income public school
graduates. Its main goal is to facilitate college enrollment to those who would other-
wise be unable to attend college because of financial limitations. Brazil’s best ranked
universities are federally funded. Admission to a federal university is accompanied
by free tuition (and often free room and board) for the entire span of the program
regardless of performance. Because all enrolled students attend for free, there are lit-
erally no fees assessed. The combination of top education and zero costs makes these
universities highly competitive. As a consequence, these universities are populated by
high income students who can afford the best secondary schools and college entrance
preparation courses. Low income students are drastically under-represented in these
institutions.
Students who cannot attend these universities are forced to attend private
colleges, which are less competitive and very expensive. High tuition costs can conse-
quently preclude low income students from attending college altogether. The ProUni
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targets these exact low income students who attended public schools and were only
able to secure admission to a private college. To be eligible for a full scholarship
the beneficiary’s per capita household income cannot exceed one minimum wage per
month (R$510 as of July of 2010). It is worth nothing that the average tuition costs
for Brazilian private universities is just above one minimum wage per month (Folha
de Sao Paulo, July 12th 20107), suggesting that there is little chance that a program
beneficiaries would be able to attend college without the aid.
Brazil’s federal government first created the ProUni in 2004, putting it in full
effect in 2005. Since its inception the program has awarded approximately 600 thou-
sand scholarships, 70% of which were full time. The awarding of scholarships is an
impersonal process that ranks recipients by combining the applicant’s college admis-
sion exam scores and its respective colleges of choice. ProUni has a similar political
manipulation pressure point as Chile’s PAE, which is on the qualifying of colleges
that can participate in the program. Universities must petition to become eligible
to receive scholarship awardees and receive a tax break in place of the actual tuition
amount. The annual tax breaks that participating colleges receive are negotiated by
the program’s centralized agency on a case by case basis (article 14, decree 11.096-
2005). The ability to assess each case based on its own conditions gives the central
agency a great deal of leeway on how many scholarships are ultimately delivered to
each district.
The programs potential for electorally helping the party in charge is large, as
recipients are unlikely to able to attend college otherwise. Benefiters and their par-
ents are drastically impacted by the program and have an incentive to support the
7Study done by the Union of Private College Instructors of the state of Sao Paulo, published
on the Folha de Sao Paulo newspaper, see online version http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/
cotidian/ff2106201001.htm
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party that developed it, which is the laborer’s party (PT). While the federal govern-
ment cannot target recipients, its ability to impact the geographic distribution of the
scholarships allows it to direct resources to electorally attractive districts and meets
the requirements of the test.
5.3.5 Sistema Nacional de Comedores
The Sistema Nacional de Comedores is part of Uruguay’s Instituto Nacional
de Alimentacion (National Institute for Nutricion, henceforth INDA). The INDA was
created to redress Uruguay’s growing nutritional gaps and to directly attend to the
population that finds itself in nutritional vulnerability8. The Sistema Nacional de
Comedores (National Eatery Network, henceforth SNC) is one of INDA’s five main
programs. It consists of public eateries that deliver daily meals to recipients. The
SNC was created in 2001 and targets citizens that are in greatest nutritional, and
consequentially social danger. Women, particularly pregnant, and children are prior-
itized.
Meals are cooked and delivered daily through a network of public restaurants
that are operated by local municipalities but maintained by the federal government.
These restaurants serve a standard single meal that can be purchased by anyone but
is free for those who are registered beneficiaries of the program. Eligibility is granted
by a social worker who reviews the applicant’s file to determine if the applicant will
truly benefit from the program. Beyond a preference for women and children, criteria
mainly revolve around employment status. Once beneficiary status is granted, an
8Translated by the author from: Los programas INDA “ son la herramienta que permite alcanzar
el objetivo principal del Instituto, es decir: atender a la poblacion del pais que se encuentra en
situacion de vulnerabilidad alimentaria”
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identification card is issued and must be shown at the eatery in exchange for a meal.
In general beneficiaries must renew their id cards every year, with a few excep-
tions. Pregnant women and their children, pre-schoolers and public school students
must renew every six months but renewal is practically automatic. For the unem-
ployed, the option to renew is available but they must go through a social worker who
will reassess their situation since the applicant’s last enrollment.
The program’s political manipulation pressure point is at the allocation of
social workers, who meet and evaluate potential beneficiaries prior to granting their
eligibility. Social workers canvass the country at the discretion of the ministry of
development. They have been criticized for having preconceived biases about what
local necessities are, only to be plucked away after they have begun to develop a
more clear intuition of what local needs truly are9. By controlling where and how
many social workers are distributed, the program can be manipulated to favor some
districts over others.
Daily operation of the actual restaurants is up to the local municipalities.
Funds and foodstuffs come directly from the INDA in different schedules. Foodstuffs
are delivered every two weeks and funds to cover operational costs are delivered every
two months. Access to financial and foodstuff resources is vital to the functioning
of the program and given that these resources are controlled by the INDA (a feder-
ally funded centralized organ), the link between the federal government and the local
level operation exists. Uberfil Monzon, INDA’s director for 2008 (the year used in the
test) was appointed directly by Uruguayan president Tabare Vazquez. Although not
a party member, Monzon is a self proclaimed “die hard” Frente Amplio supporter.
9Sociedad Uruguaya, 08-31-06 http://www.sociedaduruguaya.org/2009/08/
treinta-y-tres-reclaman-al-mides-el-retorno-de-una-licenciada-en-trabajo-social.
html
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The INDA, whose previous director is under indictment for using INDA’s funds
for political gains(La Republica, 06-22-2006), was recognized as a fundamental tool
for national development by Frente Amplio 2010 presidential hopeful Marcos Caram-
bula. The candidate suggested that INDA should be placed under the ministry of
development so to better play the role that the executive expects out of this institu-
tion (La Republica, 05-28-2009). While Carambula did not win the presidential seat,
INDA’s transfer to the ministry of development was eventually carried out.
As for the program’s actual impact, it should be noted that this program alone
reaches 18 thousand people (Uruguay’s population is an estimated 3.5 million). The
program is one of INDA’s five main programs, suggesting that the institute has a
reach beyond the 18 thousand served. The meals cover approximately half of the
necessary daily calories of an adult. For the unemployed, this meal can be the only
guaranteed meal they have. Another way to interpret what these meals amount to
is to look at them in terms of their dollar value. The meals sell for UP$30 (approxi-
mately U$1.5) and are served Monday through Saturday, amounting to around U$36
a month per recipient. Considering that school age and pre-schoolers practically qual-
ify automatically, the benefit to the family can add up to over U$100 for a mother
and two children.
Overall, the program is appropriate to the empirical test because it delivers a
resource that drastically impacts the well-being of its recipients, delivering with it an
incentive to reciprocate its consumption with electoral support. The organ in charge
of the program is directly linked to the executive and has a history of manipulating
the distribution of the social workers that qualify recipients.
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5.3.6 Subsidio Familiar de Vivienda
The Subsidio Familiar de Vivienda (Family housing subsidy, henceforth SFV)
is a Colombian PAD meant to alleviate poverty by facilitating home ownership. It
does so by delivering a one-time lump sum loan that is to be used for the down pay-
ment of a home or lot, or alternatively to be used to buy materials to build a home
in case of applicants who already own their plots of land.
Loans must be repaid so the program is not to be thought of as free money. Its
main benefit is the repayment terms, which make the program extremely attractive
when compared to alternative ways to secure housing. According to ley Marco de
Financioacion de Vivienda (Ley 546, 1999), SFV loans are interest free and inflation
free, as the central government is committed to paying whatever inflation related loan
adjustments that have to be made, virtually ensuring that benefiters only pay back
the actual figure they borrowed. The program targets the population that is in great-
est need. To ensure efficient targeting, eligibility requirements keep loan amounts low
(maximum of 25 monthly minimum wages, or approximately U$6600). There are also
limits on the prices of the property that can be bought with the loans (135 monthly
minimum wages maximum, or approximately U$35000). These figures basically mean
that SFV facilitates a 20% down payment on a low income home, interest free for five
years.
Because housing is such a broad issue, the program falls under the scope of
multiple ministries10. The program is actually headed by a para-ministerial organi-
zation, the Consejo Superior de Vivienda (CoSuVi: Housing Supreme Council). This
council oversees all program operations and responds directly to the executive. Arti-
10The Environment, Planning, Agriculture, Social Development and Finance Ministries all play a
role in the program in various different capacities.
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cle first of decree 418/2000 states that the CoSuVi should actively zeal in favor of the
national government’s housing policy, monitoring and intervening in the allocation of
resources to ensure the program’s long term goals11. The CoSuVi is the program’s
pressure point for political manipulation. It is a centralized council with control over
the national budget and directly responsive to the national executive.
In summary, the program facilitates access to resources to segments of the
population that would otherwise find it significantly more difficult to secure housing.
The marginal impact of the program is large and likely to impact voting preferences.
These resources can be linked to the interests of the executive and his party and
therefore qualify as appropriate to the empirical tests carried here.
5.3.7 Becas Para La Paz
Becas Para La Paz (scholarships for peace, henceforth BLP) is one of two
Guatemalan programs that attempt to alleviate poverty through investments in ed-
ucation. The overarching long term goals of the two programs is to break with
intergenerational transmission of poverty and build human capital.
In the particular case of the BLP, this goal is achieved on the short run by
putting resources towards ensuring that public schools become an environment where
the vicious cycle of poverty transmission can be broken (Edubecas, Ministry of Educa-
tion). The BLP’s direct beneficiaries are the actual schools, as resources are channeled
directly to them. They come in the shape of books, schools supplies, student uni-
forms, teacher training sessions and funds to support adult night classes. The BLP
11Article 1, paragraphs 6 and 7.
http://www.superfinanciera.gov.co/Normativa/PublicacionesJuridicas/viviendauno/
dec418-009.html
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aims to make schools an attractive environment to students and parents and therefore
create an incentive for attendance.
School attendance has been a challenge for Guatemala. The United Nations
ranks Guatemala 122 out 177 in human capital (Development Programm Report,
2009). A 2000 study of the conditions of life in Guatemala estimated that only
two in ten Guatemaltecos would enroll in secondary school. Dropout rates in urban
Guatemala are as high as 38%, hitting an astonishingly high 71% in rural areas. The
study also indicated that education costs are the number one reason behind the choice
to drop out. (Encovi, 2000. INE).
By stimulating school attendance, the program impacts the students and also
their parents. With children in school full time both parents are able to earn income.
This assurance is even more vital in single parent households, where the only stream
of income is compromised when the parent must juggle job and care taking obliga-
tions.
The fact that the program facilitates not only the lives of students on the long
run, but also the lives of parents on the short run gives the program an electoral
dimension. Parents of students attending benefited schools are directly benefited
and therefore have an incentive to reciprocate with electoral support. To achieve its
goals from a logistics perspective, the program is managed by La Unidad de Becas,
which is a branch of the ministry of education that is solely focused on the success-
ful implementation of programs. The Unidad delivers resources directly to school
boards. This branch enjoys “ una alianza estratgica con la Secretara de Programacin
y Planificacin de la Presidencia” ( a strategic alliance with the executive’s secretary
of planning). Despite this strategic alliance, we were unable to secure any type of
guidelines that directly speak to the way in which resources should be allocated. After
reading the program’s brief and vague memorandum, the only clear message we were
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left with is that a great deal of discretion has to be exercised in carrying this program.
5.3.8 Becas Para La Nina
Becas Para la Nina (scholarship for girls, henceforth BLN) is the second of the
two Guatemalan educational programs. While the BLP attempts to stimulate school
attendance, the BLG is concerned with stimulating student performance. It does so
by directly targeting girls that perform well in school and rewarding their parents
with a cash transfer. The funds are delivered twice a year, in July and November.
The July delivery is conditional of attendance while the November delivery is also
conditional on the girl not having been held back at the end of the year. In 2005, the
BPLN reached roughly 50 thousand girls.
In the case of the BLN, the incentive to reciprocate with electoral support is
even stronger than with BNP. Cash transfers are given directly to parents twice a
year. The BLN is also managed by la Unidad de Becas and can be expected to be
under the same executive influence.
Not unlike the Becas para la Paz, we were also unable to secure any type of
directives that regulated the awarding of these resources. Previous research argues
that the way the Becas para La Nina program selects recipients, which basically asks
parents to nominate potential awardees, has reduced the program to a tool of political
largess at the hands of the ministry of education (Gallio, 2002). We argue that an
overall lack of clear guidelines is in itself a pressure point of political manipulation.
Without clear guidelines, the discretion of those in charge, in this case the ministry
of education, becomes the rule.
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Chapter 6
Data and Results
This chapter discusses the variables that go into the empirical test of theory
laid out in chapter 4. After all variables are introduced, we hypothesize their re-
lationships and discuss the statistical estimator. We conclude this chapter with a
discussion of the results, as they pertain to our theory as well as what they mean to
politics on the ground.
6.1 Variable Operationalization
The theoretical framework we developed in chapter 4 suggests that a party
will favor districts that are more likely to deliver critical marginal votes. Favoring
is our dependent variable and is operationalized as the percentage of the program’s
budget that is spent on a given district. Districts that are favored are expected to
receive larger proportions of the budget, ceteris paribus.
Districts are favored as a function of their likelihood of delivering marginal
votes, making this likelihood our independent variable of interest. The likelihood of
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delivering marginal is in itself a function of two possibilities: seat gain and seat loss.
Seat gains and losses occur when parties cross certain thresholds. These thresholds
are the SLT (seat loss threshold) and the SGT (seat gain threshold). Seats are lost
when parties drop below the SLT and seats are gained when parties cross the SGT.
We argued that a party protecting its seats should favor districts where its expected
vote share is barely above its SLTsq and a party looking to secure new seats should
favor districts where its expected vote share is slightly below the SGTsq+. Our inde-
pendent variables of interest are distances between the party’s expected vote share
and their respective thresholds.
A party concerned with losing seats should favor districts where their expected
vote share is very close to the marginal vote. The closer the expected vote gets to the
critical marginal vote share, the greater the chance that votes lost will include this
marginal vote and, consequently, cost the party a seat. Shorter distances translate
into greater risk of seat loss, hence the variable is labeled risk. Risk is operationalized
as the distance between the seat-losing marginal vote, identified by the SLTsq, and
the party’s expected vote share in the upcoming legislative race. Considering that
the chance of losing a seat increases as the distance decreases, we expect a negative
relationship between the proportion of the allocated budget and the distance between
votes. This produces the following hypothesis:
H1: The district’s proportion of the program’s budget increases as the risk variable
decreases
A party concerned with gaining seats is expected to favor districts where its
expected vote share is very close to a marginal vote, not unlike in the previous hy-
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pothesis. In this case the marginal vote a party focuses on is the one that delivers a
new seat, identified by the SGTsq+. Similar to hypothesis one, the closer the expected
vote gets to the marginal vote, the greater the chance that a gain in shares will include
this sought-after vote. Shorter distances translate into greater chance of securing the
new seat, hence the variable is labeled new seat. New seat is operationalized as the
distance between the seat-wining marginal vote and the party’s expected vote share.
Chances of securing a new seat increase as the distance decreases, suggesting a nega-
tive relationship between new seat and the proportion of the allocated budget. This
produces the following hypothesis:
H2: The district’s proportion of the program’s budget increases as the new seat vari-
able decreases
To test the overarching hypothesis that parties will favor districts where they
are closest to a marginal vote, whether it is a marginal vote that is closest to the
SLT or the SGT, we introduce a third hypothesis. A party concerned with securing
the most marginal votes will favor districts where its expected vote share is closest
to either the seat-losing or the seat-winning marginal vote. To test this hypothesis,
we introduce a variable called nearest.MV, which is operationalized as the smallest of
the risk and new seat values in that district. This produces the following hypothesis:
H3: The district’s proportion of the program’s budget increases as the nearest.MV
variable decreases
The calculation of the risk and new seat variables starts with inputting each
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district’s seat allocation formula, magnitude and number of competing parties into
the MuMD marginal vote algorithm introduced in table 4.3. For risk, we count the
number of seats the party in charge of the program holds in that district and use the
algorithm output to identify the SLTsq for that specific seat share, thus identifying
the marginal vote that will cost the party its seat share (disrupt the status quo) in
that particular district. We then calculate the absolute value of the difference be-
tween this SLT and the party’s expected vote share in that district.
I repeat this process for the new seat variable, but instead of calculating the
distance between the expected vote share and the SLTsq, we substitute the SLTsq
for the SGT for one seat above what the party currently holds1. In other words, we
account for the marginal vote that has to be secured so that an additional seat can
be earned (status quo plus one seat).
For the nearest.MV, we simply look at the already calculated values for risk
and new seat and take the smallest of the two.
To account for a party’s expected vote share, we use a party’s election results
for the previous election. Our intention was to use public opinion polling data as a
proxy for expected vote share, which presumably better reflects changes in support
since previous elections. We were unable to secure consistent polling data at the
district level for all districts. The little data we were able to secure are from six to
three weeks prior to elections, which is probably too late for a party to make any
1When a party ensures it will not lose a single seat, it is essentially protecting itself from losing
two or more seats and therefore this party does not have to contemplate SLTs other the one for its
current number of seats. When it comes to seat gains, we assume that a party will focus on gaining
one seat additional to the ones it currently holds in the district. To contemplate seat gain beyond
one additional seat would force us to introduce a series of assumptions about the distribution of
expected gains from the delivery of resources and is beyond the scope of this project.
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changes in its allocation patterns2. Previous election results have a 0.97 correlation
with current results, while the polling data we secured has a 0.82 correlation with
the same elections3. This suggests that polling data is not as good a predictor as
previous results despite being more current. Given availability and performance of
the polling data, we opted for the previous election results as the proxy. Figure 6.1
are plots of election results on polling data ( a) and on previous election results ( b)
for the polling data we were able to secure.
2For the polling data we did find, there were data from multiple polling companies, often with
conflicting predictions. Picking one over the other would force us to introduce further assumptions
about how parties pay attention to polling companies (and which ones), which is not trivial.
3The polling data consists of district level predictions for the top three performing parties for
Brazil’s 2006 elections. We regressed the actual 2006 results against the polling data and the 2002
results using two simple bivariate regressions. The polling data does not cluster around the regression
line as closely as do the previous results and the overall model fit of the polling data is not as strong.
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Figure 6.1: Previous Vote Shares and Polling data plots
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Figure 6.2 is the graphical representation of the operationalization process.
The figure builds on figure 4.2 and operationalizes the risk and new seat variables
twice. Subfigure (a) depicts the process for a hypothetical party holding one seat and
expecting a 15% vote share (marked by the X). Subfigure (b) depicts the process for
a party holding 2 seats and expecting an 81% vote share. In subfigure (a), because
the party holds one seat, the thresholds of reference are the SLT(1) (12%) and the
SGT(2) (64%). The risk and new seat variable values are 0.03 (|0.15-0.12|) and 0.49
(|0.15-0.64|). For subfigure (b), because the party holds two seats, the thresholds of
reference are the SLT(2) (35%) and the SGT(3) (89%). In this case, risk and new seat
values are 0.46 (|0.81-0.35|) and 0.08 (|0.81-0.89|). The nearest.MV for subfigure a is
0.03 (risk value), which is the closest of the two thresholds of interest. For subfigure
b, the nearest.MV is 0.08 (new seat value)
In addition to controlling for population size and poverty levels, we control
for a party’s incentive to direct resources to its strongholds or bailiwicks, as sug-
gested by Ames (1995). There is a control for the party’s incentive to put resources
in districts that have supported the party in executive races. Considering that this
is a cross country data set, we introduce controls that account for differences be-
tween countries4. We control for potential corruption in government by introducing
a transparency measure. We control for the stability of the political system, which
impacts how familiar political parties are with the electoral rules. There is a control
for whether voters are able to alter the order of the party list and, finally, a control
4Notice that country level controls do not vary at the district level. While a hierarchical model
would be more appropriate for data with different aggregation levels, such a model with only six
different countries would not perform well (see Gelman and Hill, 2007 pgs. 246-7). To attempt
to build further confidence in the results despite country differences, we ran six separate models,
one for each country. By doing so, we virtually eliminate any differences that might exist between
countries which might require controls in a cross sectional model. While not all of the coefficients
for our variables of interest are significant, which is expected given their small N (N average 30),
values are in the expected direction for five of the six countries.
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Figure 6.2: Graphical Representation of Operationalization Process
(a) holds 1 seat, expects 15%
(b) holds 2 seats, expects 81%
The nearest.MV for subfigure a is 0.03 (risk value), which is the closest of the two
thresholds of interest. For subfigure b, the nearest.MV is 0.08 (new seat value)
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for compulsory voting5. Please see table 6.1 for the operationalization and source of
all variables. Table 6.2 contains some descriptive statistics of the variables used in
the model.
Table 6.1: Variable Operationalization
Variable Operationalization Source
Favoring (dept var) percentage of program’s
budget spent at the district
(logit transformation)
MDS (Brazil,2008),
JuNAEB (Chile,
2007), MinEduc
(Guatemala,2005),
INDA (Uruguay, 2009),
DNP (Colombia, 2007)
MD (Argentina, 2007)†
Risk absolute value of the difference between the party’s
previous vote share and the SLT for the number of
seats held by the party in the district
Continued on Next Page. . .
5I have also attempted to introduce a series of other cross sectional controls, such as the party
age, degree of competition institutionally allowed by the system and the ability to pool votes across
parties. Unfortunately, these measures suffer from multicollinearity. When I include these measures,
their resulting VIFs are above 30, which is way beyond the accepted cut point of 10. The strong
level of multicollinearity that the introduction of these variables would introduce can render the
estimators useless (Fox, 1997 pg-338-40) and I therefore opted to keep them out of the model .
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Table 6.1 – Continued
Variable Operationalization Source
New Seat absolute value of the difference between the party’s
previous vote share and the SGT for one seat ad-
ditional to the ones already held by the party in
the district
Nearest.MV smallest of the risk and newseat values for the
party at the district
Population population per 100k, from
census
IBGE (Brazil,2001),
INDEC (Ar-
gentina,2001), DANE
(Colombia,2005),
INE (Chile,2006),
INE(Uruguay,2004),
INE (Guatemala
,2002)†
Poverty percentage of population
living with NBI(1), from
census
same as population
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 6.1 – Continued
Variable Operationalization Source
previous vote share(2) party’s legislative vote share
at the district in the previ-
ous legislative race
TSE (Brazil,2006),
TSE (Guatemala,2003),
CE (Uruguay,2004),
SerVel (Chile,2005),
Ministerio del Inte-
rior (Argentina,2003),
Registraduria (Colom-
bia,2006)†
Stronghold one if party has been the
largest vote getter in the
district for the past 2 elec-
tions. Zero otherwise
same as previous vote
share
Pres.Sup party’s executive vote share
at most recent race (district
level)
same as previous vote
share
Corruption∗ 11 point scale (0 most cor-
rupt, 10 least corrupt)
Transparency Interna-
tional country special-
ist Survey
Stability∗ number of years since the
most recent regime change
POLITY IV (durable)
Continued on Next Page. . .
94
Table 6.1 – Continued
Variable Operationalization Source
Compulsory∗ one if voting is mandatory,
zero otherwise(3)
Institute For Democ-
racy and Elec-
toral Assistance
(www.idea.int)
Alter.list∗ Zero if voter can alter the
party’s proposed list at the
ballot, one otherwise(4)
country electoral code
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 6.1 – Continued
Variable Operationalization Source
*- These variables are coded at the country level, which is one aggregation
level above the district level.
†- Census, Program and Electoral data are from each country’s electoral
courts, statistics bureaus and ministries. These are available from the
author by request.
1- NBI (Necessidades Basicas Insatisfechas: Unsatisfied Basic Needs) is
a method to identify population needs sponsored by the UN’s CEPAL
(Comision Economica para America Latina y el Caribe). It character-
izes poverty based on four criteria: access to housing, sanitation, basic
education and income.
2- This variable does not make it into the model but it is used to calculate
the risk and new seat variables.
3- Guatemala and Colombia are the two countries without mandatory
voting, all others require citizens to vote.
4- Brazil and Chile get a zero for having an open list. Colombia gets a
zero for allowing for a preferential vote. All others get a one.
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Table 6.2: Variable Descriptive Statistics
Variable Min Max Average SD
budget % 0.0001 0.293 0.034 0.043
risk 0.00006 0.721 0.216 0.17
new seat 0.019 0.893 0.395 0.209
nearest MV 0.00006 0.587 0.195 0.148
population 0.2510 41.011 2.145 4.957
poverty 0.004 0.999 0.236 0.177
Pres.Sup 0.048 0.817 0.318 0.109
Stronghold 0 1 0203 0.403
Corruption 3.26 7.86 5.086 1.88
Syst. Stability 9 50 22.883 12.19
Compulsory 0 1 0.666 0.47
Alter list 0 1 0.363 0.48
6.1.1 Statistical Estimator
We use a logit to estimate the coefficients. The dependent variable is a pro-
portion measure of the budget allocated to the district. Different budget sizes and
currencies introduce unwieldy distributions, justifying the choice to use proportion as
a way to standardize the measure across programs. While the adoption of proportions
solves the standardizing issue, proportion measures are bounded between zero and
one and this constitutes a violation of Gauss Markov assumptions. To circumvent
this violation, we use a logit transformation that fits the proportions in the R line
(Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1991). The model is expressed in the following functional
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form:
y =α + β1Hyp1&2&3 (6.1)
+ β2Poverty + β3Stronghold+ β4Pres.Sup+ (6.2)
+ β4Population+ β5Corruption+ β6Syst.Stability (6.3)
+ β7Compulsory + β8Alter.list (6.4)
+  (6.5)
We run three separate models. The three models are identical in all but the
variable of interest. The first model tests hypothesis one by using the risk variable.
The second model tests hypothesis two by using the new seat variable and the third
model tests both hypotheses (1 and 2) simultaneously using the nearest.MV variable.
6.2 Results and Interpretation
Table 6.3 contains the results for the models. The risk model (on the left col-
umn) tests hypothesis one, new seat model tests hypothesis two and the nearest.MV
model tests hypothesis three.
Given the transformations that variables must go through, it becomes difficult
to interpret their actual impact by simply examining the coefficients. We will inter-
pret their impact more thoroughly after a brief discussion of their overall support
for the hypotheses. The results reported in Table 6.3 support all three hypotheses.
The risk model, which tests whether districts where a party is in risk of losing seats
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Table 6.3: Logit Model(s) Results. Dept variable: Favoring
Risk New Seat Nearest.MV
risk -0.701** - -
(0.20) - -
new seat - -0.622** -
- (0.179) -
nearest.MV - - -1.229 **
- - (0.279)
poverty 0.096* 0.101 * 0.097*
(0.049) (0.079) (0.048)
pres. support 0.227 0.326 0.312
(0.248) (0.253) (0.248)
stronghold 0.0256 -0.039 0.028
(0.014) (0.074) (0.073)
population 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006)
alter list 0.448** 0.53 ** 0.442**
(0.089) (0.087) (0.085)
compulsory vote -0.21* -0.219** -0.317**
(0.084) (0.086)* (0.092)
corruption 0.086** 0.099** 0.129**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
system stability -0.004 -0.002 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Intercept -1.938** -1.987** -1.989**
(0.237) (0.24) (0.236)
adj R2 0.330 0.313 0.334
N 231
The * indicates statistical significance with a 5% confidence interval
and ** indicate 1%. Robust Standard errors are calculated using R
sandwich package.
The alter list, corruption, compulsory vote and system stability
variables are coded at the country level. We also ran six separate
models, one for each country, therefore eliminating cross country
differences. Resulting small sample sizes (average N approximately 30)
increases the errors but coefficients for the variables of interest were
negative for all but Chile (on the risk and nearest threshold models)
and for Chile, Colombia and Brazil on the new seat model. Overall,
the separate models suggest that results from the pooled models
presented in this table are robust despite cross country differences.
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receive larger proportions of the budget, produces statistically significant negative
coefficients. The negative sign reflects the shortening of the distance between the
expected and the marginal vote: the budget share increases as the distance decreases.
Evidence for hypothesis two, which states that a party will favor a district where it
is closest to securing a new seat, is also found. The coefficient for new seat is also
negative and statistically significant, matching the inverse relationship suggested by
the hypothesis. Overall evidence that parties go after the marginal vote, be that to
secure a new seat or to hold on to current seats is also found, as the coefficient for
nearest.MV is negative and statistically significant.
The logit transformation makes interpretation of the coefficients less intuitive
than that of a standard linear model. To better illustrate their impact, we calculated
the differences in the expected program budgets for a district with varying levels of
the nearest.MV variable. Consider an average Brazilian district6 where the incumbent
party’s expected vote share is 5 percentage points away from the nearest marginal
vote. The program’s expected budget for this district is 14.2%. Once I move this
expected vote share to 0.1 percentage points away from this same marginal vote, con-
sequently reducing the distance by almost 5%, the district’s expected budget increases
to 15.4%. While a 1.2% budget increase might appear small, from the perspective of
the district a 5% shift closer to the marginal vote increases its budget by 8.5%, which
is a substantial amount especially when no changes in population or poverty levels
have taken place.
The impact of marginal vote seeking becomes even more pronounced when
contrasted with the impact of poverty. Consider the same average district, where the
party’s expected vote share is 5 percentage points away from the nearest marginal
6By average, we mean a district where all other values are held at their respective means
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vote and poverty level is at the country’s mean. Instead of moving the party’s vote
share closer to the nearest marginal vote, we increased the poverty level by 5%. This
5% increase in poverty moves the budget from 14.2% to 14.5%, a gain of about 2%
from the perspective of the district. To put it bluntly, moving the vote share 1 per-
centage point closer to a marginal vote has an impact over four times larger than
increasing poverty levels by 1%. Considering that all programs used here are poverty
alleviation programs, it is natural to expect that poverty should be the main driver
behind allocation patterns. The data shows, however, that this expectation is un-
realistic. Figure 6.3a, named strategy free allocation, is a representation of what I
expect a marginal-vote-seeking-free allocation pattern to look like. Poverty does all
the driving and changes in the distance to the marginal vote would have no impact.
The impact of poverty is represented by the positive slope of the poverty axis and
marginal vote seeking’s lack of impact is represented by the lines running parallel to
the distance axis7.
Figure 6.3b, named observed allocation, is a graphical representation of the
allocation pattern derived from the observed data. As the graph clearly shows, dis-
tance to the marginal vote does not have a flat slope. By putting both the poverty
and marginal vote seeking slopes in the same metric, the graph shows that the impact
of marginal vote seeking is actually much stronger than poverty’s. By contrasting the
two graphs, it is clear that allocation pattern suggested by the data is drastically
different than what can be expected from a strategy free program. While poverty
does impact allocation patterns, it only plays a secondary role.
The observed pattern is largely driven by marginal vote seeking, evidenced by
the much steeper slope of the distance to the marginal vote measure. As a conse-
7While the actual slope (and functional form) of the graph is arbitrary, the important message
behind the graph is that the allocation pattern of a strategy free program is driven solely by poverty.
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Figure 6.3: Graphical Representation of Allocation Patterns
a: Strategy Free Pattern
b: Observed Allocation Pattern
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quence of the marginal vote seeking’s stronger impact, the programs’ original purpose
of targeting the poor takes a back seat to electoral interests. An efficient poverty al-
leviation program presupposes an ability to target the poor. In light of this required
ability, the take home message from figure 6.3(b) is that the observed allocation pat-
tern is inefficient. This inefficiency is evidenced by the fact that the point of highest
poverty is not the unanimous focus of resources, as is the case with the strategy free
graph (figure 6.3(a)). The fact that marginal vote seeking is taking place subtracts
from the programs ability to target those it originally intended to reach, the poor,
and therefore characterizes the inefficiency.
These programs are unable to simply target the poor and only able to tar-
get the segment of the poor whose votes are marginal. Given the stronger impact of
marginal vote seeking, should these programs be classified as either poverty alleviation
programs that happen to elect politicians or politician electing programs that happen
to alleviate poverty, the data suggests that the latter would be the most appropriate.
Ultimately, this analysis highlights the dangers that marginal vote seeking imposes
on a government’s ability to carry out policy in an efficient manner. The positive side
of these results is that program resources do reach the poor. Unfortunately, the nega-
tive side is that despite the praise these programs are getting regarding their poverty
alleviation capacities, evidence shows that resources are still being overwhelmingly
manipulated.
Concerns with space have kept us from addressing results related to controls,
most importantly presidential performance. The inability to produce robust coef-
ficients for this variable can be attributed to the complexity of the measure at a
conceptual level. Cox (1987) argues that candidates in multi candidate winner-take-
all races can have two main goals: maximize their lead or maximize their distance
from their competitors. Operationalizing the presidential support variable in accor-
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dance with these possible goals requires a degree of knowledge of the executive that is
unavailable to this study. Multiple operationalizations were attempted, without suc-
cess. The focus on the MuMD aspect and an attempt to produce a measure that can
be used cross sectionally may have diluted the potential performance of the measure.
System stability also failed to produce statistically significant results. Corruption
levels, compulsory voting and voter’s ability to alter party lists produced statistically
significant coefficients. Overall, the models have performed well despite the challenges
that cross sectional studies face.
6.3 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
It is important to see the above budget predictions with a critical eye. The
focus of this empirical test has been to leverage the power of our proposed marginal
return theory of politics to understand how parties chase after votes. We put the
theory through a stringent test, concentrating our efforts on MuMD systems. These
systems introduce district level idiosyncrasies that create strong incentives for par-
ties to adopt a much simpler strategy of vote maximization across the board. Despite
these strong incentives, our proposed marginal return theory of politics proved crucial
to the development of a framework that allowed us to better understand how parties
chase after votes in even the most complex of environments.
The examination of program budgeting is merely a way to test these incen-
tives. Ultimately, budget increases in one district must be met by decreases in other
district(s). Despite the importance of this zero sum dynamic, it pertains much more
to budgeting then it does to incentives to strategize over vote shares. As far as incen-
tives go, we have shown significant evidence that political actors differentiate between
the votes and this differentiation is captured well through the lenses of marginal re-
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turns.
Part II of this manuscript started with a discussion of how to leverage our
proposed marginal return theory of politics in order to explain electoral strategies in
MuMDs. As to future research on MuMD, we believe that results produced here are
the first step in the direction of building a model that is capable of identifying and
testing equilibria in MuMD systems, much like the studies discussed in the chapter 2.
Building on the evidence presented here, which suggests that parties favor districts
where they are closer to securing the marginal vote, future research can begin to build
models that incorporate the perspective of parties not only vis-a-vi their proximity
to marginal votes, but also vis-a-vi their competing parties. In other words, here we
assume that returns to investments in district are not affected by vote shares that
competing parties expect to secure (votewise). Returns to votes can increase simply
because competing parties might split vote shares into distributions that will inad-
vertently increase the marginal returns of other parties. Should these shifts become
obvious, contending parties might attempt to capitalize on them.
As to future research on the return to investments in the district, part II
has not directly addressed how the return to investments is impacted by how the
recipients of the investments, i.e. voters, perceive the resources delivered to them.
We purposely avoided this topic because its complexity is such that it should be
addressed on its own and not simply as a moving part of another test. Here, we by-
passed this discussing by assuming that the return to delivered PAD resources would
be constant across districts. Future research should take concerted efforts in relax-
ing this assumption. Part III of this manuscript takes the initial step in that direction.
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Part III
Voter Returns
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Chapter 7
Voters and Their Marginal Returns
7.1 Introduction
This manuscript started with the introduction of what we coined the marginal
return theory of politics. This broad theory attempts to explain political exchanges
by paying close attention to the returns to the investments that political agents make
into the political arena. We recognize that at its broadest and most general form,
the theory works mostly as a framework. We then suggest that this framework, while
powerful, must be carefully reduced to narrower realms before we can make it appli-
cable to specific topics.
Part II heeds this advice and narrows the broad theory into the more com-
partmentalized realm of electoral competition in multi member district systems. We
provide robust evidence that parties do mind the marginal returns of the votes they
chase after, strategically placing their resources in districts that offer them the great-
est returns vis-a-vis the votes being collected.
To conduct the tests in part II, we relied on the assumption that voters being
showered with PAD resources would return those resources with votes at the same
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rate. This assumption, which facilitated the test, is unlikely to hold. We recognized
the importance of this assumption since we first faced it, but chose not to relax the
assumption until now due to the complexity of the topic. Trying to account for the
marginal return of votes while simultaneously accounting for the marginal return of
delivered resources would introduce an unwieldy test. For the sake of clarity, we de-
cided not to address this assumption until we reached part III of the manuscript.
Here we address this assumption head on, elevating it to the main concern
of this third and final part of the manuscript. The following section discusses the
meaning of this assumption in further details, highlighting that we can actually lever-
age our marginal return theory of politics to assess its implications. We introduce
literature that has addressed the issue in a similar vein, discussing the similarities
and differences between them and the approach adopted here. Section 7.4 once again
takes our marginal return theory of politics as a starting point, taking the necessary
steps to narrow it down to a level that can help elucidate how resources are dis-
tributed as a function of how voters will consume these resources. We conclude this
chapter by introducing a series of expectations that are a direct result of relaxing the
assumption of constant returns to delivered resources while being informed by our
general marginal return theory of politics.
7.2 Conceptualizing Returns based on voter re-
sponse to resources
In part II, when we assumed that the returns to PAD resources were constant,
what we meant was that once a voter received those resources, they would consume
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those resources and return them with a vote. The constant return aspect suggests
that all else equal, the delivery of x amount of resources would always lead to the
collection of y many votes. Because in part II our focus was on the marginal return
of the votes themselves, we purposely shied away from the challenge of understanding
how a voter processes the resources delivered to her.
We recognize that the assumption of constant returns is unlikely, which is why
we are addressing it in this part of the manuscript. In part II, we got around the
assumption by controlling for district support for the president and party stronghold
at the district. Here we leverage the marginal return theory in order to do without
the assumption altogether.
In politics as it happens on the ground, voters do not all respond to resources
delivered to them at a constant rate. Half a century ago, Key (1955) argued that vot-
ers are impacted by how psychologically involved they are, how intense the cleavages
are between groups, what voters expect to be the consequences of their votes, just
to name a few. It should come as no surprise to any student of politics that voters
will not simply turn away from their preferences and blind return vote for resource,
especially if given the choice to exercise its vote in secret.
If we don’t expect students of politics to be surprised by the multitude of ele-
ments that impact voter choice, we certainly don’t expect political parties not to be
aware of them either. Quite contrarily, the chief point of our marginal return theory
of politics is that political agents pay close attention to the returns of their invest-
ments. If resources delivered have different returns on account of elements related to
how voters will perceive of those resources, we expect that political parties will pay
close attention to these very elements.
While we are honest about the importance of relaxing this assumption, we
are also painfully aware that we cannot account for all of the elements that voters
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take into account when marking their ballots. Here we limit our study to what we
believe to be the two most important cues that voters account for when making their
decisions: partisanship and output expectation.
By partisanship, we speak of a degree of attachment to a certain party. Sup-
posedly attachment can range from completely attached to completely unattached.
By output expectation, we speak of voter expectations related to the output that
parties produce, ranging from policy to pork. The underlining assumption is that
voters make their decision based on their levels of partisanship and their expectations
of what political parties should do. In the next section, we develop the theoretical
framework that will inform the empirical test carried in this third and final part of
the manuscript. The departing point for this framework is, obviously, our marginal
return theory of politics.
7.3 Returns to Resources: Influential Works
Research on the redistribution of resources has leveraged the concept of re-
turns as a way to produce expectations. Researchers have paid particular attention
on the use of pork barreling as a political currency to buy support. A focus on pork
barreling goes as far back as Ferejohn (1974). Beyond pork barreling in the U.S.
(Bickers and Stein, 1996 and 2000; Balla et al, 2002), researchers have examined
pork barreling in Latin America (Menocal, 2001; Molinar and Weldon, 1994; Schady,
2000; Calvo and Murillo, 2004, Ames, 1995), Scandinavia (Tavits, 2009), continen-
tal Europe (Lancaster and Patterson, 1990; Golden and Picci, 2008) and Australia
(Denemark, 2000). Pork barreling has shown to be resistant to institutional varia-
tions, having reared its head in presidential systems such as the US, Mexico, Peru,
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Argentina and Brazil (Bickers and Stein, 1996; Ames, 1995; Menocal, 2001; Schady,
2000, Calvo and Murillo, 2004) as well as parliamentary systems such as Finland,
Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Italy and Australia. (Tavits, 2009; Golden and Picci,
2008; Denemark, 2000). Not only is it used in SMD and PR systems, but in mixed
systems as well (Stratmann and Baur, 2000).
When making their predictions, these works rely heavily on swing and core
group models of allocation. Borrowing from profiles described by Fenno (1978), these
models predict allocation patterns based on which groups, core or swing, are the
most appropriate targets. (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibul, 1987).
In essence, core and swing groups are elegant typologies of returns to investments:
resources exchanged between parties and core opposers, core supporters and swing
groups can be perceived as nothing but exchanges with various rates of return. Core
supporters are groups of voters who support a given party unconditionally and solely
based on party label. According to this definition core supporters vote by seeking
to identify which of the candidates represents their party. Once a core supporter
recognizes that a given candidate enjoys the endorsement of their party, it is enough
for her to deliver her support. By definition, a core supporter of a given party is a
core opposer of all other parties. This is because the only cue that will prompt a core
supporter to deliver its vote is a specific party label. No other party is able to give
this core supporter the cue she is looking for and therefore these voters will always
support their party of choice and consequently oppose all other parties. Swing groups,
on the other hand, do not enjoy a strong attachment to any given party and take
cues other than partisanship, i.e. consumption goods such as pork, when it comes to
delivering their vote.
The literature on these models has made considerable strides in clarifying why
certain groups, i.e. core supporters, make for better investments than swing groups,
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depending on either risk or redistributive capacity (Lindbeck and Weibul, 1987, Dixit
and Londegran 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1998b). Lindbeck and Weibul (1987) argue
that when simply based on ideological attachment, swing groups enjoy a much higher
return to a party’s investment because when making their decision, swing groups
emphasize consumption over ideological attachment. Cox and McCubbins (1986)
recognize the importance of consumption for swing groups, but argue that their net
returns are lower than those of core supporters on account of the risk involved with
targeting swing groups. Namely, Cox and McCubbins argue that core supporters are
a well-known group, with whom a party enjoys a close relationship and therefore can
easily identify and effectively target. The gains incurred by targeting swing groups
are countered by losses coming from the likely errors that will come associated with
addressing groups about which a party knows very little. These errors can come in
the shape of addressing wrong groups, addressing the correct groups with the wrong
resources or even addressing the correct swing groups with the correct resources but
with wrong timing.1. In addition, Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that while swing
groups are more responsive, they are responsive to other parties as well. Their re-
turns, while attractive on grounds of responsiveness, are lowered by the fact that they
are “an open game” for any party to capitalize on (Cox and McCubbins, 1986, pg.
379).
We recognize the important strides that this literature has made in develop-
ing models of resource allocation that are theoretically driven. These models have
been widely used in empirical studies that have attempted to shed light on party re-
source allocation. (see Tavits,2009; Menocal, 2001; Schady, 2000 just to name a few).
Unfortunately, the introduction of the risk parameter detracts from the model’s ex-
1A notable exception to these models is discussed by Weingast et al (1981), which addresses
spillover effects of targeted redistribution efforts.
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planatory power. When we don’t account for risk, swing groups enjoy higher rates
of return and emerge as the likeliest targets of resources. When we do account for
risk, than net returns from swing groups are lowered and core supporters emerge as
likely targets. Between the two variations of the model (accounting for risk and not
accounting for risk), we can justify allocation patterns to either group. While it is
relatively noncontroversial to assume that core groups are less risky, electoral risk is
difficult to observe and propensity to accept or reject risk is complex to assess in the
realm of collective bodies. While individuals are risk accepting or risk takers, even
the most disciplined parties are still collective bodies. We cannot say that a certain
party is risk taking without anthropomorphizing it, yet we don’t really know how risk
propensity works at this collective level of aggregation.
It is not the goal of this manuscript to demerit the works that have either ad-
vanced these models theoretically or applied them empirically. Quite contrarily, not
only do we recognize the importance of the models, but we accept them as evidence
to the power of the marginal return theory of politics that we are trying to advance
here. While these models are not as explicit about the explanatory powers of marginal
returns as we have been throughout this manuscript, the concept of marginal returns
is crucial to the functioning of the models. We accept these models as a departure
point to part III of this manuscript. The overarching goal of the manuscript is to
leverage the power of marginal returns and in light of that goal, we take it upon
ourselves to introduce a more precise typology of returns to investment in different
groups.
To develop such a typology, we step away from risk as a parameter of interest.
Our choice to shy away from risk is based on two main reasons. First, as we have
alluded to above, accounting for risk solves a problem by introducing another prob-
lem. When we account for risk, we do introduce a theoretically plausible factor in
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discerning between returns. Unfortunately, we also create the problem of identifying
risk propensity at the party level. It has been argued that incumbent parties are risk
averse, while challengers are risk takers. This suggests that incumbents would shy
away from swing groups while challengers would be attracted to those. While that
may be the case, competitive races make it practically impossible to discern between
the behavior of incumbents and challengers, subtracting from the applicability of the
parameter. Second, for reasons we’ll discuss further in the next chapter, the risks of
making targeting errors can be reduced by the deployment of the government spon-
sored machines that come attached to PAD programs; which are once again adopted
in the empirical test here at part III.
The next section focuses on improving the typology of returns introduced by
core & swing models of resource redistribution. It does so by placing front and center
the elements that individuals take into account when making their electoral choices.
7.4 Choice Making
To give choice making a more central role in our theory, we draw from the
literature on persuasion. This literature is strongly rooted around the question of
how voters make their choices and what are the elements that impact these decisions.
Lasswell (1948, pg.216) argues that a useful way to frame communication and persua-
sion is to attempt to answer the following questions: “who says what to whom with
what effect? ”. In the case of the delivery of resources as a persuasion attempt, our
who is a political party. In this manuscript, we have used PAD resources as our what
and we’ll continue to use PADs here in part III. A group of voters is our whom. The
point we must focus on is to what effect.
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It is worth noting that the to what effect aspect speaks directly to our previ-
ous assumption of constant returns in part II. Previously we assumed that resources
delivered to a group would all be reciprocated with votes at a constant rate. In the
context of Lasswell’s framework, we would say that part II has focused on under-
standing who says what to whom, having left out the with what effect part. Here we
focus on incorporating this final aspect.
Several researchers within the literature on individual choice making have
geared their efforts towards understanding the effects of exchanges between persuader
and persuaded during the decision making process. Exchanges need not be material
and can be as simple as an information exchange during a conversation or even one
sided exchanges that come through exposure to media. This literature is not without
contending theories.
Several works argue that political choices are made based on how individuals
access and process their memory banks. Some argue that voters make their choices
based on information they can retrieve from memory, an approach known as the mem-
ory based (Zaller, 1992; Zaller and Feldman, 1992; Higgins and King, 1981). This
approach presupposes that when a voter is exposed to information, she will store that
information into a memory bank. When it comes time to make an electoral decision,
this voter will draw all the information from this bank, assess it all and decide. This
approach suggests that choices are made when choices are needed. In other words,
it is only when confronted with the need to make a choice that a voter will draw its
memory bank and decide.
Memory based models have been criticized due to the black box nature of the
model. These models rely heavily on the creation and maintenance of memory banks
that voters can turn to in decision making times, yet little is known about the biases
that come associated with accessing and managing these banks (Lodge et al, 1990).
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Voters are constantly bombarded with electoral information, potentially to a level of
overload. Which pieces of information make it to the memory bank and how it is
assessed later presumably impact the final decision, yet we know little about them.
Information is hardly ever impervious to interpretation and it is hard to argue that
voters will store information as it is presented to them and without any distortion.
The process of storing information can in itself be an interpretation process, which
would imply that choices indeed begin to be shaped way before any decision is ac-
tually made. These models are also criticized for the underlining assumption that
voters maintain memory banks, an assumption that requires a heavy investment in
the part of the voter.
Other works that also rely on information processing have side stepped some
of the memory storing and accessing challenges by substituting the memory based
approach in favor of what is termed online processing (Hastie and Park, 1986; Bassili,
1989 ). Online processing rejects the memory based notion that choices are made
when choices are needed and argues that voters are in fact making choices every time
they receive information. Instead of storing information into a memory bank to be
accessed when decisions are needed, online processing suggests that voters constantly
juxtapose information against preference. The process consists of weighting the in-
formation at the time it is presented against a current preference, with the goal of
updating the preference. The information is processed and its evaluation is tallied
against a current preference. Once the information is processed and the new pref-
erence is produced (either enforcing or swaying a current preference), information is
instantly discarded and the voter is simply left with the updated preference. The
ability to discard information once preferences are updated allows these models to
avoid the criticism that voters are heavily invested in the voting act. By being able to
discard information, there is no need to incur the costs associated with maintaining
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a memory bank. As to how evaluations are made during the preference updating
process, these models are still susceptible to the same criticism that memory based
models face.
In a different vein, other research that has gotten significant attention focuses
on aversions to risk (Quattrone and Tversky, 1988) and framing effects (Druckman,
2000; Druckman, 2004; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). This literature argues that
choice making is strongly impacted by how information is framed when presented
to voters. Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) argue that choice making is impacted by two
main dimensions. The first is the for or against dimension, which speak to whether
arguments presented are meant to impact preference in favor or against a particular
choice. The second dimension is the level of difficulty of the argument presented.
Their evidence suggests that arguments attempting to persuade against a choice are
more effective than arguments for it, sometimes overriding traditionally strong pre-
dictors of choice such as partisanship. It is not only the content of message that
can impact choice, but also the qualities associated with its source. Researchers have
found that the credibility of those delivering the message impact the message’s overall
ability to persuade. Enhanced credibility comes from being a recognized expert in
the field, an incumbent or a popular official (Page et al, 1987. Kuklinski and Hurley,
1994) . These positions reflect concerns for expertise, membership (insider status)
and likability. Expertise and inside information status can be interpreted as ways for
voters to minimize the risk of making erroneous decisions. In this manuscript, we shy
away from risk related theories due to a concern that incorporating these elements
into decision making would inevitably lead us to simply replicate risk based typologies
we are attempting to build on in the first place.
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7.4.1 Defining Voter Profiles
Regardless of the approach, these literatures share a consensus that choices
are fluid and that they change depending on conditions related to voters’ beliefs and
capacities, which interact in a political environment. Here we take this consensus,
chiefly the notions of belief and capacity, as a starting point to build our contribution
to the current resource allocation models. We do so by analyzing the combinations
of capacity and belief with an eye on how they impact changes in choice.
From the literature on individual choice making, we learn that returns can
be perceived as a function of belief and capacity. Certain combinations of these two
dimensions will successfully impact choice making and push voters to change their
minds, while other combinations will not do so. In part II, we argue that political par-
ties distribute resources with an eye on the returns of the votes they collect. Here, we
frame the discussion of returns with a focus on their persuasiveness. Belief-Capacity
combinations that lead to stronger chances of persuasion have higher returns than
combinations that lead to weak changes of persuasion. Consequently, we argue that
political agents will favor the voters whose combination of the dimensions of interest
yield high returns to their resources, ignoring those whose combinations yield low
returns.
These dimension combinations are explored in Basinger and Lavine (2005).
The authors interpret the concepts of belief and capacity as ambivalence and aware-
ness, respectively; defining them as the two main axes behind electoral choices. Am-
bivalence is the degree to which one feels attached to a single interpretation of an issue
space. Ambivalent individuals are likely to see an issue from multiple angles, often
validating multiple sides of an argument. Non-ambivalent individuals, on the other
hand, do not seek multiple perspectives and either validate or reject an argument
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from a single, constant point of view. Awareness speaks to an individual’s ability to
process information. An aware voter is one who is able to process the information it is
faced, while an unaware one is unable to do so. This could be the due to intellectual
level or simply due to the high complexity of the information itself.
It is important not perceive of ambivalence as a type of indifference. Indiffer-
ence is actually rather contrary to the concept of ambivalence in that an indifferent
individual cannot be bothered to distinguish between choices. Ambivalence on the
other hand suggests that an individual welcomes differences between choices, analyz-
ing them carefully and accounting for them from multiple angles. It is also important
not to confuse ambivalence with the notion of sophisticated voting. Sophisticated vot-
ing has been interpreted as the result of a thoughtful use of policy to guide electoral
decisions (Carmines and Stimson, 1980), an ability to attribute causal responsibility
to the correct agents (Gomez and Wilson, 2001) or just simply the ability to sift
relevant from irrelevant information (Mackuen et al, 1992). While all of these inter-
pretations require a careful interpretation, they say little about how decisions account
for multiple angles of the same issue. Sophisticated voters may make decisions after
giving a single issue thorough attention, without necessarily having contemplated the
same issue from multiple angles.
Different combinations of awareness and ambivalence create different profiles
and researchers have examined how these profiles behave. Basinger and Lavine (2005)
argue that when a voter of low ambivalence levels makes an electoral choice, she re-
frains from contemplating the choice from multiple angles. This voter simply turns to
her partisanship ties and decides based on that alone, irrespective of awareness levels.
Here we see a similarity with Cox and McCubbins’s aforementioned core voter. Much
like a core supporter or a core opposer, this non-ambivalent voter does not make use
of the information presented to her (regardless of the complexity level of the infor-
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mation) and simply decides based on partisanship. This becomes our first profile of
interest, which we call partisan voter.
When a voter of high level awareness and high level ambivalence makes a
choice, Basinger and Lavine (2005) argue that this combination leads her to shun
partisanship and use the information to vote based on issue positioning. Here we see
some similarities with the swing voter as characterized in traditional redistribution
models; neither type relies on partisanship to make electoral choices. This profile
becomes our second profile of interest and we call it the issue voter.
When a voter of low levels awareness and high level ambivalence makes a
choice, Basinger and Lavine argue that she still attempts to contemplate multiple an-
gles surrounding her decision, but is frustrated by the complexity of the information
at hand and ultimately is forced to make her decisions based on personal gains. In
other words, this voter makes its decision based on how each option best improves
her own well-being. Here we also see similarities with the traditional swing voter, as
partisanship also does not play an important role in the decision making. This profile
is our final profile of interest, which we name consumer voter.
7.4.2 Profile Returns and General Expectations
These three different profiles use different cues when it comes to making their
electoral decisions. Based on our marginal return theory of politics, we expect that
resources will be focused on the profiles that offer the greatest returns to resources
delivered. To draw expectations from these profiles, we need to examine each one
of them with an eye on their returns. Here, as in part II, we continue to think of
resources as PADs in hopes that findings from part II can inform our findings here
and vice versa.
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We start by analyzing returns to investment from partisan voters. This profile
makes electoral decisions based on partisanship. We argue that PAD resources are
wasted in these groups, as they will be consumed by voters while having no con-
sequences on their electoral choices. Because PAD resources are not an input in a
partisan voter’s decision process, we argue that partisan voters have the worst returns
to resources. Considering their returns, this is our first our general expectation:
All else equal, partisan voters should receive the least amount of resources.
Our second profile of interest are issue voters. Not unlike partisan voters,
issue voters also do not account for resources delivered as an input in their decision
making process. As such, our initial expectation is that their returns would not dif-
fer from those of partisan voters. However, we recognize that PAD programs are a
consequence of developmental policies and therefore carry some element of issue posi-
tioning in them, even if it is only a second order type of cue. PAD resources delivered
to issue voters may be interpreted as a sign of issue positioning in the sense that
they show a party’s commitment to poverty alleviation and therefore impact voters
favorably towards the party delivering them. Based on this possibility, we argue that
issue voters have higher returns to (PAD) resources than those of partisan voters.
Our second general expectation follows:
All else equal, issue voters should receive more resources than partisan voters.
Our final profile, consumer voters, emerges as the group with the highest
returns to PAD resources. For these voters, resources that can be consumed and
directly impact their personal gains are the chief input in their decision making pro-
cess. For a party with fungible resources to dole out, these voters become the most
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attractive because the resources will directly impact these voters towards supporting
the party. Based on the main role that these resources will play, we rank the returns
of consumer voters as the highest returns of all profiles and therefore should become
the main target of parties with fungible resources to distribute. Our third and final
general expectation is the following:
All else equal, consumer voters should receive more resources than either partisan or
issue voters.
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Chapter 8
The FONCODES program
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter we introduce another PAD; Peru’s Fondo de Cooperacion para
el Desarrollo Social (Cooperation Fund for Social Development, henceforth FON-
CODES). We decided to continue to focus on PADs for the empirical test of part
III in hopes that findings that come out from this test can inform findings from part
II and vice versa. By continuing to utilize a poverty and development program, the
nature of the resources employed in the test remains constant throughout the entire
manuscript and findings from parts II and III can better inform each other. This
chapter has three main goals: to discuss Peru as an appropriate case for our empiri-
cal test, to introduce an overview of our program of choice, and to discuss the level of
analysis (mayoral races) of the test. In the following section, we address the overall
suitability of Peru as a case. Section 8.3 introduces FONCODES, discussing its his-
tory, types of projects, organizational structure and history of political manipulation.
Section 8.4 discusses the levels of analysis of the empirical test. A brief conclusion
summarizes the chapter.
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8.2 Peru as an Appropriate Test
The first question that needs answering is a simple one: why is Peru an appro-
priate test to our theory. Peru’s party system during the 1980s was relatively stable.
Most of the votes were split between four main parties. These were the Alianza Popu-
lar Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, henceforth
APRA), the Accion Popular (Popular Action, AP), the Izquierda Unida (United Left,
IU) and the Partido Popular Cristiano (Popular Christian Party) (see Melendez 2007
for a historical overview of each of these parties). Researchers have argued that these
parties enjoyed an overall strong presence in the Peruvian political arena during the
1980, even if there were differences in strength between the right and left wing parties
(Tanaka, 1998, Cotler, 1994). Through most of the decade, independent candidates
running without any party labels secured an average of no more than 9% of the total
vote. The four parties mentioned above managed to secure around 91% of the valid
votes1, which serves as evidence of their established presence in Peruvian elections of
all levels, be them legislative, local or executive. Levitt (2000) recognizes the presence
of parties throughout the decade, but highlights that despite their electoral perfor-
mances, they are marked by a personalistic traits that are more common in weak
party systems.
Despite disagreements over party strength during the 1980’s, there is a large
body of research that argues that a decade of Fujimori rule wreaked havoc to the
party system (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003; Tanaka, 1998; Cameron, 1994; Graham,
1994), bringing the four main established political parties to their knees. With the
end of the Fujimori era, traditional parties such as the APRA and the AP have be-
1These figures were calculated by the author, based on data found on Tanaka (1998, see table
1.5, pg.55)
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gun to take steps towards rebuilding their support base (Kenney, 2003; Levitsky and
Cameron, 2003).
The post Fujimori political environment gives Peruvian parties such as the
APRA an opportunity to reconnect with old supporters and find new ones. Re-
building party support is crucial, as old allegiances are likely to have eroded during
Fujimori’s decade long attack on traditional parties. On one hand, the erosion of old
allegiances hurts a party. On the other hand, if all parties have suffered from this
erosion, then that means there are pools of voters with weak links to any parties.
These voters can be courted and hopefully annexed to a given party support base.
Given this ripe environment for party support building, it makes sense for a party
with resources to strategize well over them. With the party system still fluid, voter
allegiance is not set in stone and, as a consequence, returns to resources are particu-
larly heightened. In light of the status of party politics in this period, we believe that
Peru is an appropriate case for our theory.
Not as crucial to our choice but still worth noting, with a decade long discon-
nect between party and support base, much of the knowledge of one’s support base
is lost. Traditional models of resource allocation rely on the knowledge of one’s base
as a parameter that allows for the differentiation between the returns of core and
swing voters. Simply put, knowledge of ones support base allows a party to minimize
allocation errors, boosting the returns of those groups. Without this knowledge, tra-
ditional models lose some of their explanatory power. On that account, Peru emerges
as an appropriate test because the Fujimori decade of party disconnect is likely to
have wiped away much of this knowledge. If our proposed explanation performs well
despite the use of this parameter, we can feel even more confident about its overall
applicability.
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8.3 Foncodes as an Appropriate PAD Program
8.3.1 History
Like its PAD counterparts throughout Latin America, the FONCODES is
a program that attempts to promote local development. Its main goal is to reduce
poverty by ways of facilitating access to basic social services, improving infra-structure
and fomenting productive capacities.
The program was first introduced by Fujimori in mid-1990 as a palliative to
the severe economic crisis that impacted an overwhelming fraction of the population.
Since the mid-1980s, Peru’s economy had been under constant degradation and large
fractions of the population were under a strong poverty undertow that kept pulling
them further into poverty. According to Glewwe and Hall (1992), Garcia’s unortho-
dox attempts to control hyperinflation were unsuccessful and for every attempt that
failed, hyperinflation kept on corroding at the purchase power of the Peruvian popu-
lation. By late 1990s, Glewwe and Hall estimate that as much as 54% of Peruvians
living in Lima were under the poverty line, up from 12% since the first half of that
decade. According to World Bank figures, Peruvian GDP per capita in 1981 was
US$1846 (In 1988 US dollars). In 1990 that figure was US$1312, which was combined
with an average yearly growth in consumer prices of 7500%, resulting in devastating
instability and uncertainty (Graham, 1994).
To effectively take charge of this downward trend, Fujimori was forced to
adopt severe austerity measures, which were expected to cause even more social un-
rest.2 Initially Fujimori opted to adopt orthodox austerity measures without the aid
2Graham (1994) argues that this very awareness of the consequences of austerity programs is
what made Garcia so reluctant to adopt them in the first. According to the author, Garcia was
aware that adopting austerity measures could give him the handle on the economy that was needed,
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of any social safety net, despite having campaigned on an anti-austerity platform.
Graham (1994) argues that social upheavals such as strikes and street protests had
been strongly associated with anti Sendero Luminiso movements and the population
feared that taking the streets could lead to reprisals from the Sendero itself, which
mitigated incentives to take the streets. Without observing social unrest, Fujimori
deployed austerity measures without showing concern for how the public would react
to them.
Not surprisingly, it was not long until the already overstretched population
began to feel the stresses of the austerity measures. Fujimori did not take notice
of the discontent until mid-1990, at which point he deployed the program under an
“emergency fund” banner. At its initial stage, the FONCODES was named Programa
Social de Emergencia (Emergency Social Program). Its effectiveness was questionable,
mainly because the program’s control was given to Percy Vargas, who was close with
Hurtado Miller. Fujimori feared Miller was beginning to mount a campaign against
him and could ultimately claim the credit for the program. This fear prompted Fu-
jimori to give the program only minimal resources, essentially dooming it from the
start. As the austerity measures continued to hurt the population, the Inter-American
Development Bank pushed Fujimori to fund the program by facilitating a US$425 mil-
lion loan.
With IDB money, Fujimori warmed up to the program. In mid-1991, the pro-
gram is renamed FONCODES, the name it continues to hold as of today. Fujimori
was quick to replace Vargas for Luz Salgado, not only Fujimori’s copartisan but also
a key player in the orchestration of Fujimori’s presidential bid. Her appointment is
taken as evidence of Fujimori unwillingness to let go of the opportunity to capitalize
but the political consequences of these plans was far too great and risky for Garcia to adopt them.
Instead, Garcia attempted creative and unorthodox solutions that eventually proved fruitless.
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on the electoral benefits that can be reaped from the disbursement of resources to
voters. While Salgado was replaced one year after her initial appointment as program
director, Schady (2000) argues that Fujimori continued to leverage the FONCODES
as an electoral tool throughout the entire decade.
A decade after Fujimori’s departure from Peruvian politics, the FONCODES
remains an important social development program.
8.3.2 Lines of Action
The FONCODES operates through three main lines of action: development of
production, development of population capacities and development of social infras-
tructure.
Development of production entails investments towards the strengthening of
the means of production through the deployment of infra-structure initiatives that
boost agriculture and facilitate the transformation and commercialization of agricul-
ture yields. Development of population capacities aims at the development of social
capital. Its main directive is to improve the execution of social programs by incen-
tivizing what the program calls protagonism (protagonismo). Protagonismo is the
notion that the population that is going to benefit the most from resources delivered
by the FONCODES should be educated in ways that empower them to become the
protagonists of those programs, actively shaping program outcomes and outreach in
local communities.
The development of social infrastructure entails financing small projects that
aim at satisfying the basic needs of the population. With an average cost of around
US$35 thousand, social infrastructure projects mainly attempt to build local educa-
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tion centers, overpasses that can sustain the weight of cars or horse carriages, health
clinics, water filtration or sewage systems.
8.3.3 FONCODES: History and Structure of Manipulation
FONCODES was not the first safety net like program in Peru. All through
the 1980s, programs were set up to attend to the poor. From roughly 1985 to 1989,
the APRA government invested resources on two main programs, the PAD (Pro-
grama de Assistencia, not to be confused with Poverty Alleviation and Development)
and the PAIT (Programa de Apoyo de Ingreso Temporal: Program of Temporary
Income Support). Graham (1991, pg. 98) argues that the PAIT was a highly central-
ized, semi-autonomous institution that was capable of bypassing opposition and the
lethargy of the political process, often circumventing local institutions that were not
politically aligned with APRA. President Alan Garcia showed a strong concern with
populating the PAD and PAIT bureaucracies with APRISTAs (APRA members or at
least sympathizers), showing blatant efforts to leverage the program as an electoral
tool. Ultimately, argues Graham, the fate of these programs were largely undermined
by the critical role that political criteria played in the allocation of resources (Gra-
ham, 1991, pg. 129).
When it came time for Fujimori to set up FONCODES, it is not surprising
that the program was designed with an eye on political manipulation. As mentioned,
one of Fujimori’s more blatant attempts to establish a direct link between himself
and FONCODES was to name Luz Salgado as program director. Kay (1996) argues
that after working out the initial kinks of the program’s first and second years, Fu-
jimori drastically targeted program resources towards districts that had shown most
resistance to his constitutional amendments (particularly the one that legalized his
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reelection), in what Kay illustrates as a blatant use of public resources to build elec-
toral support. “By mid-1994, the Presidential Ministry, through FONCODES, was
responsible for the management of 4,760 support projects, most of which (54%) were
public works that kept an estimated 23,000 employed in new jobs (on a monthly ba-
sis) throughout the year” (Kay, 1996, pg.80). Schady (2000) analyzes departmental
level, monthly FONCODES data from 1991 to 1995. His findings, which are robust to
several statistical specifications and controls, suggest that Fujimori was keenly aware
of the timing of electoral business cycles.
Schady (2000) argues that beyond the appointment of Luz Salgado, Fujimori
also engineered the FONCODES to be largely responsive to him. The program was
set up as an autonomous body that operated parallel to traditional ministries. The
justification for this isolation from traditional means of politics was to give the pro-
gram the agility and flexibility necessary to respond to the needs of a population with
fast eroding quality of life. Linking FONCODES to traditional ministries would mean
that the program would be susceptible to the lethargy of the bureaucracies that come
attached to these ministries. On paper, this flexibility makes sense. However, when
you couple this flexibility with a governing body that is tethered to the executive,
the program’s flexibility and agility are used to the benefit of the executive, not the
people. This tethering was accomplished by making the FONCODES director report
directly to a board of directors. This board, which consists of four members, was
directly appointed by the executive (Fujimori himself).
It is import to highlight that in our empirical test, we use FONCODES data
under APRA’s 2006 government. It is therefore crucial that we examine the admin-
istrative organization of the FONCODES in that period, roughly 15 years after the
program’s debut.
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Since the original decree that first instituted the FONCODES in 19913, the
program’s administrative organization has gone through roughly three restructuring
rounds. All the way through 2002, the program had maintained its autonomous body
status, along with the president appointed board of directors. Our analysis of the
subtle changes in the organization of the program suggests that the executive’s hold
over the program remain strong. In 2002, decree 017-2002-MLMDES brings about the
first organizational changes that can actually impact the president’s control. While
there are significant changes made to the program, it is not clear how these changes
either hamper or facilitate political manipulation from the executive.
There is evidence to argue that the program becomes less susceptible to po-
litical manipulation by the executive, which is based on the program’s loss of its
“autonomous status”. The decree effectively subordinates the FONCODES to the
Ministry of Women and Social Development (MLMDES: Ministerio de la Mujer y
Desarrollo Social). The autonomous status afforded the program with agility to op-
erate without the constraints of a typical government agency and its subordination
to the MLMDES effectively reduces that agility. However, the decree clearly specifies
that the FONCODES is to remain a decentralized public body within the MLMDES4.
Ministerial Resolution 455 [RM-455.2005] does away with the four member board of
directors, all of which were appointed directly by the executive. The dissolution of
the board, however, is not clear cut when it comes to strengthening or weakening the
executive’s control over the program. In its original version, the four member board
answered to the program’s director. After RM-455.2005, the executive can no longer
rely on the board to control the program director. However, the program director
3Decreto Legislativo 657, August 18th, 1991
4We were unable to find a satisfactory explanation of what that status actually entails.
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position is also eliminated in favor of a single position, the executive director. Ac-
cording to the program’s current rules, the FONCODES is controlled by the executive
director, who is appointed by the minister of the MLMDES, who is in turn appointed
by the executive. Initially, the executive exercised political pressure on the program
by appointing the four board members, who in turn oversaw the program director.
Currently, the program director is free from board member pressure, but answers
directly to the minister. In either case, the executive is separated from the program
by a single degree of separation. Given equal proximity to the program’s director,
we believe that the FONCODES has remained susceptible to political manipulation
since its inception, under Fujimori, all the way through Garcia’s second term, two
decades later.
8.3.4 FONCODES as an Appropriate Empirical Test
In part III, our goal is to show that parties distribute resources with an eye on
the returns of each group. We decided to use focus on the FONCODES under APRA
for two main reasons; the FONCODES brand and APRA’s post Fujimori situation.
As for the FONCODES brand, we speak of the program’s size and exposure. If re-
sources delivered are too few, it is unlikely that any party will put the effort towards
manipulating them. The FONCODES, with its established history, is a known brand
in Peru. It contains enough resources to cause the type of impact that would prompt
a party to rally around its resources. Graham and Kane (1998) produce evidence that
higher levels of FONCODES expenditures are associated with significant increases in
support for the executive, which we take to be evidence of the program’s ability to
sway voters.
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As to focusing on APRA, while we do not disagree with prevailing under-
standing that Fujimori manipulated the FONCODES for his gain, we believe that
the Fujimori has shown characteristics that are highly undemocratic and personal-
istic. Here, we are concerned with the application of our theory beyond Peru. The
overall goal of the manuscript has been to introduce the marginal return theory of
politics, which argues that political agents put their resources with an eye on the
greatest possible returns to them. We have focused on political parties as political
agents because we believe them to be staple elements of healthy democracies. Fo-
cusing on Fujimori might bring us a much better understanding of how governments
with an authoritarian vein utilize their resources, but would produce findings that
do not speak directly to how political parties utilize their resources. In part III, we
decided to continue to use PADs as our resources of interest and it makes sense to
continue to focus on political parties as our agents of interest. That way, we continue
to ensure that our findings from either part can inform one another in the most direct
way possible while still addressing different dimensions of the topic.
8.4 Mayoral Races
The final point addressed in this chapter is the level of analysis. In part II,
we focus on the district level for one simple reason: votes are aggregated at the dis-
trict level and that is the level that will ultimately impact the returns of votes. Here
in part III, we are focusing on the returns of resources delivered conditional on the
makeup of the voter group. Not unlike in part II, parties are still concerned with
securing votes. We believe, however, that given the history of Peruvian party poli-
tics in Fujimori and post-Fujimori politics, Peruvian parties are going to invest their
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resources towards rebuilding and reestablishing their party labels. While the goal of
political parties is often to write and execute policy at the national level, much of
party building is done at the local levels. Based on post Fujimori party goals and
considering that much of party building is done at the local level, we decided to focus
on mayoral races.
By electing mayor, a party is able to establish a formal relationship with a
small and more identifiable group of voters. This link is of particular importance
to parties that elect national level legislators through systems of proportional repre-
sentation, an importance that is often overlooked. When national congressmen are
elected from single member districts, they often become the district’s go to politician,
as they are the most identifiable link between the voter and the national government.
Researchers have argued that proportional representation formulas naturally lead to
large size, multi member districts that jeopardize identifiability in two fronts. First,
voters belong to a district that is represented by multiple legislators, none of which is
particularly responsible for any subsection of the district. Identifiability is therefore
hurt because while voters are represented by all legislators, they cannot identify a
single representative to whom they can turn to. In addition, the large size districts
make it difficult for representatives to cover the entire territory they are supposed
to represent. This difficulty translates into less face time with voters throughout the
district, ultimately hurting identifiability (see Blais and Massicotte, 1997 for further
discussion ).
In systems that suffer from this identifiability deficit, such as Peru, mayors
are one of the most readily identifiable representatives of a small and tractable area
and can command a great deal of visibility. Given this heightened role that mayors
enjoy, they can become potent forces in the party rebuilding and grassroots efforts. It
should not go unmentioned that mayors are also executive positions, which come with
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budgets. Identifiability and budget combine themselves into an attractive political
position for a party to hold.
Methodologically, the focus on mayoral races allows us to take full advantage
of information made available by the data. The FONCODES operates through small
projects that aim to improve the local infra-structure. Focusing on provincial or
regional levels would require aggregation of data that would result in losses in preci-
sion.
Overall, when we account for the fact that the FONCODES is designed to
target small districts and that mayors of these districts enjoy a heightened degree
of visibility that political parties are unlikely to disregard, we expect that the party
holding the presidency will take advantage of this design to favor district according
to our theoretical expectations. As such, mayoral races become our level of analysis
for our final empirical test.
8.5 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed why Peru constitutes an appropriate case to
our empirical test. We argued that given the status in which parties emerged from
the Fujimori era, we should expect the delivery of resources to be highly sensitive
to strategic maneuvering. The chapter also introduced our program of choice, the
FONCODES. We argued that the FONCODES is an appropriate program because
of its reach and organization, which lend themselves to be manipulated by parties
with strategic concerns. We concluded the chapter with a discussion of the level of
analysis of the test, mayoral races. Our choice to focus on this level of analysis is
grounded on the identifiability of these offices, a trait that is particularly attractive
to parties looking to solidify their support base.
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The following chapter introduces the data and statistical estimator. It intro-
duces formal hypotheses between variables and discusses the results.
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Chapter 9
Data and Results
9.1 Introduction
This chapter concludes part III of this manuscript. It does so by going over our
variables of interest and formalizing their relationships into hypotheses. A significant
part of our efforts is devoted to translating our general expectations, introduced in
chapter 7, into tests that are free from aggregation fallacies.
The following section begins to sort out our hypothesis by reintroducing our
general expectations.
9.2 Resource Allocation on the Ground: Challenges
of an Empirical Test
In chapter 7, we narrowed our proposed marginal return theory of politics into
three general expectations of resource allocation. Allocation is a function of returns
from three different voter profiles:
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All else equal, partisan voters should receive the least amount of resources.
All else equal, issue voters should receive more resources than partisan voters.
All else equal, consumer voters should receive more resources than either partisan or
issue voters.
The first challenge we face is that we do not know what the proportions of
these voters in each district are. To estimating these proportions, we leverage the
two key elements that combine to shape up these voter profiles: ambivalence and
awareness. In doing so, we must be careful not to commit a fallacy of aggregation.
Ultimately, the three profiles identified in chapter 7 relate to an individual voter.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to collect individual level data to be used in
the manuscript.
While the underpinnings of the theory presented in chapter 7 operate at the
level of the individual, PAD programs usually do not allow parties to directly target
individual voters. More commonly, the distribution of resources is usually aimed at
groups within a district, or districts within the polity. Instead of targeting individual
voters that are of certain sought-after profiles, parties identify and favor districts
whose proportions of those types of voters is high, ignoring districts whose share of
those types of voters is low. Given that the non-exclusivity of PAD resources precludes
a party from proselytizing between consumer, partisan and issue voters, the optimal
strategy is to deliver to districts composed entirely of consumer voters. Absent this
choice, a party should favor districts with the highest proportions of these groups. To
make this test possible, we focus our efforts towards creating proxies of the elements
that combine into these profiles and operate under the assumption that where the
proportion of these elements is highest, the chances that these profiles will appear
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with greater frequency is maximized. 1
As discussed in the previous chapter, we test our expectations by observing
the delivery of FONCODES resources with an eye on mayoral races in Peru.
Data
Peru is divided into 25 regions, which are subdivided into provincias. Each
provincia is itself subdivided into distritos. As of 2003, there are 195 provinces and
1833 distritos (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Informatica). Each distrito directly
elects its own mayor for a four year term. Not every district holds elections during
every election cycle, with between 40 and 70 out of the 1833 districts not holding
mayoral elections. Our data only included districts holding elections in all of the 6
election years examined here. After subtracting districts that failed to hold elections
every cycle, the data set contained 1430 districts.
We operationalized our dependent variable as delivery of FONCODES re-
sources to the district, in ten thousands of Soles. This variable is labeled FONCODES.
While we were able to collect district level data on FONCODES expenditures, there
is still the challenge of timing. Considering we are interested in observing the deliv-
ery of pork that is going to influence the mayoral elections of late November, 2006,
we should attempt to observe the delivery of resources during 2006. Accounting for
FONCODES expenditures for the entire year of 2006 would introduce measurement
error because the Peru Posible party was in charge of FONCODES until June of 2006,
at which point the APRA took charge of the program. To avoid this error, we only
1We recognize that this assumption is not without risk of measurement error, as there is no
guarantee that resources delivered to a district with high concentration of consumer voters will not
actually be consumed by a partisan opposer. While that might be the case, by choosing to target
districts where the concentration of consumer voters is high, a party is actively minimizing the
chance that this resource will be consumed by other profiles.
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account for FONCODES expenditures from June of 2006 on. It is also possible that
resources directed to a given district in late 2006 only make it to the district in early
2007. As projects start to take shape, benefits such as increased employment can al-
ready bring electoral benefits. If this delay is indeed true, we should also observe the
delivery of resources in 2007. Therefore the FONCODES variable is operationalized
as expenditures in the district from June of 2006 to August of 2007.
An important challenge of this study is the operationalization of our main
independent variables of interest: proportions of consumer, partisan and issue voters.
Identifying proportions of profiles requires that we collect individual level data. For
this version of the manuscript, we were unable to collect individual level variables.
While lack of data at the individual level precludes us from directly getting to some of
the expectations of the theory with a high level of detail, we can test the implications
of the theory that are observable at the district level. It is also important to note that
parties themselves by and large do not have access to individual level data and make
their decisions based on aggregate information. It is true that parties have grassroots
operations that afford them more nuanced information about districts, but even these
are not available at the individual level and certainly not for every single district.
Because we don’t know what are the profile proportions of each of the 1833
Peruvian districts, we build our hypotheses by examining how changes in the dimen-
sions that combine themselves into profiles impact the aggregate returns from each
district. By aggregate returns, we speak of the average returns of all members of the
district. If a district is composed of three voters (a partisan, a consumer and an issue
voter), this district should have a smaller aggregate return than a district composed
of three consumer voters. The two main dimensions that combine themselves into the
three profiles are ambivalence and awareness. We know from the theory introduced
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in chapter 7 that partisan voters show low levels of ambivalence.2 Issue voters show
high levels of ambivalence combined with high levels of awareness. Consumer voters
show high levels of ambivalence that are combined with low levels of awareness.
To execute the test, we assume that if we have proxies for these two dimen-
sions, then we can juxtapose FONCODES expenditures against these proxies. As the
values of these dimensions fluctuate, we should expect shifts in the proportions of
voter profiles. For example, as the ambivalence dimension lowers from its highest to
lowest point, we should expect that proportions of partisan voters should increase.
Considering we know that partisan voters have lower returns than the other two pro-
files, we should expect that drops in the levels of ambivalence should be accompanied
with drops in investment. Alternatively, as awareness levels increase, proportions of
consumer voter should decrease, resulting in falling levels of FONCODES expendi-
tures.
These two relationships are anchored on the makeup and return of each of
the three profiles. Consumer voters, whose profile is defined by high ambivalence low
awareness, have the highest returns and therefore are expected to be the choice target
of FONCODES resources.
Consider a district D with a certain proportion of all three profiles of voters.
If information levels in this district rise to a point where all voters attain high aware-
ness levels, then the proportion of partisan voters present in the district will remain
constant, as the partisan profile is independent of awareness levels. The proportion of
issue voters, however, will increase. Issue voters differ from consumer voters only in
their awareness levels. While issue voters show high awareness, consumer voters show
2Partisan voters do not take awareness into account when making their decisions, therefore a low
ambivalence high aware partisan voter is not any different than a low ambivalence low awareness
one
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low awareness. As awareness levels increase, consumer voters turn into issue voters.
The consequence of an increase in levels of awareness is that at best, the district’s
overall return remains constant3. Most likely, the overall returns of the district is
likely to drop, as increases in awareness levels turn consumer voters into issue voters,
whose returns are lower. Given that increases in district levels of awareness tend to
lower a district’s overall returns, we expect a negative relationship between the deliv-
ery of FONCODES resources and the levels of awareness. The following hypothesis
formalizes this relationship.
Hyp1: As awareness levels increase, FONCODES expenditures should decrease.
Let us now reconsider the same district D, with the same proportion of all three
profiles of voters. Instead of increasing the district’s awareness levels, we examine
increases in levels of ambivalence.4 As levels of ambivalence increase, partisan voters
will turn into either consumer voters or issue voters. If ambivalence increases and
awareness levels are kept high, partisan voters will convert into issue voters. As a
consequence of this conversion from partisan to issue voter, the proportion of voters
with the lower returns (partisan voters) will decrease and consequently the district’s
aggregate returns will increase. In the case of increasing levels of ambivalence while
awareness levels are kept low, partisan voters will convert into consumer voters. In
3Constant returns in spite of increased awareness would require that a district would be entirely
made up of partisan voters, who do not take awareness as an input in their decision making process
4An important assumption behind this shift in levels of ambivalence is that those are not fixed.
The assumption of shifting levels is not at all controversial in the case of awareness, as this dimension
pertains to the complexity and availability of information. Given that information related issues do
not depend of the individual, we can easily conceive of scenarios where information characteristics
vary and consequently, so do the levels of awareness. This shifting is not so straight forward in
the case of ambivalence. As discussed in chapter 7, ambivalence speaks to an individual’s ability
to entertain arguments from multiple angles, which could be argued to be an individual trait that
is constant throughout life. If so, variation in ambivalence levels could only be achieved through
population immigration. Here, we simply assume that these levels are not fixed and voters are able
to behave more or less ambivalently. We recognize that this assumption is not without challenges.
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this case, the proportion of voters with the lowest returns is replaced with voter
profiles with the highest returns and the increase in the district’s aggregate returns
is even more pronounced. In either case (high or low levels of awareness), increases
in ambivalence will increase the aggregate returns of the district and therefore should
be met with larger proportions of FONCODES resources. The following hypothesis
formalizes this relationship.
Hyp2: As ambivalence levels increase, FONCODES expenditures should in-
crease.
These are the two hypotheses that speak to FONCODES expenditures given
our district level data. We recognize that resolution is lost when we translate the
model’s theoretical underpinnings to fit our district level data. While the loss is un-
fortunate, collection of individual level data that would allow us to leverage actual
FONCODES expenditures is challenging for any research project, and nearly impossi-
ble for this manuscript. Peru contains 1833 mayoral districts and to collect individual
level data on each one of them is a daunting task. Alternatively, we contemplated
collection of individual level data on a sample of districts. This choice would help
on the individual level front, but would also introduce challenges of its own, mainly
that we would have to discard data on all other districts from where data was not
collected. Ultimately, no clear cut compromise free solution to the problem exists and
we opted to carry the test by leveraging the data we have at hand.
9.3 Variable Operationalization
We have already defined our dependent variable, FONCODES expenditures.
In this section we discuss the operationalization of our two independent variables of
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interest, ambivalence and awareness, as well as other controls that are included in the
model.
To produce a proxy for ambivalence, we start with the belief that ambivalent
voters, who are eager to digest issues from multiple angles are also more likely to
be open to new ideas. This belief is couched on the idea that openness to multiple
angles exposes them to new perspectives and the values that might come with them.
We then assume that a district is made up entirely of ambivalent voters. If such an
assumption were to hold, the entire voter pool would be open to new ideas, making
it a fertile ground for new parties to attempt entry into the political arena. The
other side of this overly receptive district is that because voters would be so receptive
to new ideas, older ideas might be disposed with high frequency. This would mean
that parties currently in contention might be ignored in favor of new parties. As
the assumption fails and ambivalent voters are replaced with non-ambivalent ones,
the fertile ground for new parties that was a product of mostly ambivalent voters
loses more and more of its strength in a rate that is proportional to the level of sub-
stitution5. As a consequence of this substitution, we should see fewer new parties
contesting elections and more parties remaining active within the district. Presum-
ably, as all ambivalent voters are replaced by non-ambivalent ones, we should expect
the district to be entirely made up of partisan supporters. With a 100% partisan
voter pool, no new parties would show up and all current parties would remain with
their vote shares showing little fluctuation.
A consequence of this assumption, and its relaxation, is that the electoral
volatility of the district is directly correlated to the proportion of ambivalent voters
in the district. Based on this correlation, we use the district’s volatility as a proxy
5Or, alternatively, the degree to which the assumption holds.
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for the proportion of ambivalent voters in the district. Larger volatility is associ-
ated with larger proportions of ambivalent voters. To operationalize volatility, we use
Pedersen’s measure of electoral volatility (Pedersen, 1979). To build our volatility
measure, we examine the electoral results from the 1998 and 2002 mayoral elections.
To produce a proxy for awareness, we turn to the meaning of the concept itself.
Awareness speaks to an individual’s ability to process information. We interpret that
ability to be a function of two elements; the complexity and the availability of the in-
formation to be analyzed.6 As for the complexity of the information, for the purposes
of our test we are concerned with a voters’ ability to make ideological distinctions
between contending parties. We focus on making ideological distinctions because we
are interested in how consumer voters convert into issue voters. This transformation
is based on the voter’s capacity to process party issues and issue positioning, thus
directing us towards a focus on ideological distinction. As to the availability of infor-
mation, we are concerned with voter’s access to political information, which she will
use to make electoral choices.
To produce a proxy of awareness that captures the availability dimension, we
calculate the percentage of district households that are wired to the electricity grid.
A considerable amount of a voter’s exposure to electoral information comes from
watching television, listening to the radio or surfing the internet. Populations that
are not wired to the grid have this venue of access to information significantly, if not
entirely cut off from them. We interpret larger proportions of the population with no
access to the electricity grid to mean more restricted access to information, which in
turn means lower awareness levels.
6It is undeniable that an individual’s ability to process information is inherently impacted by
each individual’s intellectual capacity to process that information. However, as per our previous
discussion on the availability of individual level data, we shy away from attempting to produce any
proxies for individual intellectual capacities.
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To produce a proxy that captures the complexity aspect of awareness at the
district level, we conjecture that two parties that are ideologically identical are in-
credibly complex to distinguish, given their similarities. From that, we believe that
a highly complex race (i.e. a race between virtually indistinguishable parties) would
lower voters’ awareness. We collected party manifestos for 99 of the 213 contend-
ing parties in the 2006 mayoral elections. Each manifesto was individually read and
exerts that captured the party’s overall vision for the future and party values were
pasted into a document. These documents, each averaging around 500 words, were
then scored using the WORDFISH automated text analysis technique (Proksch and
Slapin, 2009; Slapin and Proksch, 2008). The technique places documents in a uni-
dimensional scale by using word counts as data. It assumes that word frequencies
are distributed Poisson and utilizes an estimate maximization algorithm to estimate
the positions of each document given two anchor documents.7 The remainder 114
parties whose manifestos we were unable to find are assumed to be ideologically in-
distinguishable from its competitors.8
With the estimates of party positions at hand, we can build a proxy for the
complexity of the electoral information that districts were faced with. The measure
consists of dividing the ideological range of the district by the number of competing
parties. We get the ideological range by calculating the distance between the two most
extreme parties in the race. What we end up with is the average ideological distance
between parties. Shorter distances means that all contending parties are ideologically
7The model is identified by taking two documents that are designated as position anchors. One
document is identified as being to the left of the other document. In our case, we introduced the
APRA (historically a leftist party) as the party to the left of Si Cumple (remnant of Fujimori’s right
wing supporters)
8This assumption is based on the fact that if a party does not file at least the mandatory party
guidelines (ley 26864, article 10 paragraph 11), it is in fact void of any ideological underpinnings
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close together, consequently making it difficult for voters to discern between them.
Conceptually, we are interested in observing the difficulties in making ideological dis-
tinctions between parties. This measure tells us how close together parties are in any
given district. The closer they are, the more difficult it is to tell them apart. Figure
9.1 is a plot of the party positions of all parties that filed a manifesto.
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Figure 9.1: Party Ideological Placement
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Along with our two dependent variables of interest, we introduce a series of
controls that are meant to account for possible alternative explanations as to what
drives the delivery of FONCODES to the districts. We control for population size
and poverty. As to the poverty measure, we operationalize the variable by measuring
literacy levels in the district.9 We also ran alternative models using the FONCODES
supplied measure of poverty. We were unsuccessful in our search to understand what
the program’s official measure actually captured. It consists of 2 factors that would
have to be included as dummies. Because this is the official measure used by the
program, we fear the measure can overpower the estimation and suggest that poverty
is the absolute driver of the program. Such results would lend undue credibility to
the program and very likely subtract from the theory introduced here. Given the ob-
scurity around the measure, we decided to adopt more traditional, less controversial
measures of poverty, such as literacy rates.
Part of the argument being made here is that districts that exhibit certain
patterns will be favored over districts that don’t. The maintenance of these patterns
across elections presupposes that populations remain the same across time, an as-
sumption seldom met. To account for shifts in population, we introduce a variable
labeled migration, which accounts for changes in population due to migration within
Peru. The variable measures the percentage of the district’s population that has
been a permanent resident of the district for a minimum of five years. An alternative
operationalization of this variable measures the percentage of the population whose
mother was a permanent resident at the district at the time of the respondent’s birth.
To account for the employment levels, we introduce a variable labeled Unemploy-
9Alternative measures attempted were the percentage of the households whose water service is not
continuous and the percentage of the households without sewage. While these measures correlate,
they don’t perform as well and were discarded based on overall model fit.
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ment, which measures the percentage of the economically active population that is
unemployed.
We control for APRA’s incentive to target districts that historically were loyal
supporters of the party. We introduce a dummy, named HistSupp that is scored one
if the district was a loyal APRA supporter in the pre Fujimori decade (1980s). These
are the Northern districts in the departments of Piura, La Libertad and Tumbes
(Graham and Kane, 1998). We control for an incentive to target Lima, a district
whose weight draws resources from any party. For the sake of completeness, we also
introduce a dummy for the Southern department of Arequipa, which historically has
shown disproportionate support to candidates running independently (Graham and
Kane, 1998).
We also introduce a series of electoral controls in order to account for other
incentives that might impact a party’s allocation patterns. We control for the party’s
concern with prioritizing districts where races are competitive by calculating margin
of victory between the winner and the runner up.10 Finally, a party might alter its
allocation patterns given how many parties are competing for seats. To account for
this concern we introduce a measure (ENPP:Laakso), operationalized as Laakso and
Taagepera’s 1979 measure for effective number of parties running for a seat in the
previous election. For the sake of completeness, we use a corrected version of the
10It is important to highlight that the competitiveness measure is operationalized as the margin
of victory, meaning this measure is observed after the delivery of resources. While we recognize the
timing issue, we take the margin as a proxy for the level of competitiveness, which we assume parties
in the race have a good grasp on. In other words, parties do not need to wait for election results to
know which races will be competitive and we take the margin of victory as a proxy of that. While
the observed measure is after the delivery of resources, it is a proxy for a concept that materializes
before the delivery.
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Laakso and Taagepera’s measure (ENPP:Golosov), as suggested by Gosolov (2010)11.
See table 9.3 for results of alternative models. See table 9.1 for a summary of the
operationalization of the variables and some alternative operationalizations.
To test the hypotheses, we adopt an OLS. Due to the two ways in which the
awareness variable is operationalized, we run two separate models. Model one uses the
awareness operationalization that is meant to capture the availability of information
dimension. Model two uses the operationalization meant to capture the information
complexity dimension. Table 9.4 includes some descriptive statistics of the variables
used in the model. Table 9.2 contains results for the main models used to test hy-
potheses one and two.
Table 9.1: Variable Operationalization
Variable Operationalization Source
FONCODES
(dept var)
Amount spent in the dis-
trito, in 10,000 Soles
Ministerio de la
Mujer y Desarrollo
Social (MLMDS)
http://www.
foncodes.gob.pe
Continued on Next Page. . .
11We do not report results for the alternative models using Golosov’s correction because the
variable does not outperform the original measure. This operationalization corrects for Laakso and
Taagepera’s unrealistically high scores for certain skewed party share distributions.
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Table 9.1 – Continued
Variable Operationalization Source
Ambivalence Pedersen’s Volatility scores
for the 1998 and 2002 may-
oral elections
Pedersen, 1979
Awareness
Availability Proportion of the district’s
households that are wired to
the grid.
Instituto Nacional
de Estadistica e In-
formatica (INEI).
http://iinei.inei.
gob.pe
Availability Proportion of the district’s
household that list a radio
as their only electricity pow-
ered appliance.
INEI
Complexity Average ideological distance
between competing parties
Slapin and Proksch,
2008
Population Population in the district. INEI
Poverty
Poverty percent of the district’s pop-
ulation that is illiterate.
INEI
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 9.1 – Continued
Variable Operationalization Source
MLMDS FONCODES supplied mea-
sure of poverty, three dum-
mies labeled Q3, Q4 and
Qmp.
MLMDS
Water percent of the district’s
households with access to
treated water.
INEI
Migration
Migration percentage of the popula-
tion that has been a dis-
trict’s resident for at least
five years
INEI
alternative percentage of the popula-
tion whose mother lived in
the district when respon-
dent was born
INEI
HistSupport Dummy scored 1 if dis-
trict is in the departments
of Piura, La Libertad or
Tumbes.
Graham and Kane,
1998
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 9.1 – Continued
Variable Operationalization Source
Lima Dummy scored 1 if district
is in the department of Lima
coded by author
Arequipa Dummy scored 1 if district
is in the department of Are-
quipa
Graham and Kane,
1998
Margin of
Victory
Difference in votes (percent)
between election winner and
first runner up
Oficina Nacional
de Procesos Elec-
torales. http:
//www.onpe.gob.pe
Rural Pop percentage of district’s pop-
ulation living in rural areas
INEI
Employment percentage of economically
active population that has
been unemployed for the
past six weeks
INEI
Continued on Next Page. . .
154
Table 9.1 – Continued
Variable Operationalization Source
Number of Comp Parties
Laakso Inverse of Hirsch Herfingh-
dal score for the competing
parties in the previous elec-
tion
Laakso and
Taagepera, 1979
Golosov Corrected ENPP:Laakso Golosov, 2010
Variables with alternative operationalizations are introduced in bold,
with alternative versions indented
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9.3.1 Results
Table 9.2: Table of Results
Model 1 Model 2
Ambivalence 11.05+ 8.57
(6.70) (6.80)
Awareness
Complexity 6.39∗
(2.67)
Availability −9.09∗
(2.97)
Population 1.38∗ 1.33∗
(0.56) (0.57)
Poverty 31.42∗ 48.18∗
(10.81) (9.87)
No Allocated Proj −29.53∗ −29.90∗
(1.30) (1.31)
Hist Support APRA −3.63 −3.64
(2.29) (2.32)
Lima −1.60 −2.06
(3.89) (3.92)
Arequipa −2.99 −3.47
(2.23) (2.26)
(Intercept) 10.83 2.60
(8.15) (8.11)
N 1430 1430
R2 0.42 0.42
adj. R2 0.42 0.41
Resid. sd 19.46 19.61
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
+ indicates significance at p < 0.1
Results for the two models are found in table 9.2. We do find support for our
two hypotheses, but overall results are mixed. Before we address the actual impact
of the predictors, we will focus our discussion on the evidence for our hypotheses,
starting with model one.
Model one tests the hypotheses with an eye on the availability of information
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Figure 9.2: Correlation Plot for Complete Model (7)
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aspect of awareness (using the access to electricity proxy). The model finds evidence
for both hypotheses. The coefficient for Ambivalence is positive and significant at
the 10% level, while the coefficient for awareness is negative and statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level. As for ambivalence, this means that as ambivalence increases,
more FONCODES resources are funneled into the district. When it comes to aware-
ness, the negative coefficients means that as larger proportions of the population
get more access to information, less FONCODES resources are funneled to the dis-
trict. Alternative model 1, found on table 9.3, attempts to test this relationship with
an alternative measure that more directly speaks to access to information. The al-
ternative proxy is the proportion of district’s households where a radio is the only
electricity powered appliance. This measure more directly captures access to infor-
mation because even in case where households are wired to the grid, we expect that
only having a radio means that access to information from TV ads and internet is
cut. The model is robust to this alternative operationalization. As the proportion of
radio only household increases, we see more FONCODES funds being funneled to the
district. As expected, the relationship is inversed, as more limited access to informa-
tion means lower awareness, which translates into greater proportions of consumer
voters, our profile with the largest returns.
Model two tests our same two hypotheses, but the operationalization of aware-
ness is adapted so to capture the complexity of the information. Results from model
two are mixed. The ambivalence measure, which produced statistically significant
evidence for our ambivalence hypothesis in model one fails to reach statistical sig-
nificance. While the coefficient is not statistically significant, it is in the expected
(positive) direction. The coefficient produces a very similar error in both models (6.7
in model one against 6.8 in model 2), but its actual impact is reduced (from 11.05 in
model 1 to 8.57 in model 2), consequently reducing its z score below the confidence
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interval threshold. The coefficient for awareness is statistically significant at the 5%
level, but in the opposite direction. The positive coefficient suggests that as informa-
tion in a district becomes less complex, fewer FONCODES resources are funneled to
it, which is counter to our theoretical expectations.
A possible explanation to the performance of model two stems from the chal-
lenges of relying on party manifestos in order to locate a party in the political spec-
trum. Latin American party structures have been recognized as atomized and ide-
ologically unanchored (Dix, 1989), lacking the essential characters that composes a
solid party structure comparable to their European counterparts (Coppedge, 1998).
Levitsky and Cameron (2003) have argued that one of Fujimori’s legacies has been
the personification of the Peruvian party system, pushing parties to focus on the
personal and charismatic features of its candidates to secure seats.12. If this is truly
the case, then ideological positions captured by WORDFISH are good on paper, but
do not truly reflect party positions. It is difficult to interpret the meaning of the
positive and statistically significant coefficient without having developed prior theo-
retical expectations. A possible interpretation of these results is that while the scores
produced by WORDFISH do not truly represent the ideological position of the con-
tending parties, candidates might frame their arguments and speeches around those
topics. While these speeches do not necessarily represent their positions, they can
polarize discussions if positions taken by one party are in stark contrast to positions
taken by other parties.13 Polarized discussions usually draw attention to races, which
can have an impact on turn out. If that is the case, than larger distances would
12While the authors make this point, they also show evidence that concerns with rebuilding the
party system are in place, particularly coming from traditional parties such as the APRA and IU.
13Here we must be qualify position taken to mean a position taken at a time when the position
was advantageous, but by no way being a an actual position against which voters can hold parties
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translate into more polarized races and therefore greater party exposure. The APRA
could be delivering resources to these districts as it anticipates that those will be
polarized races that will ultimately draw voters in and consequently increase APRA’s
exposure to them. Delivering resources to districts where voters are tuned into poli-
tics can be an effective way to credit claim. Unfortunately, this explanation is simply
a post-hoc reaction to the findings produce by model two, here we simply entertain
it as an attempt to understand an empirical trend picked up by the model.
It is also important to note that models one and two control for population
size, poverty and electoral incentives to favor or avoid specific districts. Alternative
models that include other controls are available at table 9.3. Alternative model 1
utilizes an alternative proxy for the availability of information (Radio Access Only).
Alternative model 2 replicates table 9.2’s model one but uses the MLMDS’s supplied
measure of poverty (3 dummies). Alternative model 3 introduces a third operational-
ization for the poverty measure (access to treated water). Model four substitutes the
three controls related to incentives to redistribute to specific districts (Lima, Are-
quipa and Hist Support APRA) for other sets of controls. These are Percentage of
Rural population, Employment levels, migration, margin of victory and the number
of competing parties. Alternative model five replicates the alternative model four
but utilizes a second operationalization for migration (5 year resident). Last but not
least, alternative model six tests the data with the full set of controls. It is worth
noting that this model has an overall fit to the data that is poorer than some of other
models, despite being the most parameterized of all models shown. The expectation
is that R2 increases proportionally to the number of covariates added, yet despite this
trend alternative model six still does not fit the data well and therefore we decided
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against using it as our main estimator. Model six’s overall poorer performance can
be the result of multicollinearity.14
9.3.2 Substantive Interpretation
It is important to examine results beyond their statistical significance and ac-
tually focus on their impact on the ground. This subsection concludes the results
discussion by highlighting what the results mean in terms of actual FONCODES
resources. To do so, we take parameters from model 115 and calculate predicted
FONCODES expenditures for an average Peruvian district that is not in Lima, Are-
quipa on any of the three Northern departments that have historically supported
APRA in pre Fujimori times. To calculate these expenditures, we hold poverty and
population constant at their means while changing the values of our two parameters
of interest (ambivalence and awareness16)
We start by calculating expected FONCODES expenditures for awareness.
The mean value for our awareness proxy is 0.55, with standard deviation 0.25. To
illustrate the impact of our variable, we calculate expected expenditures for a district
with awareness value at one standard deviation below the mean (0.30), and then we
recalculate the expected expenditure with awareness at one standard deviation above
its mean (0.80). The expected expenditure for awareness at one SD below its mean
is S$ 230.800. When we increase awareness levels to one deviation above its mean,
14See figure 9.2 for this model’s correlation matrix. VIF scores for some of the covariates reaches
close to 3, which is high but not high enough to suggest parameter instability.
15We decided to focus on model one because this is the only model that produces statistically
significant coefficients for both the awareness and ambivalence proxies.
16The changing of the values for each of the two parameters is done separately, meaning when we
change values of ambivalence, awareness is held at its mean and vice versa.
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expected FONCODES expenditures drop to S$185.300. This negative trend matches
our theoretical expectation. As awareness levels increase, it is likely the consumer
voters are converted into issue voters, thus lowering the overall district return. Lower-
ing of overall returns is, as expected, met with a reduction in the amount of resources
invested. Another way to examine the impact of awareness is to examine the actual
shift in allocated resources in terms of proportions. In this example, a shift of two
standard deviations in the level of awareness results in a 19% drop in investment, a
very large figure.
We repeat this process for our second variable of interest: ambivalence. Am-
bivalence’s mean value in our dataset is 0.77, with standard deviation of 0.09, We
recalculated our expected expenditures, this time with awareness also at its mean of
0.55 and changing ambivalence from one standard deviation below its mean (0.68) to
one standard deviation above it (0.86). At one deviation below, the expected expen-
ditures are S$197.400 . At one deviation above its mean, the expected expenditures
rise to S$217.000. In the case of ambivalence we observe a positive trend, which is
also a match to our theoretical expectations. As ambivalence levels increase, parti-
san voters are likely to convert into either issue or consumer voters. Either one of
the two profiles has higher returns than those of partisan voters and we expect that
the district’s overall returns will increase. Increases in returns should be met with
increases in the amount of resources invested, which is what the data suggests. In
terms of proportion, a two standard deviation increase in the level of ambivalence is
met with an increase in investment of roughly 12%.
It is worth highlighting that these results could actually be more pronounced
because we don’t know what the actual proportions of our profiles of interest looks
like. As awareness levels increase, it is possible that districts made up of largely par-
tisan voters would not observe much change in their district’s overall returns. If that
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is the case, the proxy loses some of its strength. The fact that the proxy is able to
perform despite this bias against it suggests that if we had access to the actual pro-
portions of each of the profiles, the impact of these two parameters discussed above
could be even larger.
9.4 Conclusion
This discussion concludes part III of the manuscript. The goal of part III
was to focus on an important assumption that was first introduced in part II and
relaxed here. The assumption as it was presented in part II was that voters displayed
constant returns to resources delivered to them. In part III, we recognized that this
assumption was unlikely and, empowered by our marginal return theory of politics,
introduced a typology of group returns.
The theory introduced in this chapter relies on a typology of returns for three
distinct profiles of voters. We used a Peruvian poverty alleviation and development
program, the FONCODES, as a case to test hypotheses that formalized expectations
between changes in levels of awareness and ambivalence (the two key components
that make up our three profiles) and changes in expenditure levels.
We find evidence to support our hypotheses. This evidence, however, is not
robust to alternative proxies or reparameterization of models. We attribute this lack
of robustness to the complexity of navigating between individual and aggregate level
data. We also recognize that the complexity of our two concepts of interest; awareness
and ambivalence, puts a significant strain in our ability to carry out the necessary
empirical test. We felt that the theory was worthwhile enough to warrant the pursuit
of an empirical test despite the complex challenges that the empirical aspect of the
research would introduce.
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Overall, despite the findings, we do believe that at a minimum we have found
enough evidence to warrant the continuation of the research carried here. Future
effort should start with securing individual level data that better allows researchers
to estimate the actual proportions of voter profiles in each district. The next chapter
concludes this manuscript with a discussion of the other possibilities of our main the-
ory, the marginal return theory of politics. After briefly discussing other possibilities
for the use our theory, we conclude with a discussion of future research in the veins
of findings produced in parts II and III of this manuscript.
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Table 9.3: Alternative Models
Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3 Alt. 4 Alt. 5 Alt. 6
Ambivalence 11.12+ 8.86 6.56 7.22 7.72 8.91
(6.67) (6.47) (6.54) (6.81) (6.82) (6.87)
Awareness
WiredToGrid −8.7∗ −13.45∗ −6.11 −5.92 −6.55
(2.83) (3.02) (3.48) (3.52) (3.50)
RadioOnly 15.65∗
(3.90)
Population 1.83∗ 1.32∗ 1.98∗ 1.21∗ 1.38∗ 1.31∗
(0.57) (0.57) (0.58) (0.55) (0.53) (0.62)
No Allocated Proj −29.68∗ −26.50∗ −29.95∗ −29.60∗ −29.48∗ −29.33∗
(1.28) (1.72) (1.30) (1.33) (1.33) (1.34)
Hist Support APRA −3.11 −3.11 −3.34 −3.08
(2.28) (2.27) (2.28) (2.37)
Lima −0.81 −3.59 −3.37 −2.47
(3.89) (3.84) (3.87) (4.06)
Arequipa −2.54 −3.05 −3.85 −3.32
(2.23) (2.21) (2.25) (2.33)
Poverty
main 27.22∗ 33.57∗ 28.14∗ 34.87∗
(10.74) (13.25) (12.33) (13.26)
MLMDS q3 −1.19
(3.35)
MLMDS q4 −9.59
(8.11)
MLMDS qMP 7.57∗
(1.98)
NoTreatedWater −0.96
(2.6)
ENPP:Laakso −0.18 −0.18 −0.23
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Migration
Mother Resident −6.83 −7.77
(5.17) (5.42)
5 year resident −7.39
(10.44)
Employment −1.14 −1.92 −1.37
(8.34) (8.35) (8.34)
Margin of Victory 1.73 2.00 3.33
(7.91) (7.91) (8.52)
PercPopRural 5.68 5.36 4.72
(3.22) (3.22) (3.26)
(Intercept) −3.92 15.43 23.11 15.60 15.37 14.90
(8.21) (7.36) (7.91) (9.52) (11.83) (9.86)
adj. R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 9.4: Variable Descriptive Statistics
Variable Min Max Average SD
Variables Of Interest
FONCODES dep var 0 307.6 15.8 26.43
Ambivalence 0.334 0.962 0.776 0.099
Awareness
Availability 0 1 0.551 0.251
Complexity 0 1.71 0.442 0.245
Radio Access Only 0.002 0.867 0.407 0.191
Social Econ.
Population 5.081 13.708 8.478 1.34
Poverty 0.024 0.491 0.176 0.076
Employment 0 0.91 0.056 0.073
Perc Pop Rural 0 0.987 0.518 0.305
Migration
Mother res. 0.223 0.999 0.797 0.164
5 year res. 0.258 0.934 0.807 0.071
Electoral
Margin Of Victory 0.028 0.976 0.092 0.094
No Allocated Proj 0 1 0.514 0.5
Distr w/ History APRA sup 0 1 0.087 0.282
Lima 0 1 0.023 0.151
Arequipa 0 1 0.059 0.237
Effective Number of Parties
ENPP (Golosov) 1.012 10.728 4.013 1.516
ENPP (Laakso) 1.024 10.332 4.456 1.48
Items in italics have alternative operationalizations
Please refer to figure 9.2 to examine how these variables correlate
(casewise).
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Chapter 10
Concluding Remarks
The overall goal of this manuscript has been to introduce a broad theory of po-
litical exchanges, which we termed the marginal return theory of politics. This theory
is couched on the simple yet powerful premise that political agents focus their po-
litical capital in exchanges that give them the highest possible returns, shying away
from exchanges where returns are poor. Here we have taken credit for unearthing
and polishing this theory, but we recognize that the foundational elements that make
up our theory have been present in Political Science, even if hidden, for over half a
century. Evidence of this presence was shown in chapter 2, where our survey of an
extensive literature highlights that a concern with returns is an unstated but preva-
lent issue in politics.
As introduced in chapter 3, our MRTP is powerful but very broad. In its
unabridged version, the theory is too broad to be directly applied and operates more
as a framework. To leverage its potential, this manuscript narrows the theory from
its very broad state in order to explain two dimensions of a complex political phe-
nomenon: the pursuit of votes.
Part II of the manuscript leverages the theory to account for the return of
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actual votes, an examination that is based on the simple premise that while all votes
are the same, they do not add to seats the same way. The main insight from part II
is that different votes have different returns when it comes to their ability to secure
new seats and political agents, in that case political parties, are well aware of these
differences. These parties put noticeable efforts towards ensuring that the votes they
secure advance their goals of ultimately gaining seats. To test the hypotheses that
come out of the narrowed version of the MRTP, we use a cross country data set that
includes six countries in Latin America. We find robust evidence that parties do
indeed seek out votes with the greatest returns, despite the complexity involved in
ascertaining these returns within the multi member district electoral structure that
their host nations adopt.
Part III of the manuscript continues to leverage our broad MRTP. At that
point the manuscript switches its focus away from the vote itself and focuses on the
returns of voters. This focus emerges from an important assumption that is made in
part II: voters all respond equally to resources delivered. In part III we do without
this assumption, theorizing over the returns of three different profiles of voters, termed
partisan, issue and consumer voters. Empowered by a typology of profile returns, we
once again leverage our MRTP to produce expectations about how political parties
invest their resources. To test these expectations, we continue with the choice to use
poverty alleviation and development programs as our resource of choice. However, we
focus on a single case of the Peruvian mayoral races of 2006. We find evidence that
political parties pay attention to the returns of different groups of voters, focusing
their resources in the groups with the largest returns to investment.
Overall, parts II and III provide specific evidence to a broad theory, evidence
which stacks up alongside much of the evidence that has been already produce by lit-
erature that leverages the same concept, even if in less direct terms. The manuscript
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sets out to unearth, polish and test a broad theory of politics. After two separate tests,
we feel we have accomplished just that. We recognize, however, that this manuscript
by no means covers all the angles and possibilities of the theory it introduces. Quite
contrarily, it has only begun to scratch its surface.
In part II, while the robustness of the findings gives us confidence in the
strength of our theory, there is still great room for further research to be carried.
After examining the findings from part II, our attentions were immediately turned to
parliamentary systems. That empirical test focused on presidential systems, which
we felt adds to the robustness of the test. Parliamentary systems force political par-
ties to place even larger a concern on securing legislative seats than do presidential
systems. This heightened concern is a product of the executive’s constant necessity
to rely on a parliamentary majority in the legislative branch. Given this necessity,
we should expect an even more pronounced concern for the returns of votes casted
for legislative seats. Interestingly, some of the most stable parliamentary systems
are found in Europe, a continent where the party system has been quite stable for
roughly sixty years. A heightened sense of need for legislative presence combined with
a very stable party system suggests that holding on to current seats and securing new
ones is an incredibly important and complex task, making it a fertile ground for the
application of the framework developed in part II. In addition to parliamentary sys-
tems, we feel that the framework should be put under the scrutiny of federal systems.
Differences in the strength of federal systems place different importance to seats in
lower and upper houses. While both British and Brazilian legislative branches have
an upper chamber, the capacities of Brazilian senators far outweigh those of their
British counterparts. Given these differences, we should expect that Brazilian parties
will put considerably more efforts towards securing upper house seats than would
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British parties.1 If differences in types of seats will have different returns to political
agents, our MRTP suggests that parties will put their resources in the seats with
highest returns. We can also extend the upper/lower house seat return argument to
gubernatorial and presidential seats. To the extent that overly federal systems em-
power governors over legislative members, we should expect that concomitant races
push parties to prioritize resources towards races with the greatest returns. This is
an avenue of research we feel warrants further attention.
In part III, we have literally only begun to leverage the power of our theory.
As a starting point, research needs to produce more robust evidence. We feel that the
most direct route to such evidence is to procure data that more directly speaks to the
proportions of the three main profiles introduced in chapter 7. Here, the test faced
limitations introduced by incongruencies in the level of analysis. Future research that
is able to circumvent this challenge will shed further light on the findings introduced
here. In addition, part III has an entire research opportunity whose potential we
have only begun to leverage: that of issue voters. In chapter 7 we introduce a ty-
pology of returns to three different groups of voters. The overall argument echoes
that of our marginal return theory of politics, which is that political agents invest
their resources where returns are greatest. The returns of the three groups (partisan,
issue and consumer) were a product of the types of resources that we used in the
tests (PADs). We introduced a profile that was particularly attuned to ideological
positioning, using them as a main parameter in its decision making process. As the
test was conducted here, this profile had lower returns because it is not particularly
responsive to PAD (consumption) resources. Future research can leverage this profile
1We recognize that British upper house members are actually appointed for life. We merely use
the two cases to highlight that different institutional arrangements will impact the value of seats
and, consequently, what parties would do to secure them.
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to extend the theory we introduced. Here, we theorized that issue voters respond to
clear ideological positioning. Strategic parties can harvest the support of issue voters
by showering them with resources they respond to, such as more ideologically charged
speeches, more precise language that facilitates issue positioning and more universal
policy writing.2. If our marginal return theory of politics is correct, parties should
develop portfolios of resources that match the inputs of voters. Here, we have begun
to take steps in testing relationships by focusing on one type of resource. Future
research should focus on the other profiles, examining what parties do to maximize
the returns when they engage in exchanges with each one of the discussed profiles.
It is also important to highlight that the decision to separate this manuscript
into two separate tests, one focusing on vote returns and the other focusing on voter
returns, was mostly dictated by research design concerns. Conducting a single test
that simultaneously accounted for these two dimensions was likely to introduce a
level of complexity that would certainly subtract from the clarity of our findings. In
reality, however, we recognize that a concern for voter and vote returns may in fact
happen simultaneously. That means that a political party might invest its resources
in districts where voters are most responsive to its resources and whose votes are
most likely to deliver new seats. To put it in the return terminology we have used so
far, political parties might invest their resources in high return voters delivering high
return votes. While identifying these voters might be a challenge, we believe that if
such a scenario can in fact be identified, there should be little doubt that they would
naturally become hot targets for party investment. It is intuitive that parties should
favor high return voters casting high return votes, and that they should also avoid low
return voters casting low return votes. It is not as intuitive, however, to understand
2By universal, we mean that parties may choose to shy away from pork barreling legislation that
clearly shows commitment to special groups that are in contrast to ideological stances
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how political agents would react to conflicting scenarios. By conflicting scenarios, we
speak of the possibility of investing resources in high return voters whose votes are
low return; or investing in low return voters whose votes are high return. To elucidate
these conflicts, we need clever theorizing and research design that can combine these
multiple dimensions of return into an overall return rate. In politics, as in life, pos-
sibilities are rarely clear cut and obvious. We believe that parties face these complex
choices more often than they face simple and intuitive ones and putting our efforts in
research that helps elucidate these complex choices is a worthwhile way to advance
the discipline.
As we can see, the manuscript has only begun to scratch the surface of the
potential behind our proposed marginal return theory of politics. In the beginning
2011, the Brazilian legislative chamber begun to take direct action towards overhaul-
ing large segments of its electoral code. Up in the priority list is a concern with
regulating campaign financing, with great consensus around the notion of publicly
funded races. Concern with publicly funded races is by no means confined to Brazil,
being a hot topic in pretty much any democratic race. As campaign funds become
more regulated and transparent, parties may find themselves less able to collect and
spend funds as they please. Part of the goal behind the restricting of how parties
collect and spend their funds is to ultimately produce a leveled playing field between
competing parties. Should this goal be achieved, it would mean that parties will
have similar amounts of funds. If that were the case, making every penny count will
become imperative for political parties that want to do well. When all parties have
the same amount of funds, playing close attention to the return of investments might
make the difference between the winners and the losers. Our marginal return theory
of politics is ripe to become the backbone of a research effort that attempts to make
sense of which strategies are most attractive to parties who are forced to compete in
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publicly financed races. This is just one of many of the facets in which our theory
can be put to use.
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